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Introduction 
This thesis covers a number of related topics in the 
foundations of set theory. Section 1 contains an analysis of 
the paradoxes which SU:~-_BstS a way of looking at the axioms of 
any formalised set theory as to a certain extent legislating how 
'is a member of' and 'set' are to be used. 
In section 2, two other points of view are examined and 
rejected. There are doubtless other views which directly 
contradict the view put forward in section 1, but clearly one cannot 
examine all the different solutions of the paradoxes in anyone 
thesis. The positions examined in section 2 seem to represent 
views that are most opposed to the general tendency of this 
thesis. 
Section 3 consists of a critical examination of Tarski's 
work on the semantic conception of truth for a formalised calculus 
of classes. This section has two aspects. The first is a 
defence of Tarski against some of his critics; the second an 
attack on certain of Tarski's conclusions. 
Section 4 begins where section 3 leaves off. 
it examines Tarski's conclusions about a definition of truth for 
set theory. It contains an analysis of G8del's results on the 
incompleteness of formal systems and is particularly concerned with 
the transference of certain inferences made from G8del's theorem 
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for a formalised arithmetic to a formalised set theory. rrhe 
conclusion of section 4 returns to the theme of section I and 
utilises certain metatheorems recently proved about fonnalised 
set theories. 
Throughout the thesis no one axiom system of set theory is 
presupposed though reference \till be made to several. The 
discussion is of a general nature and can be taken to be about 
any axiom system of set theory rather than some particular one. 
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Section 1 
I 
In this section I shall be concerned with the set-theoretic 
paradoxes. I wish to propose a way of looking at them which, 
if accepted, should alleviate much of the discomforture felt 
by philosophers, lOG~cians and mathematicians when confronted 
by them. I speak of 'a way of l)oking at the paradoxes' 
rather than of 'a solution of the paradoxes' because, as will be 
made clear in the sequel, the way of looking at the paradoxes 
presented here allows of a multiplicity of 'solutions'. 
It should be said here that, although much of the philosophical 
perplexity caused by the existence of the paradoxes may be 
dispelled, there will remain several problems for the mathematician 
and the philosopher, but these problems are not caused by the 
existence of contradictions. They would have arisen even without 
the discovery of the paradoxes. Indeed, there are two distinct 
problems which will remain to be solved: one of them a purely 
technical problem of direct concern to mathematicians only, 
the other a general philosophical problem analogous to the 
philosophical prob~ems aroused by other mathematical and scientific 
theories. 
The former problem is to construct a set-theory which is 
consistent and adequate for the needs of mathematicians working 
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in theories which employ the concept of set. The problem of 
consistency has itself engendered a body of literature and it 
now seems that a proof of consistency for set-theory is 
unlikely to be forthcoming. But this is a technical question; 
it is sufficient for my present purposes to show that the 
problem of consistency would still be present even if there 
were no paradoxes. Certainly, the paradoxes have made the 
problem of consistency more urgent, because they have shown that 
inconsistencies can occur in the least suspected places. But 
the problem of consittency, at least for formal axiomatics, 
exists not because inconsistencies have occurred but because 
they might occur. The adequacy of a set-theory, referred to 
at the beginning of the paragraph, is needed because the 
mathematical theories which employ the concept of set, for 
example, Le,besgue measure and integration theory and the 
theory of real and complex functions which depends on the 
theory of sets of points, employ theorems of set theory. 
The mathe~ttician working in such fields requires the theorems 
of set theory and, therefore, a set-theory which will provide 
him with these theorems. The related problems of the 
consistency and adequacy of set-theory are not then directly 
caused by the existence of the paradoxes and they will remain 
whatever philosophical solution of the paradoxes is offered 
They are essentially mathematical problems and can be solved 
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only by mathematicians; they are only of indirect interest to 
the philosopher because they are not philosophical problems. 
The general philosophical problem, mentioned on the 
previous page relates to the existeuce of sets. It is the 
problem aroused by the question 'Do sets exist?' or 'in what sense 
can sets be said to exist?' rather than the question 'i,'hat 
sets exist?' This is indeed a philosophical question but not 
one which a solution of the paradoxes will answer. The 
paradoxes help to give a partial answer to the question of 
which sets exist but not of whether sets exist. 
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II 
In this chapter I shall state some of those para.doxEis 
with which I shall deal. The paradoxes are all from set-theory 
and, although I shall speak of the other paradoxes, 'heterological ' 
for example, in section 2, I shall not deal with them directly. 
The list is not intended to be exhaustive. I have picked 
out those that I shall discuss in later chapters, but the 
treatment I propose should be capable of extension to other 
paradoxes of set-theory with which I shall not deal in detail, 
the parddox of all grounded classes, for example. 
There remains the difficulty of characterising the paradoxes 
of set-theory. I think that RamseY'sl division of the 
paradoxes into two groups, the logical paradoxes and the 
'epistemological' paradoxes (now generally referred to as 
the 'semantical paradoxes') will be adequate. Perhaps a 
more precise distinction may be made in the light of more 
recent work on semantics and also the distinction, now 
universally accepted, between object-language and meta-language. 
The set-theoretic paradoxes may then be characterised as those 
paradoxes which may be stated in the object-language of 
set-theory. With this characterisation the Berry, Richard 
1. Ramsey, F.P. ''l'he Foundations of Mathematics't in The 
Foundations of 1~thematics and Other Essays, London 1931 
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and Zermelo-KBnig paradoxes fall 'tithin the domain of the 
semantical paradoxes because they each refer to an object-
language as well as to sets. The Skolem-LBwenheim 
'paradox', although a theorem belonging to the meta-theory 
of formal languages, is sometimes listed as a paradox 
along with the above. l Even if this important theorem 
is regarded as a paradox, it will still fall outside the 
scope of this section because it also belongs to the semantic 
2 
category. 
Throughout this section and section2, then, I shall be 
discussing in some detail the following four paradoxes, 
bearing in mind that the procedure I shall advocate may be 
extended to the other paradoxes in the same category. 
1. The Russell Paradox. Consider the set R of all 
those sets that are not members of themselves. If R is 
a member of R then R is not a member of R; if R is not 
a member of R then R is a member of R. Therefore, R is a 
member of R if and only if R is not a member of R. 
Assuming the law of excluded middle it follows that R is a 
member of Rand R is not a member of R. 
2. The Cantor Paradox. Consider C the set of all sets, 
1. See, for examplet E. Beth, The Fotmdations of ~athematica 
Amsterdam, 1959. pp.448-450 
2. This will be discussed further in section 4 of this thesis. 
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and the set UC of all subsets of C. It follows from a 
general theorem of set theory, namely, for any set the cardinal 
number of Us (the set of all subsets of s) is greater than the 
cardinal number of the set s, that the cardinal number of UC 
is greater than the cardinal of C. Sinc@forall x if x is 
a member of UC x is a member of C, UC is a subset of C, it 
follows from another theorem of set-theory that the cardinal 
number of UC is less than or equal to the cardinal number of C. 
Therefore C has a cardinal number greater than or equal to the 
cardinal number of C and the cardinal number of C is also 
less than the cardinal number of UC. 
diction. 
3. The Set of all Cardinals. 
This is a contra-
Consider the set of all 
cardinals. One theorem in set theory states that there 
is no greatest cardinal and another theorem that for any set 
of cardinals among which there is no greatest member the sum 
of the cardinals of the Ket is greater than any cardinal in 
the set. Therefore, the set of all cardinals, which has no 
greatest member, gives a sum which is greater than any of 
the cardinals in the set, i.e. a cardinal greater than any cardinal. 
4. The Burali-Forti Paradox. Consider the set of all 
ordinal numbers arranged in order of magnitude. This set is 
well-ordered. Suppose its ordinal number is ~ • Consider 
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the set of all ordinals up to and including .n. arranged in 
order of magnitude. The ordinal of this set will bea 
.f\.t +1. Now J)., is less than .r)., + 1 • Since the set of 
all ordinals up to and including ~ is an initial segment 
of the set of all ordinals, n.. + 1 is less than or equal to S\. 
This is a contradiction. 
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III 
To understand how the paradoxes have prevented us from 
seeing their solution, it will be necessary to pay more attention 
to the way they are stated in important works on logic or the 
foundations of mathematics and in many of the text-books dealing 
with these subjects. For example, to quote only a few of the 
many different statements of the paradoxes to be found in such 
books: 
"Let w be the class of all those classes which are not 
members of themselves. Then, whatever cl ass x may be, 'x is a 
w' 1s equivalent to 'x is not an x'. Hence, giving to x the 
value w, 'w is a w' is equivalent to 'w is not a w,.l 
"Consider the set of all sets; call it M.,,2 
"Let us suppose that S is the set of all sets,,3 
" •••• the set of all subsets of a set M has a cardinal 
number higher than that of M. 
set of all sets.,,4 
This is a contradiction if M is the 
These four statements or partial statements of the paradoxes 
as well as the statements of the paradoxes as I gave them in the 
previous chapter have helped to conceal, behind the words "consider" 
or "let us suppose" a 'hidden' existential proposition. (A notable 
exception to this indirect concealment occurs in Fraenkel and 
1. B. Russell and A.I{hi tehead, Principia lllathern."ltica, 2nd edt Cambridge 
1927, p.60 
2. S. Kleene, Introduction to J,:etamath.bmatics, Amsterdam, 1952, p.36 
3. IV & M Kneale, '1'he Development of Loe;ic, Oxford, 1962, p.652 
4. H. Curry, Foundations of l'athematical Logic, New York, 196; p.5 
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Bar-Hillel's discussions of the Russell paradox.)l 
A proof that there does not exist a last prime number can, 
if it is formulated in an analogous way, be turned into a 'proof' 
that there are inconsistencies in number theory. For example, 
instead of the phrase 'suppose there exists a last prime number' 
the 'proof' would start .'consider the last prime number, call 
it P'. From 'consider the number P such that P is prime and, 
for all n, if n is greater than P then there exists an x such 
that x~l, xfn and x divides n' it may be deduced that there 
is and there is not a number wluch is prime and greater than P. 
This is a contradiction. 
It can be seen that such a proof would never be accepted 
by mathematicians because the proof has concealed the 
existential assumption that there exists a last prime number. 
It is valid only if there does exist such a number. But that 
there does not exist such a number only follows from the fact 
that a contradiction has been derived from the supposition that 
it does exist. 
Now if the same reasoning is applied to the set of all 
sets or the set of all cardinals, it can be seen that by rewriting 
the offending phrases 'consider the set ••• ' or 'let the set R 
be ••• ' in the proper existential form 'suppose there exists a 
1. A. Fraenkel and Y. Barr-Hillel, Foundations of Set-Theory, 
Amsterdam, 1958, p.6 
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set, S say, such that ••• ' what might be said to follow from 
the resulting inconsi~ency is not that there is some paradox 
that must be removed but that there is no such set as the set 
~. In the following chapters I shall be considering the 
merits of this argument and, also, what qualifications have to 
be put on it, since in the form given above there is much 
oversimplification. 
, 
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IV 
In this chapter I shall show that there are analogies to 
the Russell paradox in established fields of mathematics. 
I shall consider three examples of existence theorems. 
1. There is no last prime number. 
2. There exists a non-enumerable set. ('ro put this in a 
form more analogous to the paradoxes, there does not exist a 
one-to-one correspondence between the set of all sets of 
natural numbers and the set of all natural numbers or a subset 
of them). 
3. There do not exist natural numbers p and q such that 
p/q is equal to the square root of 2. 
Each of these theorems bears a resemblence to the solution 
put forward here to the Russell paradox. In the case of 1. 
there is no difficulty; it is an accepted theorem of number 
theory and has been so at least from the time of Euclid. In 
the case of 2. opinion is still divided. Arguments have been 
proposed, notably by the intuitionist school, for its rejection. 
In the case of 3., although it is an acc~pted theorem of analysis 
all outstanding difficulties have been cleared up only in the 
last century. 
All are analogous to the statement 'there does not exist the 
class of all classes which contain themselves as members.' All 
could be regarded as JUradoxes if we refuse to aocept that they 
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are results established by the use of reductio ad absurdum 
proofs. There seems little more than prejudice which would 
account for the attitude taken with regard to the Russell 
paradox on the one hand and 1., 2. and 3. on the other. 
Admittedly, that there is no such class as the Russell class 
may be surprising but this should be no criterion for 
rejecting that result. To some it may be just as surprising 
that there does exist a class which cannot be put into one-
one corrdspondence with a subset of the natural numbers. 
The discovery that there exist irrational numbers must have 
surprised the Pythagoreans. In these latter cases, however, a 
new fruitful mathematics has come into being. In the first, 
the theory of transfinite cardinals and ordinals; in the 
second the theory of irrational numbers. 
In other words, the discovery of 2. and 3. have altered 
fundamental assumptions held about numbers and sets. We have 
not been content to say here is a paradox but we have been 
prepared to alter our concept of number. l It would seem then 
that we should do the same for the set-theoretical results. 
Y[e should not say here are some paradoxes, but say :bather our 
concept of set must be altered according to the results we have. 
1. 'l.'he Pythagoreans held that lines were made up of an integral 
number of units. This, however, was found to be incompatible 
wi th the consequences of P~'thagoras I s theorem. Instead of introduoing 
the notion of an irrational number, Greek mathenaticians were forced to 
abandon the attempt to identify the realm of number with continuous 
magnitu~es. C. Boyer The Concepts of the Calculus 1949 p.20 
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Vie may view' the paradoxes not as inconsistencies in set-
theory but as part of unfinished proofs that certain existential 
assumptions are false. The argument which, accordine to this 
theory, should be applied in the case where two contradictory 
propositions are both derivable from some assumption, q say, 
is that not-q is provable. This argument, frequently 
employed in mathematics, is simply an example of reductio ad 
absurdum. This view has some precursers. Solutions along 
1 2 these lines have been proposed by D. Bochvar , J.F. Thomson 
and G.H. Von Wright3• 
Bochvar contends that the set-theoretic paradoxes result 
from definitions which include or presuppose existential 
assumptions of an extra-logical character. In particular, 
the axiom schema 
where U is any expression conta.ining the free variables 
xl ,x2 ' •••••• ,xp is responsible for the existence of the Russell 
paradox. The logical system Bochvar constructs is a version of 
elementary logic with variables, not subjected to a type hierarchy 
1. D. Bochvar, "ro the ~uestion of Paradoxes of the :Mathematica1 
Logic and Theory of Sets', Mat.Sbornik 15, 365-384. Known to me through 
the review by Wanda Sxmielew, 1946, Journal of Symbolic LoRic, 11, p.129 
and E. Beth, The Foun~tions of 1~thematics, Amseterdam 1959, p.506 
2. J.F. Thomson. 'On ~ome Paradoxes' pp.104-119 
3. G.H. von Wright, 'The Heterologica1 Paradox', Societas Scientiarum 
Fenniea Commentationes Physico-I.;athematicae XXIV 5, 1960 pp.1-28 
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Xl' x2' •••• , atoms X (x ,X , •••• ,x ) and excluding every n n1 n2 np 
application of the schema (A). This system is shmvn by 
Bochvar to be consistent. Instead of the Russell paradox 
being derivable from this system, it is provable that there 
does not exist the set of all sets which do not belong to 
themselves. More precisely, the sentence 
N(ex2)(xl)(X2(xlh "'xl (xl) is provable. The solution 
that Bochvar proposes seems to depend upon the difference 
between logical assumptions and extra-logical assumptions. 
According to Bochvar the schema (A) is an extra-logifal 
assumption which is responsible for the appearance of the 
paradoxes. Clearly, if he is right in his contention that the 
paradoxes do result from such extra-logical assumptions he needs 
some criterion by which to determine which sentences are of 
logical nature and which extra-logical. The question that 
arises from this is which assumptions are of a purely logical 
character. If there is to be a set-theory at all, there needs 
to be certain axioms in any set-theory from which set-theoretio 
theorems follow. Are these ~~oms of a purely logical nature? 
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It is difficult to seel the set-theory which Bochvar has 
proved to be consistent and what theorems of a generally 
accepted set-theory remain in such a system as Bochvar's. 
What is certain, however, is that Bochvar proved, in his 
system of set-theory at least, that there does not exist 
the set of all sets which are members of themselves. 'l'here 
are in various standard works on logic and set-theory similar 
results. For example, ~uine's system, referred to as 
lvI.L. contains the theorem that there is no such set as the set 
2 
of all sets which do not contain the,,$elves as members, and also 
Fraenkel in Abstract Set Theory in connection with the Burali-forti 
1. The fault is not Bochvar's but mine, because I am dependent upon 
the review by Sxmielew (see note 1 p.13 of this chapter). It is 
clear from that review that Bochvar excludes all existential assumptions 
since he regards them as not belonging to the province of pure logic 
The calculus he constructs, K , is a form of the first-order functional 
calculus with identi ty. 'l'hu~ he proves K to be consi stent whereas 
the extended functional calculus without aOtheory of types is known 
to be inconsistent. K is also a form of the extended predicate 
calculus without the wh81e of the 'extra-logical' part. It is not 
clear on what grounds he rejects these existential assumptions other 
than that they give rise to paradoxes, nor why he labels them extra-
logical. If, as Sxmielew implies, he believes that theorems of 
existential character and the study of the relations of this character 
between things is not proper to logic even when they are expressible 
in logical terms, then what does he say of the existential theorems of 
the first-order functional calculus, (EX)PX~NPX? If these are theorerr~ 
of Ko th~l it remains to show that quantifying with the existential 
quantifier over individual varia.ble is a part of 'pure' logic but 
quantifying over predicates does not belong to 'pure' logic. 
2. W.<i.uine, l'ilathematical Lorde, 1940, pp.128-9 
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antinomy statesl 
'the totality of all ordinals does not constitute a 
set' .1 
But these latter theorems are not regarded by their authors 
2 
as offering a philo 00 phical explanation of the p:l.radoxes. 
Bochvar, on the other hand, does not limit himself to obtaininG 
a theorem which is a consequence of the axioms and rules of 
derivation of a formal calculus only, but contends that the ~~radoxes 
are contradictions resulting from the intrusion of extra-logical 
existential assumptions which are instances of the schema (A)l 
J.F. Thomson3 argues that the 'Barber' paradox, the 
heterological paradox, the Richard paradox and the Russell paradox 
have a common form. He proves the theorem that if S is any set 
and R any relation defined at least on S then no element of S 
has R to all and only those S-elements which do not have R to 
themselves. In itself this is not paradoxical but 'a plain and 
simple logical truth,4 which, hm7ever, provides a foundation on 
which many of the p:l.radoxes are built. 
The answer to the Barber paradox, based upon the theorem 
is that no man exists who shaves all and only those men who do 
1. A. Fraenkel, Abstract Set Theory, AmS'Jerdam 1961, pp.201-2 
2. Fraenkel does not consider that this explains the paradox but 
uses the concept of classes which are not eligible for membership 
rather as an expedient. See his discussion op.cit. p.202. ~uine also 
uses membership-eligibility, op.cit. p.131 
3. J.F. Thomson, op.cit. 
4. ibid. p.104 
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not shave themselves. Indeed, this is the answer which is 
accepted. Yet, the heterological paradox and the Russell 
paradox although based upon the same theorem have not had the 
same conclusion drawn from them. Thomson argues that the 
heterological and Russell paradoxes should be regarded in the 
same light as the Barber and that: 
'a contradiction arises on supposing that there could 
be an adjective which is true of absolutely every adjective 
which is false of itself. Thi~ is, this supposition is 
absurd and must be given up.' 1 
'Formally, this the reasoning that the Russell set is 
a member of itself if and only if it is not a member of itself 
is just the same argument as that of the Barber: so why should 
we not deal with it in just the same way, and say it just shows 
that there is no such set as R? 
The answer is that we should deny that there is such 
a set as R the set which produces the Russell paradox ,.2 
Vihilst I agree, with qualifications,with Thomson on 
these conslusions, the Bchema he gives upon which the paradoxes 
can be based tends to conceal that all the set-theoretic ' 
paradoxes have a common structure, though not that of his schema. 
Certainly the great similarity between the Barber paradox and the 
1. Hid. p.1l2 
2. ibid. p.1l7 
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Russell paradox is brought out very clearly, but the schema is 
no help when we come to the Cantor paradox or the Burali-forti 
paradox. Here it would be necessary to go even deeper to find 
the common proof schema which would show that there is no such 
set as the set of all sets or the set of all ordinals. The 
common schema in all these cases is the theorem from the 
propositional calculus: tp";) (q ... q)\,)",p. Incidentally, 
it is this schema which is used in Thomson's proof of his theorem. 
The main criticism that I have to make of Thomson is that he 
1 does not go far enough. 
2 G.H. von Wright discusses the heterologica~j paradox 
and comes to a similar conclusion, namely, that 'heterological' 
does not name a property which a thing has if and only if it is 
not autological, or, to reformulate this proposition, heterolo~~cal 
is not a property. Since heterological is not a property 
and because the definition of 'heterological' states that x 
is heterological if and only if it is not the case that x has a 
prorerty of which x is a name, it follows tha. t 'heterological' 
is heterological. It does not follow that because 'heterological' 
is heterological, 'heterological' is not heterological, since 
'heterological' is heterological because it is not a property, 
1. Basically, Thomson is showing, thoueh he does not sav 80, 
that Barber, Russell and Grelling paradox have the schema " :, 
(t:x) (y) f(x,y) = ",f(y,y) whilst the negation of this formula is 
provable in the predicate calculus. 
2. G.H. von Wright, op.cito 
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not because it does not ha.ve the property which it names. 
The principal conclusion which von Wright says should be drawn 
is that 'heteroloejcal' is not a property. 
I shall now mention two of his arguments which I shall 
refer to later. Firstly, he considers that objections may be 
made that 'heterological' must still be a property even though 
the modo tollente proof [p :) (q:Aoq)h "p shows that it is not. 
Re maintains that it is necessary to clarify the concept of 
property understood by the objector. For example, it might 
be said that a property is anything which can function as a 
predicate in a true proposition of subject-predicate form. 
Since" 'hexasyllabic' is heterologicBr' expresses a true 
proposition of the subject-predicate form 'heterological' 
must be a property. But the sense of 'property' which 
von Wright understands is the sense implicitly defined by the 
predicate calculus which states '" ~f(x) .... f(x)1 as a 
theorem. It is in this sense that 'heterological' is not 
a property. If it is maintained that 'property' should be 
understood in the objector's sense, then there is no 
contraQiction or paradox because the predications involved would 
not be predications in the sense of the predicate calculus. 
Secondly, he gives an analogy between the heterological 
paradox and the division by 0 in aritpmetic. If for any real 
numbers m, k and 1, ml=mk implied l~k, it could be proved that 5a1, 
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since 0.5=0.7 This contradiction could lead to the 
conclusion that 0 is not a real number. It is more useful, 
however, to admit 0 as a real number than to reject it. 
Instead of rejecting 0 from the class of real numbers, it is 
preferred to say that there is an exception to the proposition 
that for all real number m,k,l, if mk=ml then k=l and the 
proposition is modified accordingly. The proposition becomes, 
for all real numbers m,k,l, if m*O and mk=ml then k=l. 
An; analogy exists between the case of division by 0 
in arithmetic and the case of heterologicality. Von Wright 
contends that if the evidence in favour of calling heterolo,~cal 
a property outweighs the evidence against it (in this case, 
the derivation of a contrdiction from the supposition that it 
is a property), then it could be said that 'for any word x, 
if x is not a name of the property of heterologicality itself, 
then x is heterological if and only if it is not the case that 
x has got a property, of which x is a name. ll 
I shall return to these two arguments later in this 
section. In the next chapter I shall show how similar reasoning 
may be applied to the paradoxes of set-theory, a subject only 
mentioned in passing by von Wright. 
1. G.R. von Wright, op.cit. p.27 
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v 
In this chapter I shall be looking at the paradoxes in 
more detail and showing the implications of viewing them as 
part of reductio ad absurdum proofs. 
In chapter III of this section I maintained that the 
apparent paradoxes were only partial proofs of set-theoretic 
theorems. They served the same function as a contradiction 
in any reductio ad absurdum argument, namely, to negate the 
premise from which the contradiction was derived. 
from the assumption that there exists a class of all classes 
which are not members of themselves, the Russell paradox proves 
that there does not exist such a class. In other words, the 
paradoxes are the penultimate inference steps of theorems. 
In such a manner the paradoxes are removed and 'new' 
theorems take their place in set-theory. The new theorems, 
which replace the four paradoxes taken as examples of the 
paradoxes in general in chapter I of the present section, area 
1) there exists no class R such that, for all x, x is a 
member of R if and only if x is not a member of Xi'~) there 
is no class C such that, for all x, x is a member of C if an,' 
only if x is a class; 3) there is no class S such that, for 
all x, x is a member of S if and only if x is a cardinal number; 
4) there is no ordered class T of all ordinal numbers, ordered 
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according to magnitude. 
Such theorems as these represent gross simplifications of 
what would happen in the case of sl1ch a 'solution' being 
applied; Above, it is applied directly to the 'hidden' 
premises. In practice, however, the implications are far 
more complex. In the case of the Russell paradox, I 
believe a good case can be maintained that no such class 
exists, reasoning on the reductio ad absurdum argument outlined.. 
The other paradoxes require a more subtle treatment because they 
are embeddied rather deeper in set-theory. Al thoueh I have 
not been concerned with any axiomatic or formal system of 
set-theory in this present section and have treated the paradoxes 
and purported solutions as informally as possible, it will 
be necessary to give a more detailed analysis of the Cantor 
paradox and to give the proof of the theorem on which it 
depends. The proof is informal and is not derived from 
any axiom set in particu1ar.1 The proof, and the remarks 
that I shall make on it, should help to answer the question of 
why from the contradiction involved in the Cantor paradox, 
for example, it does not necessarily follow immediately that 
no such class as the class of all classes exists. This 
would seem to contradict what I have said above, but it will 
1. For a treatment of set-theory in an informal manner see 
Sierpinski Cardinal and Ordinal Numbers, Warsaw, 1958 
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be seen that there may be more than one premise involved and 
that the Russell and Cantor paradoxes may not be as independent 
as they seem. 
Cantor's paradox follows from the theorem that for all 
sets X, the cardinal number of X, denoted by ''x", is less than 
the cardinal. number of UX, the set of all subsets of the set 
X. I shall give one proof of this important theorem. For 
the definitions of equality and order amongst the cardinals I 
shall take the following • 
.. 
X .. Y if and only if X'" Y S- Y and Y'" X S Xl. 
o 0 
.. 
2) X < Y if and only if X '" Y <;; Y and fo r all X if X S X then Y ~ X 000 0 
Proof: Each x of X can be associated with txJ of UX (where "{x}" 
denotes the set of which x is the sole member). 
Hence X ",X S UX 
a 
(X being the set of Ul1it subsets of X) 
o 
.... 
By 1) and 2) X < UX or X .. UX 
Suppose X .. UX Le. UXN Xl So X, for some ~ 
I::.t, a 1-1 correspondence, such that to each x & Xl' 
'f (x) "" X" where Xl> is a certain subset of X. 
I 
Let R be the set of all x which are members of XI and 
are not members of 'fJ (x) 
i.e. R' .. tx; x (XI . X ~ ~ (x)1 
1. l)!s not the usual definition of equality between cardinals, 
which is X=Y if and only if X"'Y, but due to the equivalence theorem 
of set-theory, 1) is equi-pollent with it. See A. Faraenkel, Abstract 
Set Theory Amsterdam, 1961, pp.58-78. 
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:Now R' is a sub-class of X 
:. R€ UX 
:. (Ey) ~~(y) =R' • Y€XJ.l 
I 
Now, Y £ ~ (y) if and only if y €. R 
" 
" 
It II 
" 
tI II 
" 
since y € XJ., 
II Y cc {x; X E. JS.. x ~ ~ (x)] 
II y~ \Xl • Yft(y) 
Y £ ~ (y) if and only if Yf ~ (y) 
which is a contradiction. 
Hence, by reductio ad absurdum, X f fiX 
(4) X <. fix 
This theorem provides half the basis of the Cantor 
paradox where the set in question is the class of all classes, 
c. 
a <. uC 
The other half is provided by the fact that, in the case 
of C, UC £ C. (since all members of UC are sets, all members 
of UC are members of C, UC ~ C follows from the definition of 
subset). By (1) and (2) uC ~ a which contradicts (5). 
A less precise statement of Cantor's paradox is that 
obviously the cardinal number of the set of all sets is the 
highest that can exist, yet the theorem proved above shows that 
1 the set of all subset of this set must be greater still. 
1. See, for example, E. Beth, The Foundations of 1,Tathematics 
Amsterdam, 1959, p.484. 
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If, for the moment, the paradoxes and the above theorem 
are forgotten and fresh attention paid to the class of all classes, 
a new relationship may be found between it and the class of all 
its subelasses. On an intuitive level, then, the class of all 
classes does have the largest cardinal number, but, as yet, nothine 
is known of the cardinal number of the class of all its subclasses. 
One would expect that, as its cardinal number cannot be higher 
than the cardinal number of the class of all classes, and, on 
the other hand, as the number of its members cannot be less 
than the number of members of the class of all classes, its 
cardinal number should equal the cardinal number of the class of 
all classes. Continuing to disreeard the above theorem, this 
can be 'proved' as follows. 
Let C be the class of all classes, 
Let UC be the class of all subclasses of 0 
(6) A 1-1 correspondence, L, can be set up between 0 and 
a subclass of C of UC, in this ways 
o 
For each x ~ C let 1 (x) .. {x 1 i.e. the unit class 
consisting of x alone. 
(7) Also, a 1-1 correspondnece,e, can be set up between UC and 
C .. a sub-class of 0, in this wayl 
For each x E. Uc associate x € C 
i.e. tJ (x) .. x 
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(6) and (7) together imply that C ",C S. UC and DC'" esc 
o • 
which implies, by definition (1), that C == uc (e) 
The last result (8) is not surprising. It is very much 
as one ";Quld expect, if the theorem (4) was ignored. Yet, 
(8) is in direct contradiction to (5). In other words, 
(8) and (5) restate Cantor's paradox. To prove (8) a 1-1 
correspondence was established between C* and DC, but accordihg 
to the proof of (4) no such 1-1 correspondence can be established. 
If, for the moment, one accepts (8) then there must be a fallacy 
in the proof of (4). This proof will be more thoroughly 
examined to see how it comes into conflict with (8). 
That part of the proof which used reductio ad absurdum 
reasoning began with the supposi tion that for some ~, UX.., Xl S; X. 
In the proof of (8) a 1-1 correspondence, 0, was established 
by which DC .. C ..,'~.C. It is no longer just a supposition that 
there exists such an X related to UX under a 1-1 correspondence, 
for C* and DC are related by e in exactly this way. The 
contradiction which followed in the proof of (4) should, 
therefore, follow when C is substituted for X and i for f 
in that proof. 
The first step (3) was to let R/ be the class of all x 
which are members of ~ and not members of t (x). In the 
case of the 1-1 correspondence i and the olass C*, this becomes, 
let R / be the class of all x which are members of C* and not 
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members of 9 (x) • 
Using the definition of e (x), this becomesl let 
R'= I. C ,-x; x~ *' xfX}, Now, this clasa R/ia a subclass of 
the class of all classes which are not members of themselves. 
In other words, R; is a suspect class already since it is a certain 
sub-class of the Russell class R. The contradiction which 
follows in (4) is transf6rmed into an argument analogous to the 
argument leading to the Russell paradox by the substitutions 
of C and 9. 
Since R I is a certain sub-class of C, R' E. UC. 
Hence, there exists y such that YGC* and 9 (y)=R' • 
From the definition of 9 (y), yaR' • 
Therefore, y' e (y) if and only if y"R' , hence, if and only 
, , I ' 
1. e. R' R if an d only if R t R 
In the proof of (4) the contradiction led to the rejection 
of the supposition that there could be an equivalence between 
Xl and UX, but it was taken for granted that R' would exist 
in the formulation of (3). If, however, the existence of Rt 
is not assumed, the contradiction could equally well prove that R' 
does not exist. In the case of the class of all classes and the 
1-1 correspondence set up between UC and C*, the supposition that 
there could exist such a correspondence between a subclass of 
a class and the class of all its subclasses is no longer just a 
supposition. 
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I 
'rhe supposition that there exists such an R 
must be rejected if the 1-1 correspondence e is accepted. 
'rhe point I have been makin,; in the detailed analysis 
of the proof of (4) is that the existence of Cantor's paradox 
does not prove that there does not exist a class of all 
classes. 
In the Case of the Russell paradox, I have applied the 
method of reductio ad absurdum directly to the Russell class. 
(The reason for so doing I shall explain later). But with 
Cantor's paradox, the situation is different. For the paradox 
to occur, there must be two classes, the existence of which is 
assUI)jed, namely, the class of all classes (together with the 
class of all its sub-classes) and the class R', the class of 
all those classes which do not belong to themselves and also 
belong to C*. As I have shown, the Cantor paradox occurs 
because the existence of C is incompatible with the existence 
of R'. Therefore, the reductio method could be used to show 
that ~' does not exist. As R' was a suspect class in any 
case (since it was a sub-class of the Russell class) this would 
not be 80 surprising. Two 'new' theorems would then be 
established. Firstly, cr=~ and, secondly, for all classes X 
except the class of all classes X <. IDe, Etnalogous to the treatment 
given to "division by zero in arithmetic. " Again, this leads to 
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complications. In the first place, C=UC may still be 
inconsistent with some other result of set-theory; secondly, 
the supposition that C exists (and hence C=uC) implies the 
rejection of an infinite number of classes. 'l'his latter 
implication follows from the fact that there are an infinite 
number of 1-1 correspondences between DC and subsets of 
C. For exampla, e can be taken to be the 1-1 correspondence 
which associates each x belonging to UC with {xl belonging to c. 
T"t,;~s correspondence el , say, thus establishes an equivalence 
between UC and Cl a subclass of C. The class which then 
corresponds to R' will be the class of all those classes which 
belong to 01 and do not belong to their only member. 
Le. ~ ={x; ix1' 01' tx1 ~ x 1. By the same reasoning as 
was used previously Rl does not exist if C does. Similarly, 
by establishing the correspondence between each x)f UC 
does not exist if C does. By the 1-1 correspondence 
associa ting tttXm with x and with x etc., 
the classes R3, R4, etc. formed analogously to R', can be shown 
not to exist. If so many classes have to be rejected, it may 
be felt that it is the class of all classes which is the root 
of all the trouble and that it should be rejected rather than 
the classes R', Rl , R2, etc. 
Rl , •••• could be rejected. 
, 
Nevertheless, the point is that R , 
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To sUllllIlarise this chapter I although I said in chapter III 
that the paradoxes could be regarded as implying the non-
existence of the sets that give rise to them, to do so would b~ 
to oversimplify' the si tua tion. For the rejection of one set 
may remove the necessity of rejecting another. 
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v 
It might be said that it is a mistake to talk of 
preferring to reject one set rather than another. It might 
be thought that either there is such a set as the set of all 
sets or there is not. We are not free to choose whether a 
particular set exists. We can only discover that such a 
set exists. One might sa:,! that the paradoxes show that no 
such set as the Russell set exists, in the sense that we 
discover that the set does not exist. To talk in this way 
is to talk as though set-theory is a science investigating 
objects open to our inspection, rather as the physical sciences 
investigate the nature and behaviour of physical objects. 
Now abstract set-triliory, as opposed to theories of 
point sets, set o~ natural numbers etc., is, as its 
name suggests, a theory of abstract sets. Its universe of 
discourse is limited to sets. We are speaking in abstract 
set-theory of 'sets' rather than of 'sets of'. It is this 
change from the faI,dliar to the unfamiliar which should make 
us look askance at the view that we are discovering laws of 
how sets behave. 
Certainly, the familiar talk of sets of points or 
natural numbers guides us in how we shall talk of abstract 
sets. For what we want from a set-theory is a ready-made 
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apparatus which will be applicable when we want to discuss 
sets of some particular kind. 
The 'arithmetisation' of analysis is, as \'langl says, 
a misnomer. For, besides the theory of natural numbers, 
Cauchy convergent sequences and Deilicind cuts, in 
terms of either of which the real numbers can be defined, 
need infinite sets of natural numbers for the 'arithmetisation' 
to be carried out completely. ,Vhat is needed, then, is a 
theory of sets which can be applied to natural numbers. 
i.e. a theory which will give the theorems which we need for 
the 'arithmetisation' of analysis when the 'sets' of the 
abstract theory are identified with sets of natural numbers, 
sets of sets of natural numbers, etc. 
Perhaps Wang is wrong insayihg that since real numbers 
can be regarded as sets of rational numbers the 'arithmetisation' 
2 logically calls for a general theory of sets. Vfna tit does 
call for is only a theory of sets of rational numbers or sets 
of sets of such. I can see no logical reason why a general 
theory of abstract sets is needed, although we may feel more 
intellectually satisfied if we have such a theory. Wang's 
theoryZ with a bottom 'layer' of rational numbers would provide 
1. H. \lang, "fhe Formalisation of lIl8.thernaties', in A Survey 
of Iviatherntttical Lode, PekinG' 1963, p.560 
2. ibid. p.561 
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such a theory but even this theory goes beyond what is needed 
for founding analysis on the theory of natural numbers and sets 
of them etc. 
Al though we are not compelled to cons truct an abstract 
set-theory even for a successful reduction of analysis to the 
theory of natural humbers, nevertheless there is no reason 
why we should not do so in order to satisfy our intellectual 
curiosity. Besides, we do not want to construct a new theory 
each time we want to consider sets of another sort; sets of 
pOints, for example, in measure theory. To do so would be 
wasteful if we could find. a theory which would be applicable 
in each case. 
The abstract set-theory that we create as a result is 
founded on what we know from considering such sets as sets of 
natural numbers, sets of points, etc. This knowledge guides 
us;.in our choice of axioms. It does not, however, force us 
to adopt any particular atiom. As long as we choose axioms 
from which we can derive all the theorems that we need for the 
application of set-theory to some universe of discourse, we 
are free to choose what other axioms we like. (Consistency 
of these other axioms being the only limitation, since, 
otherwise the set-theory would have no applications.) 
This will be ma~e clear in section 4. 
If we look at the paradoxes in this light we should not 
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be so puzzled by them. It should be remembered that the 
syntactic paradoxes have occurred only in abstract set-theory 
and no paradoxes have been found when considering sets of 
natural numbers, points etc. In such contexts the known 
,1 2 paradoxes do not threaten, as ~uine and others have noticed, 
since problems raised by 'xex' do not come up. 
'iI'hat Cantor tried to take as an axiom for this new theory 
of abstract sets is the axiom of comprehension in its naive 
form: 
where 'F' is any condition whatever. When the variable y ranges 
over the members of some set, this axiom will not, taken as the 
only axiom of set-theory, give rise to any contradictions;3 in 
other words, as Kreise14 remarks, when we think of the axiom as 
giving the existence of a set whose members are of a particular 
kind. 
It is when the variable is not so restricted that trouble 
occurs. The Russell paradox follows immediately the moment 
we put in the specific condition '~yey'. The problems arise 
when and only when we do not restrict the range of the variable 
toaa particular kind of object. 
1. 'if. ~uine, Set-Theory and its Logic, Cambridge, lViass., 1963 p.5 
2. K. Gadel, 'What is Cantor's Continuum Problem?' American Matherr:atical 
ll'ionthly, vol-54 1947 
3. Ii .~uine, Set Theory and its logic p.37 
4. G.Kreisel, 'Informal Rigour and Completeness Proofs' in Problems in the 
Philosophy of Mathematics, ed. I.Lakatos, Amsterdam, 1967, 1l.14 ~ .... 
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In abstract set-theory we are only interested in giving 
axiom for sets, considered as sets and not of sets of something, 
though the axioms must be interpretable for application as 
sets of something. In abstract set-theory there is only one 
primitive predicate, the membership relation. The axioms that 
we choose will determine the properties of this relation. r1'he 
axioms determine how we are to use the phras(!) 'is a member of'. 
Initially we try to make these axioms tally with accepted uses 
of the phrase 'is a member of' as when we say that the number 
5 is a member of the set of odd numbers or Jones ia a member 
of the class of unemployed. 
In the field of abstract sets we first meet counter-
instances of the axiom of comprehension. It appears that not 
every condition determines a set. For example 'x¢x' does 
not determine a set. There is no set which consists of 
those sets which do not belong to themselves. We cannot carry 
over, without inconsistency, the assumption that every condition 
determines a class of objects that satisfies it from, say, 
the universe of natural numbers or of human beings to the universe 
of abstract sets. 
All that the paradoxes show is that the axiom of comprehension 
cannot be taken as one of the axioms of abstract set-theory. 
It is a situation which is analogous to other situations that 
have occurred in ma thema tics. The creation of imaginary numbers 
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needed axioms which would be in accord wi th the axioms of the 
real numbers and such that the existence of a root of any 
integer was guaranteed by those axioms. It turns out that 
we cannot keep all the axioms of the real numbers, for it 
could be 'proved' that the square root of -1 is both less than 
and greater than O. The axioms of the real numbers do not 
carryover to the universe of complex numbers. 1'he axioms of 
order are rejecte~ 
We are assured by the predicate calculus that there is 
nothing which bears the relation f to everything which doew 
not bear the';relation f to itself, whatever relation f may be. 
i.e. .. (~x)(y) ~ f(y,x) :. tv f(y,y)) is a valid theorem 
of the calculus. So there can be no barber ~ho shaves all 
and only those who do not shave themselves; there can be no 
set which contains all and only those sets which do not contain 
themselves. We discover that we cannot use the phrase 'is 
a member of' in the way we would have liked. The axioms for 
the universe of abstract sets cannot include the comprehension 
axiom. 
It could be argued that we are not forced to give up the 
axiom of comprehension. Instead we could object to the phrase 
'x€.x' • We could argue that this phrase is not meaningful. 
This is what Russell did. The axiom of oomprehension is retained 
in the fom of the axiom of reducibi.lity and thE phrase 'member 
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but we can note here that Wang, who, perhaps more than any 
other log~cian, sympathises with some theory of types, says 
that Russell went needlessly far in maintaining that such 
expressions were meaningless. l Wang's system ~ presents an 
example of a theory where the objects are stratified in types but 
where it turns out that 'x~x' is false and not meaningless. 
If it should be found that Russell's reasons are not 
sufficient for the conclusion that certain phrases are meaningless, 
there rel1'.ain powerful reasons for saying that the axiom of 
comprehension does not hold in the field of abstract nots. 
For whatever relation f may be, we can be sure from the predicate 
calculus alone that there can be nothing in the universe of 
discourse which has that relation to all and only those things 
that do not bear that relation to themselves. In chapter IV I 
mentioned that von Wright regards the predicate calculus as 
defining what a predicate is. To go back to his discussion of 
'heterolog1cal' if we say analogously that there must be such 
a predicate as 'member of' and, at the same time, maintain that 
this predicate is such that there does exist an x such that y€x 
if and only if y~y, then we must be understanding the tem 
'predicate' in a way which is in need of explanation. 
We cannot in constructing a set-theory use the axiom of 
1. H. Wang, 'The Formalisation of Mathematics', p.577 
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comprehension (if v{e regard 'xu:' as meaningful). How are 
we to replace this axiom? Axioms of set existence are needed 
and the obvious candidate has failed. At the beginning of 
this section I said that it would be misleading to speak of there 
being just one solution of the paradoxes; it would be more 
correct to say that there are a multiplicity of different solutions. 
If we were to ask two (classical) mathematicians what a 
real number is we might receive different answers. One might 
say that it was a set of rational numbers, theother that it 
was a set of sequences of rational numbers. It would depend 
on whether they accepted the Dedekind cut construction of the 
real numbers or the Cauchy ccnstruction. We might say that 
both answered the question of what a real number is, that both 
provided a solution to the problem. 
Similarly, there are many axiomatic set-theories, differing 
greatly in the sets that the theories are committed to. Each 
can be regarded as substituting a number of existential axioms 
to replace the axiom of comprehension. There is no sense in 
asking which theory is the 'correct' theory, although we might 
worry that some system seemed inadequate for the applications 
we wish to make of"tt. By the adequacy of a set-theory I mean 
only ttat it guarantees the existence of any set which we need 
when we interpret the objectsof the set-theory as 'sets of'. 
Thus, for example, we would want the intersection of two sets 
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to exi&t and so any set-theory which failed to provide such 
a set would be inade~uate. 
I shall return to the question of the choice of axioms 
in section 4, where I shall discuss further the 'freedom' we 
have in choosing the axioms of set-theory. 
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Section 2 
I 
As mentioned in the previous section, I shall discuss 
Russell's reasons for denying that the phrase 'X~x' is meaningful. 
I do not intend to discuss all of Russell's philosophy of 
mathematics nor even the whole of the doctrine of ramified 
type theory. I shall be concerned on:'y with that part of 
his doctrine which touches on the above problem. 
Russell's first thoughts on the discovery of his paradox 
seemed to be that the axiom of comprehension had to be given up. 
In his letter to E'rege he writes, 
' ••• there is no class of those classes w[uch, each taken 
as a totality, do not belong to themselves. From this I conclude 
that under certain circumstances a definable collection does not 
form a totality. ,1 
This view is also indicated in his first paper on the subject some 
2 four years later. 
By 1908 his view had changed. A paper published that year 
outlined the theory of types in which it became nonsense to talk 
of a class being a member of itself.; The doctrine was embodied 
1. B. Russell, 'Letter to Frege' (1902) in From Freee to Godel 
ed. J. van Heijenoort, Cambridge, liiass. 1961, p.125. 
2. B. Russell, 'On some difficulties in the theory of transfinite 
numbers and order types' Proceedings of the London l.!8.thenn tical Society, 
1907, pp.29-53. 
;. B. Russell, '1!8.thematical Logic as based on the Theory of Types' , 
(1908) in Logic and Knowledge, ed. R. Iv.a.rch, 1956, pp.59-l02 
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in Principia lTathellk'ltical and his reasons for adopting the theory 
of types were given in greater detail. 
In Principia 1,Jathematica classes were considered to be 
logical fictions. Statements about classes could be translated 
into statements about propositional functions. The explana tion 
of what a propositional function is remains very obscure. As 
~uine2 has noticed, quantification over propositional functions 
which Russell allows (the axiom of reducibility asserts the 
existence of certain propositional functions) implies that Russell 
has not rid mathematics of abstract entitie~. As <tuine 
says, Russell has repL~ced a clearer notion by one that is more 
obscure. Russell himself, in his discussion of propositional 
functions, veers from thinking of the function as what ~\line 
would call an open sentence to thinking that it is some kind 
of entity over which we may quantify. 
He speaks of a propositional function being an ambiguity. 
'A function, in fact, is not a definite object .... , it is a mere 
ambigui ty awaiting determination, and in order that it may occur 
significantly it must receive the necessary determination,.3 
But if propositional functions are not definite objects but mere 
ambiguities how can one apply existential and IDliversal quantifiers 
to them? 
L B. Russell and A. Whitehead, Principia };hthematica, Cambridge, 1913 
2. W. Quine, 'Whitehead and the Rise of 1la.thematical Logic' (1941) in 
Selected Lotical Papers, New York, 1966, p.19-22. 
3. B. Russell, Principia ]\Iathematica, p.48 
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Russell's analysis of classes in terms of propositional 
functions provides his solution of the Russell paradox. For 
to ask of a class whether it belongs to itself is to ask whether a 
propositional function is satisfied by the class determined by 
that function. 1 The problem reduces to the problem of whether 
a propositional function can satisfy itself. 
Russell has two arguments to show tha tit cannot. One 
rests on the simple theory of types and the other on the vicious-
circle principle. (That the simple theory of types is lOGically 
independent of the vicious-circle principle was pointed out by 
Gl3del) 2 
The fom.er argument relies on the essential ambiguity of 
the propositional function. In his discussion Russell considers 
the possibility of substitutihg a propositional function for an 
individual in an elementary proposition. The argument is general 
and its conclusion is that propositional functions are divided 
into ranges of significance or types. The reason he Gives 
for sayinJ that (a propositional function cannot meaningfully 
be an argument to an elementary propositional function is that 
a function is not a definite:thing but an ambiguity awaiting 
determination. Consequently it is nonsense to say that 
1. ibid. p.63 
2. IC. Gedel, -'Russell's :Mathematical Logic', in The Philosophy 
of Bertrand Russell, ed. P. Schilpp, La Salle, 1944, p.147. 
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sa tisfies '/J x where both r and p are elementary propositional 
functions. 
This would seem too strong an argument and establishes more 
than Russell desires. If a function is 'a more ambiguity' 
it is difficult to understand how a function can ever be an 
argument. That there are functions of higher type Russell does 
not doubt and does talk of functions as arguments to other 
functions. It is not clear how this can come about if functions 
are not 'definite things'. Nor is it clear, as I have already 
indicated, how these mere ambiguities can be quantified. 
Russell makes the distinction betr.-een the symbol 'I x ' 
and 'I ~ '. The first is what is ambiguously denoted, the 
second that which denotes (ambiguously) its many values. 
We may paraphrase Russell's talk of 'ambiguously denoting' 
and 'ambiguously denoted' in more modern terms. It is clear, 
I think, that Russell's use of 'i x ' corresponds closely to 
the idea of an open sentence or sentence frame (Quine). 
For Russell says that 'By a "propositional function" we mean 
something which contains a variable, and expresses a proposition 
as soon as a value is assigned to x. ,1 There is difficulty, 
however, in trying to make the notion expressed by ¢ 
1. B. Russell, Principia 1~thematica, p.38. 
l-
X clearer. 
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For, in one place Russell says that 'p ~ , is 'a single tlung,l 
, J. .... x' , and, further on in the text, he says that f' is not a definite 
object,.2 Any interpretation of Russell's use of '6 X' is 
almost certain to contradict one of these characteristics. 
~uine asserts that Russell's propositional functions are 
attributes, in the sense that the open sentence 'x has fins' 
determines the attribute of finnedness. 3 But this seems to 
contradict Russell's claim that a propositional function ~ x 
denotes its values.4 For the values of a propositional function 
(according to Russell) are propositions. If '-iulne were right 
then an attribute would denote a set of propositions. In 
speaking of propositional functions denoting, Russell implies 
that they are linguistic entities. It is clear that attributes 
in Quine's sense are not linguistic entities. But if px is not 
an attribute but a linguistic entity which is different from the 
open sentence ~~, which denotes and which is a single, thought not 
definite, thing, there would seem to be no possible interpretation 
which would fit. 
As a result of Russell's obscurity at this point, it is 
hard to evaluate his argument for the conclusion that 'px is a man' 
is nonsense. The argument he does &ive, that in '//£ is a man' nothing 
1. ibid. p.40 2. ibid. p.48 
3. W. Quine, 'On Frege's Way Out', Mind 64,1955 p.146 
4. B. Russell, Principia Mathematica p.40 
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defini te is said to be a man can be applied to another of 
Russell's examples which he gives to illustrate the axiom 
of reducibility. In this example Russell considers '¢~~ 
is a predicate required in a great general' which is a function 
of a function. Since ¢!z is nothing definite, it could 
be argued that nothing definite has been said to be a predicate 
required in a great general. Russell needs more argument to 
show that the first case is meaningless but the second 
meaningful. 
Since functions are divided into different types in such 
a way that function is of a meher type than its arguments it 
turns out that a propositional function cannot be meaningfully 
said to satisfy or not to satisfy itself. It is a special 
case of the more general thesis of the simple theory of 
1 types. 
The second argument that Russell gives for denying that 
a propositional function cannot be meaningfully said to satisfy 
1. Convincing arguments against the theory of types in general 
have been presented by M. Black, 'Russell's Philosophy of Language' 
in The Philoso 7 ,hy of Bertrand Russell pp.232-240 who points out 
a new contradiction and suggests ways of modifying the theory, 
though he regards the modifications as unsatisfactory. That the theory 
of types cannot be presented without contradiction has been argued 
by P. Weiss, 'The Theory of Types', Mind 37, 1928 PP.338-348 and 
F. Fitch, 'Self-Reference in Philosophy' 1tind, 55, 1946 pp.64-73. 
Black's problem has been examined by F. Sommers, 'Types and Ontology' 
Philosophical Review 72 1963, pp.327-263. 
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itself depends on the vicious-circle principle. A 
propositional function Russell claims presupposes its values. 
Again, neither open sentences nor attributes will fit, for 
neither presuppose a totality of propositions which could 
be called the totality of their values. (Expressions of the 
form ~(¢a) are not excluded either by the vicious-circle 
principle or the theory of types. Yet another principle has 
to be invoked to ensure the meaninglessness of this 
expression, namely Russell's theory of the proposition.) 
Russell claims that expressions of the form p(¢x) are meaningless 
since tx presupposes ~a, ¢b, ¢c, etc. Consequently the vicious-
circle principle does not allow ¢(px) to be a value of px since px 
would then presuppose one of its values, i.e. b(~x).'rhis 
argument cannot be properly evaluated until an explication of 
the expression '¢x' is given and in what way it can be said to 
presuppose its values. 
The vicious-circle principle is variously phrased by 
Russell. 'Given any set of objects such that, if we suppose 
the set to have a total, it will contain members which presuppose 
this total, then such a set cannot have a total. ,1 '\fhatever 
involves aal of a collection must not be one of the collection. ,2 
1. B. Russell, Principia lIIathematica, p.37 
2. ibid. 
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'If, provided a certain collection had a total, it would have 
members only definable in terms of that total, then the said 
1 
collection has no total.' GBdel has shown that these three 
2 
statements are not equivalent to each other. There is 
also a vagueness about the first two on account of the words 
'involve' and 'presuppose' which receive no elaboration. 
Although G8del considers that the first two are more plausible 
than the third - he adopts a realist attitude to classes -
it is not clear in what sense an object can be said to involve 
all of a collection, (though, as GBdel points out, a 
description of that object can be said to involve all of a 
collection). The third form of the prihcip1e G8de1 considers 
to be false if classes are considered to be independent of our 
description or construction of them. 3 
Hintikka has a proof that at least one interpretation 
of the principle is insufficient to keep out the contradictions. 
His interpretation is that no definition of a set y should 
include a bound variable which admits y as an argument. 4 Originally 
Hintikka proposed an interpretation of variables occurring in 
formulae mf the predicate calculus in which the variables would 
1. ibid. 
2. K. G8del, 'Russell's :Mathernatical Lo&:ic', p.133. 
3. ibid. p.136 (a further discussion of this point will be 
found in Chapter IV of this section) 
4.· K. Hin~ikka, 'Identity, Variables, and Impredicative Definition', 
Journal of Symbolic Lorde, voL 21, 1956 p.242. Also K. Hintikka, 
'Vicious Circle Principle and the Parado;ces', Journal of Symbolic to ;:i.e 
vo1.22. 1957 p.245. 
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exclude each other. An example he g:i ves is the eeometric 
axiom: 
a) Any two points determine a straight line. 
If this is interpreted as allowiijg the points to coincide 
then a) is false. If, on the other hand, the phrase 'any 
two points' is interpreted as 'any two distinct points' then 
a) is true. As applied to set theory distinctions are made 
between the interpretations that may be given for the quantifiers 
occurring in the axiom of comprehension. The quantifiers may 
be interpreted with various degrees of exclusiveness. The 
axiom of comprehension 
1) (Ey)(x)(x~y ~ F(x» 
may be in terpre ted to mean 
or 
where F'(x) is the same as F(x) except that all expressions of 
the form (tz)K and (z)K occurring in F(x) are transformed into 
(£z)(z,ty.K) and (z)(z,ty.) K) respectively. 2) represents 
Frege's suggestion which ~uine has shown to be inconsistent.1 
Hintikka regards 3) as being the simplest way of carrying Russell's 
1. libre strictly Frege's way out is represented by (fy) (x)txG-Ys (~y.F(JC 
Geach has . found this to be inconsistent with (~X)(EY) xfy. 
See W. ~uine, 'On Frege's Way Out'. 
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vicious-circle principle into set theory since the variable 
y cannot be included in the range of any bound variable in 
It turned out, however, that a set-theory based upon 3) 
would be inconsistent with (ex)(£.y)x.,ty.2 Hintikka sug0;Bsts 
that the quantifiers could receive a still more exclusive 
interpretation whereby the variable x in the axiom of comprehension 
is prevented from coinciding with any of the free variables in 
F' (x) as well as the variable y. Such a cou.rse wOll1d be 
su.icidal for set theory as the definition of unit sets, couples etc. 
would be impossible. The vicious-circle principle in one 
interpretation is insufficient to stop the derivation of the 
paradoxes and, in the more exclusive interpretation, is too 
restrictive to be a basis of Bet theory. 
Wang has questioned Hintikka's approach to the vicious-
circle prinCiple, claiming that it is based on 'a strenuous 
misunderstanding,.3 Wang points out that although the range of 
the variable x does not include y in 3) yet it may include sets 
definable only in terms of y, e.g. the unit class whose only 
member is y. Hintikka 's incons i steney proof demonstrates thi s 
1. K. Hintikka, 'Identity, Variables and Impredicative Definitions' 
p.242. 
2. K. Hintikka, 'Vicious Circle Principle and the Paradoxes'. 
3. H. Wang, 'Ordinal Numbers and Predicative Set Theory', in 
A Surve;r of l"'iathematicCtl Logic, Peking 1963, p.640 
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point nicely, for the contradiction is produced by considering 
a set c defined in terms of two sets a and b - in fact c is the 
set consisting of a and b - as a possible member of both a and 
b. l Whether or not Wang is right in saying that Hintikka' s 
approach is based on a misinterpretation of Russell cannot be 
known because Russell's use of 'involves' and 'presupposes' is 
not made clear. It is more correct to say that both Hintikka 
and \fang have given possible interpretations of the vicious-circle 
principle as formulated by Russell. Wang may convince us that 
his constructivist interpretation is more philosophically 
justifiable but this is not to say that it is what Russell 
intended. 
There are, then, many difficulties in Russell's thesis tl~t 
'x~x' is meaningless. It depends on a chain of reasoning the 
links of which are each open to dispute, even the 'safest' of 
these, the vicious-circle principle itself. Wang, himself in 
sympathy with the constructivist version of the vicious-circle 
principle, claims that Russell has merely stipulated that 'XEX' 
shall be meaningless. 2 
1. K. Hintikka, 'Vicious-Circle and The Paradoxes', p.245. 
2. H. Wang, op.cit. p.641 
- 54 -
II 
I shall nor; consider a more recent solution of the 
paradoxes. This solution is presented by J. '.ruc;;er in 
I trro papers containing major attacks on fonlalism and 
fort1alists. These attacks and the solution proposed have 
to be examined, for if 'fucker is correct then the arguments 
of section I of this thesis are invalid and several points 
tha t I shall make in section 4 contradicted. 
'rhe first of Tucker's papers that I shall consider 
attacks the formalist doctrine and holds that formalism 
is untenable beca..1se formal lancuages cannot be entirely 
separated from informal discourse and because its forr:nl 
concepts are dependent on infor~~l concepts. ?;y a forll1::J.1ist 
Tucker means any loc;ician or ma.thematician who sees any 
special virtue in forITal languiges. I shall deal,i th 
certdn points raised by Tuc':er in his general attack on 
formalism in part III of this section but for the moment 
I shall concentrate on his solution of the paradoxes. 
He contends that formalists have been led astray by 
the paradoxes because they icnore the fact that the paradoxes 
L J. 'rucker, "rhe Fonnalisation of Set-'l'heory', Hind 1963, 
pp.500-518 
J. Tucker, 'Constructivi ty, Consistency and Natural 
La.nguages', Proceedin~'s of the Aristotelian Society: 
1967, pp.145-l6s. 
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occur by the breaking of inforll18,l langua.,;'e rules. 'i'hroughout 
his p::cper he relies on an intuitive or naive notion of set, 
nov[here defining vrhat a set is or [,ti.ving any postulates or 
axioms for it. Accordingly THy criticisms of his arb'Wnents 
will also be on the pre-formal, pre-axioEli:l.tic level. 
AlthouGh I do not believe that we have a c011sistent intuitive 
notion of set I shall pretend throughout tIlis part of the 
thesis tl~t we do have such a notion. 'rucker's solution 
may be r3&arded as a defence of the naive concept of set. 
For if the paradoxes arise solely through the breaking of 
informal lan,SU.3.ce rules then the notion of a set does not 
Mve to be revised in the light of the p8.radoxes (a.s I have 
sug[c;ested in the first section of this thesis) since itt s 
a consistent notion an 1 the paraclT',ces arise only Yvhen 
extraneous languaGe rules are broken. I hope to show, 
:10 wever , that he has not demonstrated that each p2::cadox arises 
from the breaking of an inforElal lan,;uace rule. 
Firstly, it may be noticed that he deals not with 
every paradox but with only a few of them. Although any 
proposed solution of the paradoxes can be illustra.ted only 
by a selection and not by all of them, there is a difference 
between 'l'ucker' s solution and a solution i,hich says, for 
example, that each paradox is caused by violating the 
vicious-circle principle. In the latter case, there is 
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SOIle guide enabling us to see for each parado:..: as it tarns 
up l'lhether it does depend upon a viel-,tian of tilt:: vicious-
ci:ro1e principle. In the former case, however, the rc is 
no such guide. One is told that each parado~;: depends 
upon breai<:ing an informal lc.nGuasse rule, but is ,siven no 
guide to discover \'rlrich informal rule is broken nor how 
it is broken in those Cases he does not discuss. If 
Tucl~er contends th3,t each paraiiox is caused by the neGlect 
of some infornul rule then it is llis job to show the 
rule in each particular case and not just those;; that he 
chooses to illustrate. 'ri.lis does not imply ths.t his 
contention is y,rong but only tha t he has supported it 
inadeQuately. 
I shall now consider the l)aradoxes he does deal with 
and S<10'.[ that in each case he has failed to show that 
they depend upon the violation of sor;ie rule. 
The first parado.[ with w{lich he deal::::; is the Epi;}lenides. 
Al thou,:sh it is not set-theoretic it is apprOl)rii:i,te to consider 
Tucl:er's solution here becaLlse of the corinection he makes 
between this paradox and the Russell paradox. "l'his is 
false' Tucker says is applied only to statements which could 
be false. 'rhis is the rule '.vhich is folloved in informal 
lall{;,'Wlge. The paradox occurs vrhen this requirement is 
icnored and it is pretended that 'this is false' tal~en by 
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itself CQulJ be ei tiler true or f'als e. How it is one "G'litl,J 
to give a rule for inforr!ul lanc:;u -,·C:e ami ,mother to shovi 
tha,t this relle has been broken. Tucke:!.' has t;iven a rule 
it. He says that it is pretended that 'this if false' could 
be either true or false I,hen considered by itself m::d not 
in conjunction with some other st3,tslllent. :aut it is up 
to him to shal'l why it cnn only be pretended tha t 'tlJ is i~ 
false' could either be true or false. In other worJo he 
has to show that' this is false' cannot be either true 
or false when taken by itself. 'l'his he does not do; he 
Llere ly as s erts it. I do not mean to imply that it can..'1ot 
be done, but only that he has not shown it. Certainly 
atteupts hc;.ve been n;ade to show thLd 'this is f""lse' 
cannot be either true or false. For example, Ryle's 
analysis of the paradox in terms of an infinite regTess shows 
just this. Ryle l claims that 'the statement I am now 
making is fa18:3 I is analysable into I the statement I am now 
making, na.;:;ely, the statei.lent I am now making, na.mely •••••••••• 
is false I. (In the form Tucker chooses 'this is false' 
would become 'this, namely, this, namely, •••• is false I .) 
1. G. Ryle 'Heterologicali ty', Analysis, 1961 
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This analysis, if accepted, would show that the sen tG~1Ce 
'this is false' does not express a true or false proposition 
because it does not express a proposition at all. Such 
an analysis would imply that 'this is false' when taken 
by itself could not be either true or false. It would. then 
be breaking an inforIi;al lancuac;e rule to pretend that it could 
be either true or false. .But if we accept the analysis we 
aTe not terapted to break the rule. Tucker's cj,l'gwllent that the 
paradox arises by neglecting an informa.l rule is simply not 
valid, for the rule is not broken if 'this is false' is 
considered to be either true or false. All thn. t has b.cen 
done is to assuJIle a false proposition, namely, the proposition 
tl~.t 'this is false' is either true or false. Once it has 
been shovm that 'this is false' is neither true nor fedse 
then ther'e is no tel!lptation to go on and form tl:e pg.radoJC. 
It seems clear that, whereas Ryle' s analysis does offer a 
possible solution to the paradoxes, Tucker's proposed solution 
is, at best, a hint at WheI'B a solution might be found. 
The first of the set-theoretic paradoxes with which 
'rucker deals is the Russell paradox. He treats it analogously 
to the Epimenides; his discussion of it is even more brief. 
I shall quote it in full: 
'Russel.l's paradox is obtained by breaking the 
rule th::-tt lie say of a class that it is not a member of itself 
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only if there is some way of estaolishinc that it is not a 
member of itself. ,1 
There are two objections to this argament. -'1' .. irstly, 
that as an informal rule it is im?recise a.nd, on one inter-
pretation of it, questionable. Secondly, even if it is accept'3d 
as an infoI'llial rule Tucker has not shown that it is broken in 
formula ting the p::n:'adoxes. 
In one interpret:.1tion of the above rule, which seems 
to ;;,e to be vague because of the imprecise vlOrd 'sa.y', it 
becomes: we assert of a class that it is not a member of 
itself only if there is some way of establishinG thd,t it 
is not a member of its0lf. But this interprdition is not a rule 
vlhich is necessarily broken when the r(l.rado:~ is formulated. 
For it ignores the fact that the paradox in question is 
the outcotle, 'not of asserting thn. t the class of all classes \7hich 
are not members of themselves is not a member of itself, 
but of sunpQsin?: tr.at it is not a merulJer of itself. '1'he rule 
is inapplicable in this interpreta.tion. If the rule is extended 
to cover a,sserting and SUP;)osinC then the rule is que" tiona ble. 
The rule nov! reads in this new interprets. tion: He assert 
or SUPI)ose that a class is not a J;:ember of itself only if there 
1. op.cit. p.510 
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is some way of establishing that it is not a member of itself. 
But this is a rule which is not followed in mathcm::tiics. 
In some mather[,atical arguments, for exam:Qle, a pro}-,osi tion is 
established by supposing th at its neg:j.tion holds. fro est .. ,blish 
th3. t there is no greatest prime nUL'liJer it is supposed or as:31Ulled 
that there is a greatest prime num1:,er. SUPIlosing a pro posi ti on 
is one of the methods of establishing the negation of tInt 
proposi tion. To bring the argument closer to the Russell 
paradox I shall consider the class of all empty classes, i.e., 
the class y such tha t 
(x) xey if and only if (z) z~x. 
One way of proving tha t y~y is to sho:1 tbn, t y is not empty. 
This can be shovrn by the fact that the null class ¢ belongs 
to y. But there is another metilOd of proving tha t y~y closely 
analogous to the method used in the demonstration of a large 
class of set-theoretic p3.radoxes. Thi s method is to sUPi,ose 
that y"'y. Hence, (E:ll) ZE.y ancl tilerefore Y4Y. It is 
concluded that y~y since if y(y then yh. 
In other words, a proposition is sometimes established, 
8l1d perhaps can be established only by SUPi:osint-; its neg:~tion. 
If a proposi tion of mathematics can be established then there 
is no method of establishing its negation (asswning consi:3tency). 
Its negation, hO\'iever, is supposed even though there is no 
method of establishing this negation. Clearly, this interpret;'ltion 
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of the rule is unsatisfactory. Yet wik'1 t 0 ther ill terpre G:ltion 
is TJOssi 'ole? Possibly all inter},ret:ltion could be that 
"'Ie as:o:ert or suppos", tlF_t a class is not a iLomoer of itself 
only if there is so;:;e ':a/ of establishing '.vhether it is a raen;oer 
of itself or it is not a liiemoer of itself. This does not 
rescue the rule. For the generhl rule which seor;lS to be 1Jehincl 
this particular one is that we assert or suppo::e a 
l"rolJosi tion only if there is some way of establishinG' til ,.t 
proposition or its ne3:ltion. Again there are nu::ctheLntical 
:proofs that involve the supposi tioD of a prof,o~ . .:.aon P in 
order to establish NP. But if P can be supposed only if 
NP can be es-tablished or p can be established, and .. p Can 
be established only if p is sup::?osed then we heve coce 
full circle and cannot answer the Question of whether p can 
be supposed. Furthermore, it is common n:a thclln tical 
practice to exru;lin3 the consequences of some supposition, 
e.g., Cantor's continuurnhYliothesis, when there is the 10gi.ca1 
possibili ty tbl1 t neith8r the proposi tion supposed nor its 
negation can be est:lblished. It may be that 'fucker would 
disallow such suppositions but he has prodLc3d no arGuments for 
such 11 oar. 
Turning now to the second. objection that even if the 
rule is accepted then it is not clear how a formulation of the 
paradox breaks the rule, I shall argue that ,]ucktr h::ts not shown 
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that the paradox does break the rule. As vrith the previous 
paradox, the E:pir:,edides, it is one t:.1ine to sta.te a rule, another 
to sho',i that that rule lIas been oro1(en. In the case of the 
Russell paradox, it is not the case that there is no way of 
establishing that the class of all classes is not a member of 
itself. (Here I am ta.kine 'established I to mea.n the sallle 
as 'proved'. As Tucker does not elaborate on what he meana by 
this vague word I may be misinterpreting his arL'Ument, but it 
is difficult to see what else could be meant by 'est.:tblished' 
in such a context.) It .2!ill. be 'estJ.blished' by a normal 
nuthematical procedure. The problem is not the lack of any 
method of establishing a particular proposi tion but that too 
much can be 'established'. Both the proposition that the cl;J,ss 
of all classes which are no"t members of themselves is a member 
of itself and the proposition tlm t the class of all classes which 
are not members of themselves is not a member of itself can 
be 'established'. Of course, the fact that both propositions 
can be proved can be used to show that there is something lo;'ically 
vlrong with both proposi tions. For example, from t he fact 
tha,t both can be proved it mig:lt be deduced that no such class 
as the Russell class exists and thus that the question of whether 
it belongs to itself or not does not arise. l • But thi s argument 
1. See section 1 of this thesis. 
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is not open to Tucker because he bolieves that in forcul9-tine; 
the paradox an informal language rule has been br01\:en, and any 
such conclusion is blocked. 
Gran ted that the totali ty of all classes that are not 
Ii1embers of themselves forms a class, rl'ucl~er has to show how 
his rule is broken by asking if the cbss is not a member of 
itself • This he asserts but does not show. Bnt this is the 
most important 1uestion. It is one which most proposed solutions 
of the Russell paradox have attenpted to ansrler. Russell's 
own solution in terms of the the ory of "type, for eXc1JJlple, is 
designed to show that it is Beaningless to assert of any cbss 
that it is not a Bember of itself and a fortiori it is meaningless 
to assert of the Russell class that it is not a member of itself. 
The many different solutions !lay be said to be just so many different 
ways to ansner the question of why it is meaningless to 
suppose that the class of all classes that are not members 
of themselves is either a rr.ember of itself or not. If any 
of these solutions Viere to be accepted then there would be no 
tempta tion to break the rule. The posi tion i s analoi"~us 
to that created by Ryle's solution of the Epimenides. If 
it is recognised that 'this Ll false' does not express a 
proposi tion \7hen taken by itself, then the:l'e is no temptation 
to ask v!hether it is true or false. If it is recognized that 
it is meaningless to assert that the Russell cl&ss is not a 
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member of itself, then there is no temptation to asl~ y;bether 
it is a member of itself or not. The informal rule in each 
case need not be invoked for it would not be broken. rl'uc~er 
seems unaware th.'"1t he himaelf has not given a solution. 
Furthermore, he has the aJded difficulty of explaining 
why, in the case of some classes it does not break an 
info i:mal rule to ask whether they are members of themselves, and 
in others, the Russell class for exmnple, why it does. To 
ask of the class of all classes v/hich are not members of 
themselves whether or not it is a member of itself seems to me 
to be loCi cally similar to asking of any class whether it is 
a member of itself or not. If we call the predicate from 
which a class is obtained by abs traction the classifying 
predicate, the idea behind Tucker's solution seems to be that 
one must not ask v{hether the class so obtained satisfies its 
classifying predicate. Thus, the predicate 'does not belong 
to itself' collects into a class certain classes, but since this 
is the classifying predicate of that class it must not be asked 
of that class if it satisfies this predicate. But if this 
is the idea behind his solution then the possibility of 
asking of any class whether it is a member of itself is 
ruled out. For in asking this one is asking a question which 
is equivalent to asking whether the class satisfies its 
classifying predicate. 
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For to ask of the class of all unit classes, say, whether 
it is a member of itself is equivalent to asking whether the class 
is itself a unit class. To asle of the class of all finite 
classes whether it is a member of itself is to ask vlhether it is 
a finite class. I do not see how Tucker can draw the line and 
say of one class that it is meaningful to ask if it is a member of 
itself and of another class that it is meaninGless. Russell's 
solution of course was to banish 'member of itself' into the 
realm of meaningless expressions regardless of which class it 
is applied to. 'l'ucker does not intend to do this, for he is 
willing to allow that it is meaningful to ask of some dlasses \7hether 
they are members of themselves, for otherwise there would be no 
problem of applying 'member of itself' to the Russell class because 
there would be no such class. 
In addition, Tucker has the problem of giving the rule 
and showing how it is broken for those paradoxes which closely 
resemble the Russell paradox. I refer to these classes of the 
form: 
and 
Each of these classes give ri se to paradoxes and it is 'rucker's job 
to show why these paradoAes brea.k some informal rule. If he is to 
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maintaiYl his thesis he Luat be able to do just this. It is 
made more difficult by the fact that the class of all empty 
classes, referred to above, bears a striking resembla.nce to 
the paracioxical class y such thc.t Xf:.y if and only if there 
is no z such that XE.Z and ze.x. 1'he only differr,mce 1)et'::een this 
defini tion and the definition of the ChS,3 of all empty 
classes is the addition of 'XEZ'. Wha t informal rule could 
be invoked to stop the application of 'member of itself' to one 
whilst allo-.vin3' it for the 0 cher? 
I do not deny that Tucker is able to deal with these 
paradoxes (and the paradox generated by the class of all 
pounded classes) along the lines that they break informal 
I assert only that it is diffi~Qlt to see 
how they can be so explained. 
I turn to the next set-theoretic Ik1.radox with which Tucker 
deals - the Burali-Forti paradox. He outlines it as a 
consequence of two theorems. Firs tly, there is a theorem whic h 
st:1tes tha t 'the series of all ordinals up to a11d including 
any given ordinal e;,ceeds the given ordinal by one. It 
follows from this theorem t11.:1 t there is no greatest ordinal. 
The other states th)t the series of all ordinals has an ordinal 
number. It follows that there is a Greatest ordinal, namely, 
the ordinal number of the series of all ordinals. The two 
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theorems contradict each other. ,1. 
'rucker then Gives his solution of the rnracLo:;c, t:cacil;i~ 
its forua tion to t(18 orGaldng of info rmal la;IC1.18.,;e rules. 
He points aut th.'1 t the first theorer shoW's tlla t the cl a.ss of 
ordinals is a self-generating class, by which he underst .. wcls 
a class such thc.t \\'hstever group of r.lem~ers is considered, it 
foHm{s by the property of self-generation tl":i.t there is yet 
another Lieli,ber. He arGues th[1 t we cannot 8}J on cs'eneratL1g' 
from such a class since self -genera tion cw only oe a.pplied 
to it by the use of 'more than all' which is a clea.r case of 
breaking a rule of informal 18.l1t,'Ua t;e. 
'fhe difficulty arises when the con~li tiOll thn t the class 
of a.ll ordinals has an ordinal is brouGht in, for it would seem 
that self-generation rlust apply to this ordinal also. .Jut, 
Tuc;,er contends, it is cle~1r tIl t self-Generation c:1nnot apply 
to this ordinal Hi thout breaking an informal rule f,::overning the 
use of the ~,orl 'all', for" when "Vie say aJl we reic.lly m8(;'.n the 
vlhoJJe lot, lie mean there are no more to C01a8. So when vre 
spaak of the claSG of all ordinals we really me:; .. n all of the Iil • 
.Te cannot apply self-6cner"tiol1 to this class because to do so 
would brea':: the rule for this use of 'all'. 
112 
of ',nore than all'. 
1. ibid. p.511 
2. ibid. p.512 
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He does not seem SUl"e ;,-\letller to a1Jllly his conce/c of self-
genera tion to the cla.ss of all ordiYlals or to the ordin3.l 
nwnber of the class of all ordinals. i!'urtLer, ther~, seoms 
some confusion over the theory of ordi~~l nur,bers. lie says 
that 'the series of all ordinals up to a,::-,d includin:;S' an;)' ;"iven 
ordinal exceeds the given ordinal by one.' Yet H is 
not the series that e:{ceeds the Given ordinal "0:/ one but the 
ordi:lal nUl:,oer of tllat series. Ai;uin, this propcrt;y of the 
series 0 f all ordinal nWllbers up to and inc luding a L-i ven 
ordinal th::lt its ordinal nWt:.ber exceeds the tSiven ordinal 
by one is not sufficient to prove that the class of all ordinal 
munbers is a self-generating class in the sense given by 
Tucker. For it is the projJerty of the classes of rationals, 
integers, prime numbers and many other classes thlt given any 
class of them up to and including any KEmber then there e:dst 
yet other members not belonging to the p:1rticular sub-claGs. 
'l'hese lat,:;r classes, however, are not self-Genera.ting, for 
it is not the ca,se th,~t whatever clas3 of them is chosen there 
are other members not included in that class. 'rhe class of 
all rationals, for example, does not yield another rational 
nor included in the class. illlat is needed in addition to 
ensure that the class of ordinals is self-generating is the 
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theoreu! that the orier8d sum of a class of orclinals m,;ol1c; 
which there is no [,Tea,test mell,ber is creater than ccny EleLlb~T 
of ths.t class. 
But these objections r:::ay orlly be IJluddles vlhicl1 'l'uGker 
can cln.rify by a little more precision. '.L'lli re remain much 
greater objections. Firstly, his contention t:1£Lt self-genera,tion 
cannot be applied to the totality ef a self -ce:1era ting ehss 
because it breaks an informal rule for the use of 'all' 
succeeds only in blurrine the distinction between self-
generating classes and ot:10r classes. }'or, if self -genera tiOll 
cannot apply to the totality of the class, it must be apflicable 
to proper sub-classes only. But the definition of a 8elf-
generating class then degener:l,tes into a tautoloGY applicable 
to any class, self-generating or othervrise. For any class, 
there elCists lllembers not included in any proper sub-class. 
lihat, them, is the force of the distinction drawn by the 
definition of a self-cenerating class? All classes mUBt 
become self-generating under rl'uc;~er' s res:triction of the 
applicability of that term to only proper sub-classes. 
Secondly, if, when we say of any class t~1at whatever group 
of its members be considered t:1ere exist other members of 
the class not included in the gro;:p, it ,1ould seem to break 
the inforn:al rule for the use of t.he word 'whatever' if it 
does not cover the class of all members of the class, since 
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'wha.tever' weans 'whatever' and not 'whatever, except'. {(:~t 
this is a conclusion 'fucker is forced to drml by preventinb 
the concept of self -{Sen era tion applying to the totali ty 
of a class. 
If, for the moment, we cccept Tucker's arCll . ment, it 
still leaves man;I questions which it is impem,tivc to 3.n8,."er 
before the paradox is cle3,red up satisfactorily. In ])articul,:,x, 
if he is willing to acce:pt that the ordinal humber of the 
class of all ordinals, exists, which it appears he is, then if 
this ordina.l is denoted by,n , vrha tis to be said of .n. + I? 
Since.o. is the greatest ordinal number then there are only 
two alternJ.tives open to him. l!'irstly, that [\ + I is equa.l 
to or less than t'l. in trhich case there will be furtber contradictions 
arising because no class can be similar to any section of 
itself which thi s would imply (see below). Secondly, that 
n.. + I does not exist. This would seem to be the most likely 
alternative for Tclcker as he says that self-gc':reration cannot 
ap}Jly to.no • But what does it signify to deny existence to 
this 'ordinal nuru ber I, for it is the ordered sum of two ordinal 
numbers, .n. and 1. It is even possible to find set representatives 
of it, nawely, for t\, the set of all ordinal nurnbers arl'anged 
in order of magnitude and for 1 the set consisting of - 1 alone. 
~ + 1 will then be the order type of the ordered sum of these 
two classes. Since the ordered sum of these two classes will 
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be well-ordered, n. + 1 '..-ill be the ordinal of this class. 
IIOVl ca.n existence be denied in this case? 'ruc;~er rJUst 
answer this question before he can be said to hfwe '00 lved' 
the f-.aradox. 
The above argument rests on Tucker's assUlllption that 
theTe is a greatest ordinal, naLlely the ordinal numoer of the 
cla,,:s of all ordinals, which he st"tes as the seco11(l theorem 
of set-theory needed for the construction of the J3urali-Forti. 
But this statement is not the only way in which the par;ldox 
may be expressed. A much lEOre preci se st_:.ter::cnt of the 
paradox would show le ss grounds for supporting 'rucker's thesis 
tha t the paradox is groUl1ried in the misuse of 'all'. For 
example, consider the set of all ordinals arranged in order 
of rr.agni tude and letn. be the ordinal number of this set. 
Consider the set of all ordinals up to and including th.is 
ordinal arranged in order of magnitude, then the ordinal 
of this class will equal S\a + 1. I)roviding it is not 
assumed that.n. is the greatest ordinal nur.,ber, there is no 
danger of misusing 'all' in the sense of TucJ:.er. For .ru 
is only ohe ordinal amongst many and lies somewhere within 
the series of all ordinals and not necessarily dt the end. 
(Analogou~ly, if the continuum hY];lothesis is assmied, then 
then the set of all cardinal numbers up to and including 
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the c[;.rdinal number of the continuwn has a cariinal number 
which lies wi thin the given set of nWJlbers.) :Sut this latter 
set is a section of the set of all ordinal numbers and, by 
a theorem of set-theory its ordinal nwnber will be less than 
or equal to t!1e ordinal number of the whole 3et. 1. e. 
:Jut this contradicts the theorem which SeWS 
that for any ordinal number w, w is less theW VI + 1. In 
this sk .. tement of the paradox, there is no misuse of the Hord 
\ 
'all' in the sense that \"Ie have tried to use it to mean 
'more than all'. rrhe fact tha~ the class of ordinals is self.;) 
generating has not been used. Nowhere in tIll s deL10nstration 
have we relied on the fact that the cbss of all ordinals 
gives ris e to an ordinal not in the class. I twas 8,E;sumed 
that on.. lay son:ewhere wi thin the class. Now:1ere did we use 
as part of the demonostra tion thl. t there was an ordinal lying 
outside of the class of all ordinals. 
Of course, rrucker may still object that although the 
pro.hl9rty of self-generation has not been used explicitly in 
this proof it has been included implicitly by the use of 
tl1e ordinal nUlllber .n. + 1. rrucker wruld no doubt say that 
this 'ordinal number' can only be procl.uced br self-generation 
from the class of all ordimls which h",6 the ordinal .n.. 
Again, he v.ill be confronted with the difficulty of the status 
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of.t\.+ L In the versi on of the pp.rtd.ox th." t I 11:1 ve i~i ven 
;" oove thi s wo uld be the place lEaS t vulnerable to an a'~ tac;c 
;~.long his lines. It \7ould seem tl-J2. t .{'). + 1 has been ::;enernted 
froEl the class of all ordinals up to cU1d includinG" s\, • 
Tucker, clair:line ui,i1ueness for tllis orllinal, Ylo'J.ld deny 
thnt this is a leeitir.:ate move since n. is the only ordinal 
to which self-generation does not apply. Tl1is in turn would 
imply t11:lt S'l.. + 1 does not exist (since if it existed the proof 
of the paradox would proceed lll1barmed) but, as I have arcued 
pre'viously, there is no clel . r Reaning to this assertion L 
It would appear that 1'ucker objects to the self-generation 
of the class of all ordinals up to and including n., but there 
are ways in which the ordinal n. + 1 may be generated, other 
t11an by this process of self-generation. One hilS only to 
consi der the definition of an ordere 1 SWil of tyvO ord.inal nur:~bers 
to see that !\.+ 1 can be gei1erated from other sets th[lll t1:.e 
set of all ordinal numbers. B;r definition.{\ + 1 is the oTtUm 1 
number of t~le ordered sum of the tl'lO represent;J. ti ve sets, 
the set of all ordinal numbers (it must be remembered thi:1.t this 
aSSUliies thJ.t such ~:, set exists, an assumption Tucker is willing 
to allow) and a set consi sting of one roem bel' alone, - 1 say. 
A set-representative of.1'\. + 1 can t,ms be fOLmci which is different 
from the set of all ordinals arranged in order of lilagni tude up 
to and including ru. Provided that the set of all ordinals 
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exists, there seems little reason to deny e:ds"vsnce O~O ttis 
new set DDd b;I cl.efini tion .!).. + I will '08' its ordinal munber. 
To ~ert, in the face of this set, thc"t the:ce is no such 
ordinal as .n. + 1, as Tucker's view ilD.plies, is to n;isLmderst:"nd 
the notion of an ordered sum of two ordered sets. tlis 
argu:wents could only apply if tl,er(~ were just one way of 
generating the ordinal .ru + 1 and that way v:as by self-eene:cation. 
As I have shown, there aTe other viays aDd for the se more explanation 
is needed than he has [;iven. 
Even if 'rucker could show tk1. t there was no such ordinal 
number as .f' .. + 1, there are other ways of stc;,ting the paradox 
which do not depend on this number in any Vlay and do not, as far 
as I can see, depend upon self -genera tion from the class of all 
ordinals. 
Let.n. be the ordinal nUJ:lber of the class of all ordinal 
numbers. Then, by a theorem froffiohe theory of ordinal numbers, 
the class of all ordinal nwnbers, arranged in order of maf,'ni tude, 
less than C\. has the ordinal n.. But this latter class is a 
section of the clas;;: of all ordinal numbers whic]l has the same 
ordinal nill,1ber, .(\. • Now", two classes h<.'1,ve the sante ordinal 
number if and only if they are similar. Therefore, the class 
of all ordinal nill~bers is similar to a section of itself, the 
section consisting of all ordinal numbers le:3s than.n. • 'l'l1is 
contradicts the theorem of set-theory which states that no set 
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can be sildlar to a section of itself. 
Stating the paradoA in this wa~F, there is no use made 
of the self -genera ti ve property- of the class of all ordbals 
explicitly or implicitly. It is not based on the class of all 
ordinals up to and i1:1cl ueling s... but only with the class of 
all ordinals less than .1\. • Tuc;~er h3,9 to shovr, if his thesis 
is to be maint.:1ined, thc.t some infon:nl IcU1["11ag8 rule has been 
broken in such a demonstration of the raradox. So far as I 
can see he will be unable to appeal to either the pro1)erty 
of self-generation or to any suspicious use of 'all'. 
Finally, there is the additional dr:.nvbac'( th .. Lt if 'rucker's 
reasoning is accepted many proofs in mathematics become 
more doubtful. Some mathematical proofs depend on a reductio 
ad absurduJTI which involve classes that cenerate i"embers not 
included in the totality of members of that class. '1'hi8 is 
perhaps easier to see in examples; I shall 6'ive tv/o. 
a) If every class of integers has a least member then 
the principle of rr.athematical induction holds, i.e. if pel) 
and if pen) implies p(n+l) then for all n p(n). Suppose 
the statement a) to be false. Then, every class of integers 
has a least member, pel), pen) implies p(n+l), and there is 
an n such th8.t tV pen) • Let s be the cla.ss of all n such tlut 
.. p(n), then there is a least member of s, m say. mf 1 since p(l). 
Therefore m is Grea.ter than 1. Now, if p(m-l) v:e should be 
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able to deduce p(m), therGfore, ., p(m-l). I.e. m-l is a 
j~,ember of s, but III is the least member of s which is a conc:r:::,lictiol1. 
hence a) holds. 
b) A. sir:ilar mappil!fi of a Vlell-ordered setil onto a subsot 
never relates a L"ember w of -'.i to an ir;-IaCSe which preceded VI in 'J. 
Suppose b) false. Then, there is a mappinG f such tlli1t at 
least one member of W is mapIJed onto an imaCe which precedes 
it in '~{. Let t be the set of all meLlbers of 'Ii which, by the 
mapping f, are related to ima::;es preceding them in -il. Since 
t is a sabset of W t will be well-ordered and have a first 
Llember x. Let f(x)=y. y is less tll.c'1n x. Because f is a 
similar mapping f(y) is less tr.an f(x), Le. y. '1'herefore 
y beloni'Ss to t, but y is less than x and x is the least member 
of t. Since this is a contradiction b) holds. 
In both of the above eJC.:'1.mples use has been m3.'ie of clas~es 
which generate members different from any r.1ember of the totali ty 
of that class. In a) s was such a class and m-l the merr,oer 
generated from it which was different from the to tali ty 
of members. In b) t was such a class and y such a member. 
In both cases the rosu1 ting contradictions were used to negate -
the hypothesis from wrJ.ch they were proved. How does such a 
use of these classes differ from the use ll13.de of the class of 
all ordinals to generate on. + I? If such a use really does break 
an informal rule for the use of 'all', then not only does Tucker 
- 77 -
prEi'vent self-gener3tion beine applied to the class of all 
.ordinals, but also self-gel1er1tion as a~:·pliecl to these classes. 
l'he theorems which a) and b) state can no loncer r"ly on the 
proofs presented allove, since these proofs depend upon a 
Llisuse of 'all' (according to '.!lucker). One consequence of 
'rucker's c.rgument is that accepted TIlather:ntical proofs like the 
a,bove can no lonGer sta.nd. Such proofs arlo often used in 
anal~rsis as well as in set-theory (e.(;. the I,roof of~he theoreili 
that a continuous function in a closed interval is bounded 
and takes every value between the values of the function at its 
end points). Perhaps 'l.'uck,;r believes that these proofs are 
invalid, but it is important to realise t:1ese iuplica tions of 
his arguments. 
I shall conclude DrY objections to 'rucker's Lethod. of solving 
the Burali-Forti paradox oJ observing that it is misleading 
to talk of tl:e Burali-Forti paradox and it is thi s way of 
talking which leads (or rr.isleads) paradox-solvers into thinking 
that there is but one paradox to soibve. In fact, 'the Burali-
Forti paradox' covers a class of differer,t, thOU[9.1 connected, 
t d " t" -r. con ra ~c ~ons. I bave Given abolTe ti"m different st::1tements 
of tb.e par''cdox, one of which Ins the contr'tJ.ictor;:r conclusion 
L ibid, r.l5} 
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that .n. + 1 is le Cd tban or equal to J\., , tllG oL:;eT ti,,} t tlLTe 
is a set y,'hich is sir:lilar to a section of' i t'oelf. 'fhm'e is a 
third, ...-hicl1 'l'ucker secus to concentrate on, tbat, steLuliing 
from the theorem that for any set of ordLlals tho:ce is an 
ordinal greater th3J1 any in the set, st .. ' tes that th 2re is [ill 
ordinal greater tl1~Ul any ordinaL It is only in t;lG last til ,t 
tr"e notion of self-generation is applied to the set of all 
ordinals aDd which can be attacked alone the lines ri'ucker 
sug,~;'e s t s • ConcentratinG only upon this e:cpression of the 
llara J.o x , it would appear th.1.t l:le neslects the first tKO which 
do not involve the r:.oticJl1 of self-[;ellercl.tion Q,;plied to the 
set of all ordir:.a.ls. A solution of the Burali-Forti p:J.radox 
must 'solve' all of the contradictions which arE; referred to by 
that name. 
If T ' l' 1. t . t·· t tl ,as aCreer calms, :L :LS necessary 0 p:Ln-pO:Ln -le 
exact place :l.t which the contr'-Ldiction occurs and then see v;h~t 
lansuage rule has been broken, then it is precisely this v.Thich 
he has failed to do. He has c11o",e11 only one of Irli:.1.ny contradictions 
Y:hich fall under the sallie head and is thus led to pin-pointinc 
self-generation as the cause of the contr:ldiction. A wider 
viev{ of the paradox which would include all tbree expressions 
of it might have prevented this. For, if~e can specif;>r the 
1. ibid, p.153 
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one concept which is essential to allotl the workinG" of the 
raradox and whic;l is Cor.,,'lon to all three forms then tin t concept 
is not self-generatioil but the concept of the set of all o:'''1innls. 
It is this r:hich leads us to talkin(l" abol1t X~ Bur8li..}<'orti 
paradox. By 'the .Jure.li-Forti paradox' we really mea)l any 
paradox which involves this concept and as lonG' as it is 
understood in this way no harm ensues. '1'he Illis take of 
confusing just one paradox wi th a C1;.13S of p'lr'l,do:ces leads to 
such unsatisfa~tory solutions as 'l'uc;;:er's. It is, perhaps, 
the fact tha.t the set of all ordinals enables contradictions 
in a variety of contexts to be dedu.ced that arouses slwpicion 
of the set in question rather tlnn the deductions which ure E1ade 
from it. Only if TLIcker can show that each paradox be lonsing 
to this class relies on a faul ty applicQ. tion of a LW.1G'lJ.3.s·e 
rule can he be said to h:1.ve given a solution of tL.e .Jurali-}'orti 
paradox. It is for a very good reason that logicia.ns lave been 
unhappy about the set of all ordinals. 
'1'l1e next paradox wi th "rhich 'rucr:.er leals illustr8.tes all 
the faults of his discussion of the Bilrali-Forti. This time 
he manaGes to confuse not t.,-o p3.r:.l.doxes belonging to the sallie 
Cla.3S but two altogether different paradoxes. I give his 
discussion in full. 
'There is a theorem to the effect that the cardinal of tile 
set of all sub-sets of a Given sot is createI' than the cardinal 
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one concept which is essential to allow the vforkinG of the 
ruradox and which is COlDmon to all three forms then Un t concept 
is not self-generatioii but the concept of the SGt of all ordinals. 
It is this which leads us to talking about .:0~ Burali-:b'orti 
paradox. By 'the .Jurali-Forti paradox' l[e really mean any 
parado~c which involves this concept i:i,nd as lon,; as it is 
understood in this way no hann ensues. 'l'he mistake of 
confusing just one paradox wi th a class of p'],rcldoxes leaJs to 
such unsatisfa:tory solutions as 'ruc'~er' s. It is, perhaps, 
the fact that the set of all ordinals enables contradictions 
in a variety of contexts to be dediJ.ced that arouses suspicion 
of the set in question rather than the deductions which are made 
from it. Only if Tuc;,:er can show that each paradox be lonCing 
to this class relies on a faulty application of a laJ.1,';t11.'l,£;'e 
rule can he be said to have gi.ven a solution of tl""e 13urali-t'orti 
paradox. It is for a very good reason that lo,;rJ.cians bave been 
unhappy about the set of all or:l.inals. 
The next paradox wi th vrhich 'fucker leals illustrates all 
the faults of his discussion of the Burali-Forti. This time 
he r.unages to confuse not t,IO paradoxes belonv.ng to the same 
eliss but two altogether different paradoxes. I give his 
discussion in full. 
'There is a theorem to the effect tbl,t; the cardinal of the 
set of all sub-sets of a Given set is creater thon the cardinal 
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of the given set. So for any given carJinal there is a 
Greater cardinal. The noti·Jn of a carJin:.ll is self-ge er:.1tin;. 
By applying this rGsul t to the set of all sets Ca.1'l tor 
11Zd alrealJ obtained a contradiction vlhich is isor,lOrllhic wi th 
that obtained later lW Burali-Forti. It is solved in the 
sm;;e way.' 1 
From this paragraph it is necessar,Y to extricn te the two 
paradoxes D.nd see how ~~ell the solutio!l in ten.s of mis-appl,;ing 
the notion of self -genera tion to a to tali ty fi ts each of the 
two cases. 
Firstly, as WaS the case with '1'uc::er'3 treatment of sets 
of ordirc,ls, it should bE: .1oticed tkLt Cantor's theorem - tl1L1.t 
the cardinal nUDber of a c,i ven set is less than the c".rdinal 
nWl1ber of the set of all the sub-sets of tha tEet - does 
not ensure that the notion of car,linal l1ULlber as self-ecmerating 
in the sellse 'ruc' .er uses it. 2 To deduce th:::.t the notion 
of ca.rdina.l nuuber is self-eeneratint'; it is necessa.rJ to -:'WG t,£) 
theorem of set-tlcJry which asserts that for ::.:.ny set of cardinals 
ar.,on,;st which there is no greatest raeHljer there is a cc:.r,iinal 
greater than any cardinal in the set, namely the carJ.inal l11.uuber 
eiven by the S'J.ill of all cardinals in tae set. It is only by 
combinins this theorem i7i th CCU~ t~r.' s the orem that \ie are able to 
------_.-•. _-----------------
1. ibid. p.512 
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is bYe.]" ter tha.l1 L? .. l1J'" ill tIle set. 
Jecondly, only one of t:le 1~:1::,,\~~oX:GS in\To 1 ved in ~:.i s 
discilssion C311 oe said to rol/ on 3el.~'-;3'ener;1tion. 
z;eeL1S inde:r,.1endent of it. It is with t,18 lutter thL1t I (loCll 
first. 
!lot need the notion of cardinal nU~llber at all; it needs only 
the cOnCelJt of one-one corrcspolHlenco. It st;>tGS that the 
set of all sub-sets of a given set cannot be lJiIt in one-
oile corres~)ondence l1i tll any sub-set of that set. hence, 
if S denotes the ;Jet of all sets and lJS the c;et of all i :;8 
subsets, US cannot be l:ut in one-onG corresponlence wi tll an;;' 
Oll the other lund, since US is a sul)j·cct of S, 
DS is in one-one correspondencG with a sub-set of S. 
'1'his is a contracliction. It is orle of t}~e I'<':i,ralo~ws ':ri tll which 
'rucker should be d(3[llin:;. The question tha t ~)resents ib;elf 
is (,hee dOGS the notion of self-Generation enter'? ::8 are 
no lonGer deEilinG' wi th ca.C'clinal mmloer8 but \ti th sets and one-
olle correspondences betY{eon them. Nor h;J.3 the pam.do.;;: been 
rephr:lsecl in terras of sets in such a rrFty tlu t self-gener.ltion 
is still nece::Jsary for a (leiuotion of t, e p:J,radox. Certainly 
the concept of set is self-~3ener3.ting as a ruraphrasing of the 
second paradox involved would show. But the fnc t th,~t the notion 
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of sot is self-Gene1'atinc is not G.1c:t,lied :101'e. 
of all subsets of S is no t anot;1er set difforont frora ,Ln;r 
r:,on;ber of S, nor does the rn.ro.Qox 'prove' t:'lis. It delJeYhls 
on the e1uivalence and the non-01uivalence oftl:is set with 
any suo-set of S, not vii th any member of S. l~eJ:ce the notion 
of self-Generation is L-relevant for the 'iell'.c-tion of this 
rarauox. 
The secon,i paradox does involve the r;otiOl1 of 8elf-
generation and here Tucker's solution is relevant. The 
paradox involves the set of all cardinal l1UIabers. Since 
to 0Dy set of cardirL9.1 l1Uilbers the:ce is a greater cardinal _ 
if, among the set there is a greatGst cardinal, c, then 
the cariiinal of thozet of all sub-sets of a represent,~tive set 
of th"t cardinal c is cre:::terthan any cariiina,l in the 
gi.ven set; if there is no e,Te::1test ca:'Qiml nlllilber in the 
set then the sum set of ti,eile carJinals is {STe,lter tha,n any 
member of the set - there will be a cardinal creater than 
allY cardinal in the set of all cal'iinals. 'l'rJat is, there 
will be a c8r1inal greater than any cardinal, which is absurd. 
'rucker's solution to this raradox, since he says tba tit is 
solved in the same. way as the Burali-Forti would be to maintain 
that an infomal lmlc,''Uace rule has been broken: - the rule 
governing' the use of 'all'. The swue objections apply to 
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this .s,rgument as we.c'e made ag'ainst the solution of the 
Burali-Forti. 
It should be clear that this solution le;:::,ves OJ8n 
LJany import3..'1t questions wldch have to be answered before the 
paraio~{ can 1e said to be solved. For e,~i.lmple, if it is 
correct to talk of the set of all sets a11(1 the set of all 
ca1'1inals 8..'1d also to talk of these sets haviniS' cardinals 
as Tucker seems to imj!ly, wlnt is interesting and raises grave 
problems for his solution is the relationship between these 
c~rdinals and the cardinal of the set of all sub-sets of S 
8.nd the cardinal of the sum of all cardinals. If both Sand 
U::; have cardinals, 'which is the [,Teater or are they eqLL:'J.l? 
.. l1atever answer to this question is g1.V"en, it will conflict 
wi th at least Oi18 theorem from set theory. If the car,-linal 
of US is Ie ss than or equal to the cardinal of S then Cantor's 
theorem is contra,tided; if the car1inal of US is greu.tel' than 
S then the very defidtion of 'G:t'eater' in cardinal mlJaber 
theory must come under revision. Tucker is silent on these 
implications of his solution. A:;ain, if it is admitted that 
for anyone cardinal there is a greater, what is to be said of 
the SUll of all cardinals? For it is not the Cdse that we 
simply use the theorem that for any set of cardinals there is 
a [;-reater ca:rdinal and, bJ applying this theorem to the set 
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of all cardinals, arrive at a con traUi ctiOil. lie can be 
more explicit them t;1is. 'file SULl of all cardiilals will be 
a cardinal greater tll8.n any cardinal, providing that therE: is 
no gI0atest cardinal. '.'hat relationship holds between this 
cardinal (e1ual to the SWll of all cardinals)' and any cardinal? 
Tucker's solution implies that it is le.~s tluln or equal 
to SOf,le cardin:;,l in the set of all Ck1.rdinnls. But this imillies 
in turn th3.c the theorem of set-theory which says that the sum 
of any set of cardinals amonb'st which there is no c,reatest 
member is ::;rea ter than an;)" in the set. He has not removed 
the parada .. : "out shifted it so that other theorems of set-theory 
become paradoxical. If there were a createst ca.rdinal then 
of course there would not be a p3.radox involved. in the notion 
of the set of all cardinals bLl.t t~lcre would be a par2.dox 
produced by Cantor 1 s t;leorem. It is from Cantor's theorem 
that both the lk'1radoxes under di scussion sprinc. If there 
were some set - the set of all sets, say - which had the 
highest ca'dinal number then the cardinal number equal to the 
sum of all cardinal nmnbers 'l"TC)uld again be the greatest cardinal. 
But cO.n it be deduced that there is a grea.test cardinal? 
Cantor's theorem says there is no CTeatest cardinal. 
So it should be Vii th t~lis theorem th:1. t Tucl~er should be concerned 
since it is fundar:1en tal to the cons tructi 011 of the two paradoxes. 
- 85 -
As I have made clear above the notion of self-ceneration ,nd 
its limitations is of no help in this context. 
There are a:doraa tic set-theories, and in particular <i"line' s 
';(ew Foundation', in ·which Cantor's theorem is not forthcoming.l 
In this axiomatisation there is a set - the universal set -
v[hich is equi valen t to the set of all its sub-sets. \[orkiuc; 
in this set-theory, there v/Ould be a set of hichest card.inality 
and consequently no problem over the set of all carlinal numbers. 
But the fact tl1a. t there is a set-theory vrhicn provides a set 
of greatest cardinality in no rray supports Tucker's contention 
tbat there is a greatest cardinal number. There is no 
primarily philosophic motive behind-iuine's system ocher than 
to effect a simplification and clarification of the theory of 
types in terms of stratified and unstratified formulae. It is 
a sUGGested axiom system among otr,ers. It has not been 
constructed from allY conviction that the universal set must 
be a set of hichest cardinality. ~uine' s axiom system does 
not then support Tucker's thesis that there is a sec the cardil19.1 
of which is t,-rea ter than any other cardinal. The difference 
between the bro positions is between what a theory says to be so 
1. if.~uine, 'New ]!'oundations for I,;athematical LoGi.c', in From 
a Logical Point of View, Cambridse, I.!a::.os, 1953. 
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and what is claimed to be so. 
The difficulty would be more apparent if 'l'ncker -!ncklnd 
the ta.s:!;: of axiom at is in,,; his set-theory so til t one could :Jee 
from exactl:i what assamptions he deduces such theore);ls tk.t siB. te, 
for example, that the set of all ordinals arrangerl in order of 
mac;nitude has the createst ordinal nU1:.ber. One could then see 
wl'd.ch theorems of classical settheory remained anJ. measure 
how adequate the theory was for the tasks a.sked of it anJ. wbetller 
there was some way of reconciling, for eX:!llnple, Cantor I s theorem 
y;i th the theorel,1 that there is a Grea tes t cardinal number. 
Until such an a.:domatised systelil is cOl';structed it will be irapossible 
to judge the success of the solutions proposed by 'rucker. 
It is possible, honever, (and this I have attempte(l to do) to 
sho.: ~'!here the main difi.±cul ties lie and why the solution 
appears unsatisfactoI"J and in some Cases irrelevant. 
I shall nOVi consider 'l'ucker's arguments concerning the 
iiagonal argument and impred.icative definitions. According to 
'rucker impredicative definitions do not cause the p:3.rad.ox8s 
for 'the sole causes of the contn:!.dictions are those already 
mentioned' •1 However, cerbin uses of imlJredicati vc tlefini tions 
occur in invalid arGuments, not because they are imllredicative 
-----------------------------------------------------------"-----
1. Tucker, OPe ci t. p.514 
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but because the argwilents involving them are invalid. 
AS an e:G:uaj.ile of such an invalid ar::;tlLlent lI'uc;~er takes the 
diagonal argument contending t:~at the use of iupredicative 
lefini tions to establish th'l,t the set of all ,;ets of natural 
numbers cannot be put in on8-one correspondence,;i t~1 the set 
of all natural numbers involves an in.-alid argwnent. I!'urtllerlllOre, 
he n.ainca :ns, the diagonal arS'Ulllent crm be reformulated in 
such a lray trl<1.t the Ut:e of irupredica tive d.efini tions is 
unnecessary. 
'rhe proof of the non-denumerabili ty of the set of all 
natural numbers that Tucker wishes to show cont[]ins an inv(11icl 
f " 1 argument is taken rom liang. 
' ••• suppose that; the set of all sets of positive integers 
is denumcrQ,ble. '1:hen each positive integer hus its cor"esponding 
set and each positive inte ,er eit .er is or is not a member of 
its corres?onding set. Cons ider the set l; of all t 110 se 
positive inteGers vihich are not I,lelll;,Jen; oft;heir corresponding 
sets. Is n the positive inteGer vihose co crelate is H a member 
of II or not? If it is a men;1)c;l' of N then by the condition 
of Ii,emoer:ship of :i.J it is not a member of }.. If it is nota 
member of lJ, then by the same condition it is a member of N. 
1. Hao ".fane, 'l"ormalisation of lhtlwmatics', Journ:cl of 
S,yubo lie Lo,r::ic, 1954, p. 246. 
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';3.11,~~ thinks that these contradictions p:cove that the l,r-:miss 
is false and. concludes that there is no such one-one 
correlation. ,1 
'i'ucicer continues :,~S c,rrrument: 
I:~O~-{ this argurlient is isomorphic wi tll the LeteroloG'ical 
family of raradoxes. :b'or His the set of all those rosi ti ve 
inte(:;,ers which are not members of their correIa ting sets, 
c1nd in order to be a mel1ber of l-J a positive integer must 
already be cor_,-elated with a set. N is a second-order set 
rrhich is parasitic for its members on other first-order sets. 
• •• "is n a member of N?" could only be 3.1:SI';ered in the affirm3. ti ve 
or the neGative if n were already assie,l1ed to some set other 
than N. But this would be contrury to the condition that it 
is assi,sned to N and only to iii. '1'he ar,sument turns on the 
brea;,:inb" of this rule and is therefore invalid. ,2 
'J:'here are two points to be made wi th reSl)ect to this 
Firstly, the use of 'already' which occurs tvrice in 
the abo'l8 quotation, and, secondly, the u~e of 'first-order' 
cU1d 's econd-orier' • \o'na tis the force of the wore1 'alrea.dy'? 
Presunably, tha t the set N' is not one of the sets of posi tive 
integers in the enumeration. .Jut since, by hy!,.'othesis, the 
1. Tucker, op.cit. p.515 
2. ibii, pp.515-5l6 
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emmeration is of 2.11 sets of p,)sitiv8 intecers atld L is a 
set of posi ti ve inteGers, N nill occur some',;he:L'e in t:;e 
el1umerc~, tion. So it is not the case the.;; t:1e1U0:stion 
'Is n a member of N?' can only be answered if n is a:;sii:::ned. 
to SO;;le set other th3.n ~J. Tile enumeration is of 0,11 sets 
of posi ti ve integers and IJ will be one such. T,1C~;,er' s 
argument would be more to the point if he were supportinG a 
radical constructivist view which demands tba t a definition 
describes a construction involving the creation of some new 
enti ty which carmot be assumed to exist independently of the 
construction. This is the constructivist argument 8.(:rdnst 
impredicative iefinitioi1s which 'dang nas discussing in the 
paper ci ted. l But no such scruples activate Tu.cke1', for he 
says: 'If :":npreJicative definitions o,1'e needed in tutheruatics, 
ma thema ticians can have as r;-,any of them as they like'. 2 
He is prepared to accept that an impredicative definition is 
a method of picking out one entity frora a pre-existing 
totality of entities. Thus he must be prepared to accept 
that H will be one of the sets by lileans of vihich h v;as defined. 
'1'he conseQuence of this is that he may not use the phrase 'already 
be correlated with a set' to mean 'correlated with some set 
other than N'. 
1. 'dang, op.cit. p.246 et sec. 
2. Tucker, op.cH. p.514 
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Secondly, the use of the e~'cr!r(,s:3ions 'first-order' and. 
'seconJ.-order' to def3cribc sets seems an inv~,lid 011e, or a.t 
least constitutes a retrocrade step. It YJaS pointed out by 
Ramsey in a discussion of Russell's adom of reclucibiliGJ tlL~,t 
tlle property of being elementar;{ or non-elementary belon~"s 
not to a proposition, as Russell claimed, but more properly to 
1 
instances of a proposition. A propos.L tion, according to liamse;y, 
Illay occur in t"VQ instances I one instance elementary, the 
other non-elementarJ. As an ex::mple he gives the proposition 
instclllces 'pal and ,pa.(Ex)px' which are two insknces of the 
same proposition, yet the first is elementary and the second 
non-elementary (in the sense of llussell). Such an argument 
rests on the assULlption that two proposition symbols are 
inst;mces of the same proposition if and only if they 
express agreement or disagreement with the same set of truth 
possi bi li ties. 'rhus the whole hierarchy of orders stratifies 
proposi tion s.¥JTiboihs rather than proposi ~ions (as the axiora of 
reducibility itself seems to suggest). rrurning from Ramsey's 
theory of propositi ons, th e same }:oint may be made in connection 
with 'l'ucl~er's division of sets into first-order and second-order. 
The notion of first-order and second-order prorerly belon/?: to 
the Ef.tJmer of definition of a set rather than the set itself. 
1. F. Ramsey, The Foundations of I,:athenutics, p.34 
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A set of posi tivG nwnbers re17lains a set of positive nur;:bers 
no matter ho¥[ defined, providing the definition itself is 
ullobjectionable. It is even clea,rer in the ca3e of sets 
tr.tan in the case of propositions since there is a well 
recognised cri teriol1 for the i den ti ty of tlIO sets I tyro 
.sets are identical if and only if they haV'e the same 
Tr.ernbers (the axiom of e.densionali ty) • Thus, the set 
.lefined r;k.'1Y have yet another definition of firs t-order. 
In order to clarifJ these tVIO objections I shall giv~ an 
illus tra tion from set-theory which \1ill show why it is absurd 
to say that Yie cannot pTollerly ask of a set whether its co-relate 
belongs to tl1d.t set and also why it is dangerous to talk 
in terns of the order of a set. 
It .rill be instructive to consider not the set of aibl 
sets of natural n1.llllbers but the set of all :f..ini tel sets of 
natural numbers. I do so because thi s set is equiva.lent to 
the set of natural numbers and a correspondence can be 
f)stilblished bet',;een each natural l1WUoer v.nd each finite set 
of natural nUl:lbers, thus simplifying the cons ~ruction of 
'second-order' sets. 'rhe correspondence can be established 
by means of arranGing the sets in a sequence: A precedes B 
1. In the caGe I run discussing, it is the set of all nQU-
empty fini te sub-sets of the sc)t of all natural num'bers. 
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in the sequence if the sum of the members of • .\ is less t;l3,n tile 
smil of the melabers of B; if their S1liIlS are equal' A precedes 
B if the least member of A is lesr3 than the least lf10mber of 
I )r, if these are equcu, if the ne:ct to least mem:Jer of A 
is lees than the next to leetst metlber of 3, and so on. 
It is cle8.r that before Wly set in tL.is seluence there will 
only be a finite number of sets at most and that all finite 
sets of na tura1 numbers can be re ..... ched in tllis "Yay after only 
a finite number of sets. Hence, a cor1'es pondel:ce has been 
set up, the first few terr[;s of which are: 
1 .... (1) 
2 ~ (2) 
3 ~ (1, 2) 
4 
'" 
(3) 
5 ~ (1, 3) 
6 (ot (4) 
7 ~ (1, 4) 
8 ~ (2, 3) 
9 ..., (5) 
10 .., (1, 2, 3) 
11 
" 
(1, 5) 
12 '+ (2, 4) 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
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~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
4-) 
(6) 
(1, 2, 4) 
(2, 5) 
(3, 4) 
(7) 
In this correspondence it is cle,'lr that the set of all 
na tural numbers '\1hich do not belong to their corresponding 
sets C]' second-orcler set in Tucker's usa,'je) is the set of all 
numbers GTeator than 2 (a first-order set). So that although 
the set has ()een defined by means of a second-order expression 
i-I; does not entail that the set is of 'second-order'. '1'he 
,lifference between 'second-order' and 'first-order' as applied 
directly to sets is seen to be unreal. 
The correspondence also i11us j;ra tes a much gre3.ter 
objection to Tucl;er's argtunent. On his own account we ac::e-
debarred from as~dng of the 'second-order' set N whether n 
is. a member of U or not. On exactly similar grounds he 
would havo to adilli t tha. t the same reasoning a:pplied to the 
set of all positive inteGers that ,iere members of their 
corresponding sub-sets. For this set too is a 'second-
order' set parasitic for its members on 'first-orcler' sets. 
In the above correspondence betl'teen the set of l}osi ti ve 
inteGers al'ld the sot of all finite sub-sets of this set the 
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set of all positive integers which are not members of th.il' 
corres)onding sub-sets is the set of all positive intecers 
Greater than 2 0.11,1 the set of all positive inteGers rrllich 
::\,re members of their corresponding sub-set iel the sel; (1,2). 
3ince there is no posi ti ve inteGer correspondin,; to the 8Gt of 
all in tegers £,Tea tel' than 2 (the set being infinite) the 
question of vrhether the n Y/hich correspol1ds to it is a mem"LJer 
of the set does not arise. Bu t the '1uestion may be aksed of 
the other 'second-order' set, the set of all Ilositive integers 
which do belong to their corresponding sub-sets and, in 
this case, answered neg3.tively, for 3 (which corresponds to 
the set (1, 2» does not belong to (1, 2). In this case it 
is clearly absurd to maint3.in that all questions of the form 
'Is n a member 0 f II?' where H is a second-order set can 
only be ans',rered in the affirmative or in the necative if n 
is assic;"ned to some set other than N. For al th, Ill,Zh we are 
discussin,z- a diff,,,rent set from the set Nit is still of the 
same 'order' 3.S n and. the question has been answered even 
though 3 is not assigned to some set other than (1, 2). 
I am not assertin,3 that in all cases a second-order 
defini tion can be replaced by a first-order one. Such an 
assertion 'ilO\lld be tantamount to asserting the axiom of 
reduci bili ty and di smissing the difficulties involved in the 
notion of impredicative definition. It is sufficient to 
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poin tout that whore a second-order can be replac(~cl bJ a 
first-order definition Tucker's differentiation betrreen first 
and second-order sets disappears and his arGUIllent;s about 'ahat 
questions cannot be answered is seen to be invalid. Hor 
is it o})en to him to say that in other cases where the 
definition cannot be so replaced his arGUment still stands. 
For, since he expresses no ,'ID!'ries about impredicative 
definitions, he must accept that a set of positive integers, 
no matter how defined, is still a set of positive intet;ers 
and thus belongs to an enumeration of all sets of positive 
integers, should such an enumeration exist. If impredicative 
defini tions of tais type are legitimate then he L1USt accept 
the reasoning involved in the proof of ti1e theorem thi'l. t the 
set of all positive integors is not equivalent to the set of 
all sub-sets of that set. 'ro adrui t that the definition of H 
is impredicative is to admit that Ii is one of tho sets by 
means of \Ihich H is defined. 'l'his is the meaning of 
'impredicative'. By allowing impredica ti vo definitions, it 
is invalid to arb'Ue that 'II is a second-order set which is 
parasitic for its members on other first-order sets,.l 
For N is one of the sets amont:; the se 'first-order' sets. 
His argument expresses a contradiction: on the one hand, 
he states that impredicative definitions are legitimate, tllat 
is, it is leJi tiliL'.te to define such a set }j oy means of a 
1. Tuc~er, op.cit. p.515 
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totality of sets of which :r is a member, and, on the otl:er 
hand, that the clefini t-i on of H emmres that N is s:)mehOH 
differen t from ea,ch of the J::lembers of tlla. t toti':,li t,;:. 
After arguin!5 tha. t tho se forms of Cantor I s diaGonal 
ar[;1:.nent which involve impredicative clefini tions are invalid, 
Tuci(er proceeds to show that there are forms oi' the dia{;ona.1 
arGument irhich do not Fake use of imllredicative definitions. 
As an example he takes the proof that the set of all 1.mendinG' 
decitJals is not denumerable. The proof, he says, consiuts 
in civins a rule whereby a decimal is constructe,l ,"{hich 
differs frOLI eacLl d.8cimal in a denuITler:~.ble set of ll..'1ending 
clecimals. If the unendinG decimals are arranged in a 
sequence then corresponding to each positive integer there 
\';ill 1:e an unendini; decimal. To cons truct tbe required 
clecie:al all one needs is the rule t~la t in its nth. place 
is an intecer different from the inteGer in the nth place 
of the clecimal corres)onJ.ing to the posi ti ve int eger n in the 
enumeration. 'It (this (leciIilal) cannot appear (L1 the 
enumeration) 'because the rule for writing it down consi sts 
in making it differ from each lmendin,3' d.ecimal in the 
denm:L:.:rable series. It fo11011S that there are more 
unend.ing decir:Ials than theTe are intcbers. ,1 
1. ibid. p.5l6 
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A:l->'lrt from the fL1ct tha,t the rule ;.18 'l'ucl.:er gi vc:s it 
need not succeed in ei vin,:; em unendinG decir.::.al different froLl 
each of the decimals in t:1e denuLlcrable set (since the iJusGibili ty 
of replacing the irtegers nith 0 has been overlooked, thus 
pro duciuG' a t erminatin,; decll)al), the re is a nore inr,:;()rt:::n t 
objection. It does not follow, from the fact that there is 
an unending decimal not included in the sequence th:,t the set 
of unending deciL1als cannot be put in onc-one corl',:sponder,ce 
with the set of all pocitive integers. It only foHovTs from 
the theorem till t there is a decimal not included in any 
enumeration of unending decima,ls. The addition of one 
object alone would not alter the cardinality of any in i~ui te 
set. 'l'his mistake would not, perhaps, be very important if 
it ,yere not fhe case that 'rucker uses this incoaect aCC01111t 
in his argwilent and rrhich a correct account of this forlLl of 
the diae;onal argllIllent would invalidate. He says: 
'How this argu.r:~ent differs entirely from th:. t g~ven 
by Jang .. For the decimal whi.ch differs from each decimal in the 
denumerable list is not iefined in terms of a to tali ty of 
which it is a member. It is not defined in terms of a to tali ty 
at all ••••• It is not laid dO',m that the totality of unending 
decimals is required prior to its construction. 
is mentioned. ,1 
1. ibid. p.5l6 
No totality 
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A more car·:?ful stat811F)nt of tilE: proof i'lould h,J,ve sho',m ti.l. .. t 
refenmce to the totality of unendinG' decimals is in·7.vi table. 
There are at least two W!"ys of llrovin;; tLa t the set of all 
unending decimals is not equivalent to the set of all positive 
integers, though the two proofs are not essentially diffeJ:imt. 
'.che firs tis to aSSUT,1e thJ,t an enumeration of the unending 
decimals is possible and then proceeds to construct a decimal 
which is different from all decimals in the enumeration which 
is a contradiction and, hence, by reductio ad absurdum the unending 
decimals cannot be put in one-one correspondence with the positive 
, J. In,,egers. Such a proof does involve the totality of all unending 
decimals since it is assumed that the set of all unending deciLl'3.1s 
can be enumer.l.ted. (This type of proof is barred to Tucli:er 
because from all of a collection vie have generated one of 
that collection which does not belonG' to that collection. 1) 
The totality of all unending decil!luls II required prior to its 
con struction . 
. 'rhe second method of proof is based on a leillllla. The lemma 
states that given any denumerable sub-set of the set of all 
unendin0 decimals there exist members of that set which are not 
in the sub-set. This is proved by the usual construction of a 
decimal following the rule given above. This certainly does not 
1. see abov8, p. 
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require the totality of all unendinG decinmls. .Jut the 
lerilllJa does not prove that the set of all Ul1ending decimals 
is not equivalent to the set of all positive integers. 'l'he 
proof of the latter from the lemma is easy and proceeds by 
reductio ad absurdurJ. It is assumed that there is a one-
one correspondence between the tvlO sets and from this it follorrs 
that the 2et of all unending decimals is a proper sub-set 
of itself, which is a contradiction. I-e can be seen that the 
totali ty of unending decimals is again required in the assuu;tion 
that they can be put in one-one correspondence with the 
positive integers. Nor is it the case tl:.li.1 t the to tali ty 
of l.U1dnding decimals is not I'equired for the construction 
of the decimal. For, although the lemma was proved before 
the latter thoorem, the theorem is only a disguised version 
of the firs t r;;ethod of proof. The lemma s t,ltes that all 
denumerable sub-sets of the set of unending decimals are 
proper sub-sets of that set. '1'he theorem is only one 
particular case of this lemma where the set in question is the 
t 1 di d ' 1 1. se of £1.1 unen ng -ec~ma s. It is equivalent to the 
first proof in this respect I that it is based 011 the as::mmption 
1. This is perhaps clearer if we write the lernma (Do) (P.,Dos,:J)",) Doc. l} 
where P is the set of all positive integers and D the set of all 
unending decimals. 'rhc theorem fo Il0H s by the substitution of 
D for the "bound variable Do Thus (pAID)';) (DeD) '~he theoreJ!l is 
proved because it is assumed tInt the lenma is true vrhen Do is D 
and this is so only because the construction of the decimal is 
assumed to be possible even when Do is the to tali ty of all unending 
decimals. 
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that the totality of all unendinG decimals <."re lCt,id out in 
an enWi1erd ti on. Tucl:er is therefor vTrong in assuming tl1:1 t 
the construction of such a decimal does not Te'1uire the totJlity 
of unending ,6.ecimals. 
If he were riGht th::lt it invol vas no men tion of the 
totali ty ond that this decillk'l,l only differs from each of tlle 
decimals in the enwneration t~len it would. be equally pos:dble 
to maintain that the set N of all positive inteGers not 
belonging to their corresponding SUD-sets differ from 
each of tho:3e SUD-sets. Indeed such a proof is often given 
1 by means of an analogous lerriL1a follO":red by a theorem. 
It is curious that Tucl:er did not consider this to [ie a way out 
of referl'ing to a totality of which N is a member. 
rrucker t s view al so stops Can tor t s theorem from being 
proved because it relies on the impre,iicati ve definition of such 
sets as N, 17he th er we prove it directly or b;)" means of a lemma. 
Cantor's theorem is aoout any set qnd the set of all sub-sets 
of that set. Thus the particular fonn of diagonal 
argument wl1ich meets vdth 'rucker's approval is not available 
for the theory of abstract sets. It may be that he does not 
1. S. Kleene, 'Introiuction to l,ret1Jl:~~theJ:utics.' Arnsterdam 
1952, pp.14-l5 
- 101 -
object to the rejection of Cantor's theorem but trus imlJlication 
sho.lld at least be ~·ealised. 
Lastly, 'rucker dea13 1'.1 th the Richard pClraclox. Let 
E be the class of all finitely definn,1)le liecimals. 'l'hen E 
has ~o members. Let N be a decir,lal defined by means of tile 
,ia&onal rule applied to an enumeration of all fini tely 
definable decimals. Then N differs from each memoer of 
E. But since N is thus a finitely definable deciual i.f 
belonGS to E. This is a contra:1ic tion. 1'1;e J)aradox is 
sW'iftly deal t wi th: 
'But this is not a paradox at all. The diagonal m.othod 
does not of itself generate contr~dictions. For from the 
fact tlnt Ii is fini tel,,! defined by the dial3'onaJ. rule, it 
follows tha.t E has more tllan no r;,embers. So the assertion 
that E has No IL8Elbers is thereby proved to be fa13e, th:lt 
is all. The form of the argll1ll(mt is simply th;c1.t il. is 
asserted and not-A is s:10wn to be the case. ,1 
Once again a paradox is not solved but only 
moved to anotl:.cr J luce. It is not <the case that it is 
simply asserted that the set of all finitely definable decimals 
is e1.uivalent to the set of all lo:i;itive inte[Sers. It can be 
proved on one highl~,r plausible assumption: that the number of 
letters and punctuation marks e;,:ployed in the English 1anbUace , 
1. 'l'ucker, op.ci t. p.516 
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say, is at lilOS'-t denumerable. lIo",7 the set of all fini tel,y 
defin",ble decimals will be a sub-set of the SEt of all seClUe'lCE!S 
of letters and punctua tion m~:rks and this in turn will be equivalent 
to the set of all finite seqQences of positive integers. 'l'l.is 
last set can be proved to be equivalent to the set of all 
positive integers. Hence, the set of all finitely definable 
decimals has the cardinal ~o • If T'.lc1:er really means to pursue 
his ergurnent to its loGical conclusion, what is proved by 
:i.~eductio ad abG::rdum is that the number of different letters 
2..nd pLllctuation marks available in the English lancwlGe is 
creater tl1an the number of posi ti ve integers, an assertLm 
vrhich is only a little less repUG11ant than the pU,l'aclox with 
which YJe started. It is clearer still if we restrict the 
symbols which we are to use in a lanuuage to a finite number, 
to all the sJIlJ.bols on this rage, sa:>", 
, 
decimals finitely definable b r means of the symbols on this 
pa::'e is N •. and the paradox follows through 011ce II is defined 
as th2 decimal constructed by the diagonal rule for an enwneration 
of these decimals. Since all sJlllbols occurring in the 
definition of Ii are on this p ge it must belon,; to the ;cet 
of all decimals finitely definr;,ble by means of symbols on 
this paGe. The definition of N however ensures that it does 
not belonG to that set. By reductio ad absurdum the set of 
all Svffilbols on this ps.ge is non-denumerable. 'fhis is the 
conclusion 'I.e have to accept if we are to allow the 
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diagonal areumen t as a valid areument and the notion of 
'finitely definable J.ecil[k'11' as a legitimate concept. It 
i;::; clear th;::,t the nuraber of sYlnbols on the rrr'8vious page 
is not non-denumerable but finite. .A solution 0 f the pi:ll'J.ao~~ 
which involves adlai ttinG that a set of symbols ,'[hich }13,8 
thirty members (the nurilber of symbols used on the previous 
IJ1J'e) has a non-denwneruble number of members is wllikely to 
convince one of its plausibility. 
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III 
I have devoted the r,hole of the last cha.pter to a de ccdled 
discussion of 'rucker's solution of the pCU'adoxes in cenls of 
informal language rules becau3e it is in direct contradiction 
wi th the position outlined in section I of this thesis. Also, 
t'le attack on formalism contained in his pa;Jer seems to be a 
baclmard step in foundational studies. '1'1:1e doctrine of 
formalisul that is being att::ocked is not wha.t miGht be called the 
'strict' formalism of Hilbert (althvw:h this posi-tion ViQuld 
of cO'cU.'se be open to the same attack); the net is spread 
wLler to catch such different views as those of~uine, Curry 
and Church. '1'he attack is to deny the need to formalise, 
to deny th0.t formalisation succeeds in any clarification of 
mathematical concepts. l 
There are tl10 separate theses involved. '1'he firs tis t ht.l. t 
there are indispensable concepts without which we should be 
unable to operate formal systems. The second is th","t any 
formalisation of these concepts must retain all the inprecision 
of their informal counterparts. 'rhe tIm concepts Tucker picks 
out for examination are the concepts of rule and the concept 
of substitution. These are both needed in the opera.tion of 
1. ibid. pp. 501-2 
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the formal system and any atterc.pted fornlalisation of theLl 
will carryover any vagueneS8 the.t the informal concepts 
have. 
'l'he first thesis is correct in as much as there must 'oe 
one meta-level v/here the rules of a formal system are 
stated in inforLal discourse. Por, in order to operate a 
formal system it is necessary to 1l..'1derstand thG rules of 
formation awl transformation of that fonnal system. If 
these are forumlised in turn, then clearly the rules of the 
meta-metalanguaGe have to be understood. 'l'he fOrlilalisation 
of the various meta-levels will still need a meta-lanb'1la.:;e 
in whicl1 the rul es are of an "LUlforr.1alised nature - framed 
in terms of inforLlal discourse. But this thesis does not 
refute fomalis11, since formalists, incluiin,j Hilbe,·t have 
not claimed that one could operate a formal Syst2TI1 \vithout 
havinG' some pre-formal concepts. Kleene, for eAample, 
in a bool~ devoted to meta-mathematics (in the strict 
Hil bertian sellse of fini tary methods as opr·o sed to what Kleen-" 
calls set-theoretic methods) writes: 
I'rhe meta-theory belongs to intuitive and informal 
llIB.therna tics. • •••• 'l'he assertions of the meta-theory must 
be understood. The deductions must carry conviction. 
must proce(')d by intuitive inferences, and not, as the deJ.uctions 
in the formal theory, by applications of stated rules. Itul(!s 
- 106 -
have been stated to formalise the objec I; theory-, but now 
we must underst::1nd without rules how those rules work. 
An intuitive mathematics is necessary even to define the 
formal \2iatheLiutics. ,1 
If 'rucker -,vere only arGuinG this thesis thene would 
be Ii ttle or no disagreereent between him and those he 
attacks. 2 To understand and operate a formal lanc,'uage it is 
necessary to understa.nd and er.lploy those concepts both 
formal and informal used in the met3,-theory. nut he is not 
content to stop there. He maintains th2.t formal concepts, 
dependent as they are on informal concepts retain all the 
unclari ty of those informal concepts and therefore a formalist 
rejecting informal lancuaGe because it is unclear 
must reject the formal lanG~age also. Eut even for those 
iiiiispensible concepts th:.1t 'rucb:er lists it is by no means 
certain that because they are informal concepts any 
unclarity attachei to them carries over to a formal systelll 
which needs them as a basis. 
For eX:::1mple, Tucker's argwnent that the informal 
notion of a rule is necessary in settin;:, up a formal lan:;ua.;;e 
1. S.C. IGeene, Introcluction to Lebmnthematics, j"ms"terdrl.m, 
1952, p.62 
2. Even Church s ta,tes that "In order to set up a forr.li3.lised 
lanu"'U[:J.,J'e rIe !:lust of course ma.ke use of a lan[,'t~ise alre3.Jy k.nexfn 
to us, ••• , st::ttin,; in tlut. laneua;,;e the vocabulu.ry and rules 
of the formalised 18J1£,"'Uage." A. CllUrch, Introduction to 
1,~.?~th8111atic('l\ LO';ic, 1. 1'.47 
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does not imply that beC:lUG8 the informal notion is uncle3.r 
the fOTIJ.al lan.:u[, ~"e is unclear also. l].is ar,:,Ul;}ent is bo,sed 
on the fact that any formal lmiL;ua;e depends on ,i;ivin,z a 
set of rules: rules of formation which Clve conJi tio11s for ., 
forr:lUla to be well-formed and lules of transformation ;;i vini:; 
condi tions for a sentcl1ce to be an ilfu.,edia te consequeDce of 
another and for a string of sentences to be a proof of another. 
Certdnly, the infornal notion of a rule is erJplo./ed. in 
cons tructinz a formal languaG"e. It mus t be unders tood tlB,t; 
the rules of forIJa tion and trDDsf::n.'11lation are rules; it does 
no t follow, hov/ever, tha.t the formal lancu.ac;e is unclear 
because the infornnl concept of rule is unclear. For there 
is a perfectly harmless way in which inforrilal notions can 
be said to be unclear. It is unfortunate that 'I'ucker does 
not say in w11.1. t way the ix:formal no tions are 11.'YJ.cle!:'..r. 
Kerner, on the other hand, has given a definition of a type 
of unclari ty es:pecially useful in discussions of the problems 
of pure and applied mathematics.1. Concepts are dividod 
in to two cat egori es : exac"1; and inexe.c"~. It is his contention 
th:~t mathematics1 concepts such as 'line', 'croup', '3' etc. 
are exact whereas the corresponding empirical concepts are 
1. S. Kerner, The Philosophy of l:~",them~.tics, London, 1960, 
p. 159ff. 
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inexact. 11. concept is e{'~ct if it does not athni t of 
borderline cases; a concept is inexact if it does. If 
~L concept is unclear because it aruni ts of borderline cases, 
i.e. because it is inexEl.ct, then tiLLS type of unclarity is 
not necessarily transferred to a formal lml{;ua.~·e which 
employs such a concept. In the case considered here, if 
'rule' is unclear in the sense that it is inexact then it 
does not follow that the formal system must stare this 
inexactness. For althou~h the construction of any formal 
system is dependent on the informal notion of a rule, what 
is required in connection with the rules of forIl~2.tion Wld 
transforraa tion is the recognition tln t they are rules. 
'rile fact that the concept of 'rule' admits of borderline 
cases does not imply tlv1t the rules of formation and 
transformE;tion are borderline cases. !fhe fact that there 
are some cases which are ne'ltral instances of the concept 
'rule' does not imply that all cases are neutral instances 
of the concept 'rule'. Tae inexactness of the concept 
'rule' does not carryover to a fOllilal system ~ivel1 as a body 
of rules. 
TJle same arE;UTiLent applies to Tucker's second. thesis 
that the formalisation of the concept of a r11le carries with 
it all the l.U1clari ty of the inf~rnal notion it is supposed to 
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formalise. To formalise the concep" of 'rule' a rule 
must be Given to show that the formalised concept of a relle 
is intended to replace the informal notion. A rule is 
employed in layin.;; dOi'm uhat is to be cOW"lted as a rule in 
the new, forrualised sense. AGEan the concer,t of rule is 
informal and 'rucker a,'71in argues that any unclarity pertaininG 
to this concert of 'rule' is carried over to the fO:l.'I;;cLlised 
concept. But if the notion of 'rule' is ul1cLar because it 
is inexact then the forrualised notion of rule need not be 
ulJ.clear in that sense. Providing the rule layinG down 
that the forr.;alised notion of a rule is to replace the 
unformalised notion of a rule for some specified meta-laEGua?;e 
can be recognized as a rule, then there is no inexactness 
cai.Tied over to the fOI'I'lalised concept. Sin;ilar arc.;ulIlents 
apl;ly to the other indispensible concepts listed by 
1'uc1::er. 
Another, though related, sel1de in which the conceDt of 
rule r;a;f be said to be unclei,r is in the difficul ty of [,'i ving 
a precise definition of 'rule'. In a discussion of rules 
\[aismann claiI::ls that it is indeed difficul'G to tc'i V2 a clear 
uefini "cion. T:iis, he says, is 1ecCl,use ' ••• the riOI'd "rule" 
like t:1e term I'ostensive definition" is one vihie:. stands for all 
sc)rts of different tLinC;3 which werelJ have a ee::::tclin similarity 
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In other words, the thin,,:;s t11 it -,te call rules 
;lave a 'fauily likenesu' in liittG'enctein's pin·ase. If 
rules are like this then clearly an;: pro,?oseJ formalisation 
of the rule concept is [,t)il1,_; to u.iffer c}ywide',;LJl.,r from 
the infon .. al concept. 'de lr,a,I look .a t SUCl:l a forIlalisation 
2 
as an e:q:lication of the concept. If t:lis is the Se113e in 
"'hieh 'rule' is thought to be unclear then the forn:o.li sa hon 
vdll escape this kind of unclarity. 
It may be that Tucker Ul1J'3rst.:mJs 'unclear' in some other 
sellse than I ine:Cc'1.ct' or 'lac:-;:s 1:1 e1';;3,r defini "Cion' in whieh 
case it n;ay be th~t tile unc1ariGJ is transferred froill the 
indispensable inforJ:ul concepts t::> the fon,lal 1::nJ.,-;11arse i'tself. 
l3ut it is necess.J,r;:r to explain e:~actly vr1,13.t se71se of thG -Nord 
I unc1e.::.r , is to be Ullderstood -",hen he affir;.!s Unt 'if the 
formalist premiss that all tc.e usage which oC::;U:y"S in informal 
1&1isuac'e is Ul1cle,,~ .. r is cor:cect, then rle are couJelT':neJ. by the 
preE:iss to perpetual unclarity,.3 The formalist may still 
argue that informal law,u8.,;e is unclear in the sense th",t it is 
1. F. Ylaisn:11n:;, TLe P""inq,inles of Lin'''l1istic n,il,:sopb.;r, ed. 
R. Rarre, London, 1905. f.140 
2. '1'h8 concept of explication is e;ul.r.:ined in section 3 of 
tUs thesis. 
3. Tuc~er, op.cit. p.503 
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cO;li;ain this- ul1clari ty, 
In the sar:le wa;, ti:Ie fact tInt in the s trine?: of rGek,-
lanGuaGes th",t 3. forr;,alist way set up to construct a,nu 3 tujf 
a fOl'lJal syste,,; tilere ll"J.st be one which is sta,ted in inforcal 
lanGuace does not imply tll,·;:t the forlinl L1.1lg!la!~e is !~s 
unclear as the infol'lHal If.neuCLce llsed in that meta-theory, 
Anf notion used in the inforE;al IB--1'1,;uaGe of the weta-theor~' 
J;!D,,Y be inexact. '.chere lila] be contexts ,,, .. heTG the concept~; 
are unclear but this does not i:r::tply t~le.t they are wlcle,J.r 
in the context of the meta-theory. For example, in a 
meta-theory the class of provable forr;mlae 1'18,y be defined as 
'the sUiallest class of fOTImlae which con tains the axioms and is 
closeo. ni til respect to the relation "inlI:ledia te conse',luEmce of",.l 
The concept of 'rela tiOll' eElployed in tl"!.is defini tion Lay be 
inexact in the sense tlu,t it is not abm,{s cled!' vIhettler any 
particular ten," is a relation or not. It i ~3 suffic i en t, hO'Never, 
for the fonaal lancua,:;e not to carry with it this inex-:;ctness, 
tha t tb.e COnCel)t of I ilTWledia tG COilse'luence. of' be recogili8ed as 
an insknce of the concept I 1'ela tion' , 
In SUL1TIldry, then, fOI'lllal lanG'u<1,2,'8s depend upon informal 
lan.;uages and informal concepts, but any ullclari ty in the 
1. K. GCHel, On Forman;! UndecicL'1.hle Pro}Josi tions of Princi nia 
l,;a,ther:u:'ltica trans. :b, lu:eltzer, London, 1962, p.45 
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SGllSe of inexuGtness of tho3e informal concG.iJts dOGS ilOt iL:plJ 
that a fonnal lant',Ll.ace is doomed to the S3.ltle inexactness. 
At one lJoint 'rucker SeellJ3 to De saying tlJ.:lt no clarification CC1n 
ever be made by using mathem2"tical loCSic since matheilntical 
logicians fl'equently fall into conceptual cOl1fu~'lion;J. He 
cites S':colem's view that the concepts of set-{;:18ory are r(c:b,tive. 
Yet surely S~(Qlem' s proposal to replace Zermelo' s 'definite 
proposi tion' by the notion of an expression wllich contains as 
atoms only expressions 0:: the form 'aeb' or 'a=o' is a 
clarific.tion of that notion.l. 'fhe fact tba t Skolem uiUy 
have fallen victim to a conceptual confusi0n elsewhere does 
not mean that no clarific:Ltion has been achieved at this point. 
:Defore concluding this chapter I should like to discuss 
tyro other theses Tucker holds. :B'irstly, that contradictions 
occurring in a fOTInal languaGe are understood if they are 
understood in infor.nal lanG~ge. Seconclly , that the 
contradictions can be solved only by looking to see which 
informal laneuage rule has been broken. The syntactic contra-
dictions of set-tlleory are just as much paradoxes when stated 
in informal la..'rlguages as they are when statei in formal sys tems. 
One may agr-ee to tr.is without rejecting as fl'ucker does the 
1. E. Z~rmelo, 'untersuchenden liber die Grundla2;en der l\;enc;enlehre I' 
IIB,them.ltische Annalen 59, p.262. 'f. Skolem, 'Einige Bemerkungel] ZiLr 
axiollL'1 tischen .tlec;rtlndung del' Lenge111ehre' , 1I;a, tema ti kerkol1i';ressen i 
Helsinf'ors den 4-7 Juli 1922, Den femte S!\andinavisJ<a J:latimatiker-
konrrressen, Redo,:;or-lse, AkE.der;:,.iska Bokhandeln, Helsinki 1923~pJh8 
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distinction drmm b,/ Russell 1Jetween the mathematical and 
philosophical aspects of foumlational ::?roblems. 
distinct even though the pars,ctoxes of set-theory f:l11J be 
solved in the same manner for both the f01'];1"l,l and inforE:al 
sbter1ents of them. ',~ t R 11~" . tl 1. .IGa usse L.eans].n n.e p.'1ssaze 
cited bJ Tucker is th·".t the mathematics of the theory of types, 
i.e. the deduction of theorems from assumptions embodyinG type-
theory, is separable from the philosophic .justification of the 
theory of tJpes. Even if the the()r~r of types turns out to be 
without such justification and philosophically llnsow1d, the 
lila tl" e;Ja, tics of type-theory may still be developed. 'rhe 
mathematics of a certain set of assumptions is indC::'IJewLent of 
the justification of th?se assumptions although interest in the 
mathematical developliient of t:lem may not be. 
Syntactic paracloxes that are contnined in any forrnlised 
system of set-theory are st3.table in infoY.'E:al lanc-uLl.ce. 
PODllalists t>..ave not denied this and often intro,luce tile problens 
involved in the construction of a, formal set-theory by the 
paraclo".;:es wi t;h an inforillal discussion of the pa.raloxes. 2 
'.rhis should be qualified, however. A paraclox occurring in a 
formal systew is a purel;Jr forr,al characteristic. It occurs when, 
1. B. Russell, Lordc a119:: Kno1.'!led c,;e, London 1956, p.102 
2. e.G. R.L. Goodstein, ~"~ltheffi'ltical LO,cic 
Curry, In tro iuc~ion ~o i'lih3ma ticC'"l Lotic 
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3ay, h;o fOl'LlUlae are provaole one of which is identical in 
form to the other e:~cept; tlu,t it is }:r'o'faceri by 'AJ'. 
A fOI'l!ial 11i1::,"u:i,:'e cOllsistinG' of a cert:',in vocabCl13,rJ and 
certnin s;yn"Gactic rules may be c;i ven such a defini tion ,~f 
inconsistenc:r. Any triO forrilulae ',,'hich have the above tile fonll 
vroulri constitute a contraiiction in th"1,t forn:al langu.'), ,:e. 
But, villa,t does it signify to say tha,t BelCh a contra-iiction if 
understooi call be lmderstoocl in inforr';al lanc;ua,;'e? As ~ret, 
the lan;;uar;e is considerod to bo fOrI,;al a,nd not as a forl11alioed 
lanGuage. In the role of formal laIl[,"llage it is a Game played 
wi th cert~,in pieces accorJins to a certo.in :0et of niles. A 
contradiction occurrin,; in a forr:lfJl 1Cl1C:,ua2,'e will act (if the 
propositional calculus is an interpretdtion of a sub-sJstem cf 
that lan,:,"ua~;e) as a lice'ose to Ci ve theorcr;, status to any uell-
forLled forrr,ula of th.:J; lan,;U:1.:e. 
In order to 'understand I the contradictions in infol'lnal 
lanLo'UE.~e it is necess3xf to ~i ve senlallti,J rules in add.i tion to 
the s;yntactic rules. 'l'here have to be some rules of t:rJ.nsla tion 
for the fon,al system to reltjive an interpret.:).tion. !"'ormal 
lan,SLlages as opposed to form'llised languages rna;! have no obvious 
translation or interpretation. If a contradiction occurred in 
such a formal lanGU3.:;e, it would be puzz linG to saI thc.t one co uld 
'ul1,ierstLu:.d I why the con'~r[j,diction occurred. 'l'he TIIOS t one could 
hope for would be some alteration to the axioms of the system V1J:lich 
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would avoid. the proof of that contradiction bGin(i aVJ.ila-ble. 
~lor, il';. this case, would it be possible to usc the ~lOtion of 
interpreta tion, for aD inconsistent fo1',,1al system has no 
interpretation. 1<'or a purely foril,al languaGe it wakes no sense 
to say the1- t we can 'unders tan a.. ' the con tr ",dictions th<l t 0 ccur. 
At most the axior£.s ElaY be altered so th.:it no contradictions can 
oe proved., but the alterations thu.t nlay be mad.e will not be made 
as a result of eXdmining the informal transln. tiOll of the fonnal 
system. (It vrould in any case be wrong' to talk of the transla tior! 
or the interpretation of a forunl system, because for forrrni 
systems "Thich have an interpretation in an infini t8 dor:Jain there 
y[ill be tvlO nOl1-ison,orphic interpretEi.tiol1S1 • Rather, the 
corrections will be m:;.de as a result of technical eX,gerti;;e resultinG 
from workint~ wi th fonnal languages. Of course, anY' solution 
of an informal paradox vThich (.rains general acceptance will be 
incorporated. in the fornalised. languaGe. An informal solution 
will be reflected in the forraali sed theory. [l'here are, as 
Tucker says, no formal contradictions to solve as 1/ell, once the 
informal contradictions are ironed out. For formal langua:}?s, 
however, there is no po,-.;sible way of 'understandinG' the cauze 
of any contra.dictions tha.t occur, so that there will be a fear that 
the forrnal sys tem is inconsistent. Tucker is wrong in saying 
1. see section 4 of this thesis for fll.rther discussion. 
- 116 -
tr ...at in fon1al systeT!iS I •••• there is no such tilinG as a 
contradiction whic:l has no C2,use, no such thiflg as a contr,l-
t d t ·t I 1. J.iction tha cannot be tracke 0 l S source •• For a 
f'oTijal system the only thin:; that cOllld be reCS::J,;'ded as the 
cause of a contr;diction would be an adom of the sJ"sted such 
that its rOllioval 170ul;1 result in a consistent system. l.3u t 
this is not to give an explanation of why its contracl:lcts the 
other axior"s; it is to say only ti:1at it (loes contraJict the];}. 
1. ~"{. 'rucker, Pormalioation of Set-'l'l,eorv, p.5l3. J,:ore 
explici tly he maintains tlu,t the following are false I ".i'hat in a 
formal system for which there is no G"J.arantee of cO!lsistency a 
contradiction may turn up unexpectedly an;:/17here. 'ri.:at there may 
be latent contradictions SIlTead through such a system. I ibid. p.510 
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IV 
Having disposed of formalism to his own satisfaction 
and given solutions to the paradoxes in tenus of infonual 
language rules, Tucker turns to the problem of constructivity 
which he considers to be logically pnor to the problem of 
I 
consistency Once it has been shown that a lanJuage is constructive 
there will be no worry over the problem of consistency. 
To make sense of this thesis it will be necessary to see 
how Tucker uses the word 'constructive' as it is not clear 
how it is to be used in all the contexts in which it occurs. 
As employed by Tucker it is an adjective that can qualify 
'conditions ,2, 'procedures,3 and 'language,4. He defines 
it, however, only as it applies to procedures. 
'Constructive procedures are defined as procedures which 
can, in some sense, be carried out whereas non-constructive 
procedures are those which, while they can (in some sense) 
be specified cannot be carried out.,5 
It is not at all clear how such a definition can be 
extended to cover the case of a natural language being 
constructive. 
1. J. Tucker, 'Constructivity, Consistency and Natural 
Languages', Proceedinr,s of the Aristotelian SOCiety, 1967 pp.145-16B. 
2. ibid. p.164 3. ibid. p.152 4. ibid. p.145 
5. ibid. p.152 
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Tucker admits that his definition of 'constructive' 
differs from any given in the past. For there will be some 
procedures that have been regarded in the past as constructive 
that are not constructive ~ccording to the new definition and 
vice versa. l He maintains, in addition, that the limitations 
imposed on the methods of proof by constructivists are merely 
arbitrary chosen restrictions having no significance for foundational 
studies. 2 
There are two objections I wish to make at this point. 
Firstly, it does not follow from the definition that 
there will be procedures which turn out to be constructive (non-
constructive) under the definition, but have in the past been 
considered non-constructive (constructive). It is doubtful 
whether any constructivist would wish to disagree with th;" 
defini ti on. What is doubtful is whether there would be agreement 
over what counts as 'a procedure which can be carried out'. 
It is not over the definition that there would be dispute but 
over what procedures can be carried out. The reason that there 
appear to be many different standards of constructivity is due 
to there being many different views as to what constitutes a 
procedure which can be carried out. For varied reasons one 
rray reject impredicative definitions, pure existential theorems, 
1. ibid p.153 
2. ibid p.153 
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any proof involving the notion of the totality of all real 
numbers, L~ly proof involving the notion of an arbitrary 
set, etc. as non-constructive. Constructivists who reject 
aome or all of these as being examples of non-constntctive 
procedures may do so because the procedures cannot in some sense 
be carried out. Tucker's definition can be seen to be virtually 
useless as a clarification of constructivity and for differentiating 
between his notion and those of other constructivists. He 
claims that there is a ' a single basic notion of 
constructivity that is essential to foundations' and, further, 
that non-constructive procedures are non-constructive' •••• in 
the precise sense that they are impossible of execution,l 
(my italics). It is clear from the above argument that the 
definition has not given any precision to the notion of 
constructivity nor does it help us to classify procedures that 
are constructive and those that are not. 
Secondly, Tucker's assertion that the limitations on 
methods of proof have in the past been arbitrary restrictions 
imposed by constructivists is a gross misrepresentation of the 
facts. A general account of constructivity is beyond the 
scope of this thesis but in order to see that Tucker's account 
of the 'arbitrary limitations' is incorrect it will be necessary 
1. ibid. p.153 
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to examine some of the constructivists' views and why they reject 
certain proof procedures. 
The intuitionists, for example, believe that mathematical 
assertions are reports of successful mental constructions. 
The exact nature of these mental constructions is difficult to 
specify and its dependence on an intuition or acts of intuition 
unappealing to empiricist or analytic philosophers. But if we 
grant, for the moment, that it makes sense to talk of mental 
constructions it should be clear that the logical connectives 
which the intuitionists themselves use in their reports of 
mental constructions will receive very different interpretations 
from the usual truth-table interpretation. 
The proposition 'NP', since even negative propositions are 
reports of a mental construction, is not just a report of the 
absence of a construction but is the report of a construction 
which deduces a contradiction from the supposition that the 
construction reported by 'pI were brought to an end. l 
Existential propositions of the form (~x)A(x) have no 
other meaning thanl 'A mathematical object x satisfying the 
condition A(x) has been constructed,.2 
For the intuitionist mathematical objects, whether they 
are sets or natural numbers or real numbers are essentially 
1. A. Heyting, Intuitionism - an Introiuction', Amsterd.a.Q:), 1956 
2. A. Heyting, 'Some Remarks on Intuitionism' in Constructivity 
in Ma theffi'l.tics, Amsterdam 1959, p.70 
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constructible objects. l The apparent peculiarities of 
intuitionist mathematics spring from this conception of 
mathematical objects. If mathematical objects do not exist 
prior to their construction - Heyting claims that he is 
unable to make sense of the assertion that they do - then the 
rejection of pure existential proofs follows as a consequence. 
Similarly some instances of the law of excluded middle must 
be rejected since, both 'p' and·'Np'.being reports of constructions, 
there will be cases - in particular, cases involving quantification -
where we are in possession of neither construction. Other 
logical laws to which the intuitionists object can be considered 
in the same way. The justification for their rejection is the 
nature of m~thematical objects. 
There is nothing arbitrary about the restrictions and 
limitations on methods of proof, for the limitations are laid 
down by the nature of the mathematical objects and, IIeyting 
says, there is nothing arbitrary in the notion of a constructible 
2 
object. The notion of a constructible object must itself be 
a primitive undefined notion since any attempt to define those 
operations that are constructive would need existential 
quantification3• Nevertheless, what is meant by a construction 
1. ibid. p.70 2. ibid. p.70 
3. R. Peter, 'Rekursivitat und Konstruktivitat' in Constrmctivity 
in IvTathematics, p.228. 
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1 
can be made clear by examples. Since the notion of a 
constructible object is not arbitrary neither are the methods 
of proof which the intuitionists allow. 
Another constructivist, Wang, gives good reasons for 
rejecting impredicative definitions. There is nothing 
arbitrary in this rejection. It is not a ban on impredicative 
definitions imposed simply because impredicative definitions 
sometimes lead to paradoxes. Nor is it necessarily a ban 
on all kinds of impredicative definitions. One may, for example, 
accept impredicative definitions of natural numbers but not of 
sets of natural numbers. 2 But where one allows impredicative 
definitions and where one disallows them is not purely arbitrary; 
it will depend on what one considers to be the nature of the 
objects over which the quantified variable in the impredicative 
definition ranges. 
Wang, speaking of the vicious-circle principle, says that 
the principle is directed against the introduction of new 
objects. 
'Impredicative characterisations are objected to not just 
as such but only as a means for initially introducing an 
object. ,3. 
If a set can be said to exist only after it has been defined 
1. i... Heyting, 'Intuition ',':'anlntroduction' _ . ,', 
2. H. Wang, 'Ordinal Numbers and Predicative Set-Theory', in 
A Survey of Mathematical Logic, Peking, 1963 p.642 
3. H. Wang, ibid. p.640 
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then clearly it is circular for this definition to contain a 
quantifier ranging over this set. Only if sets exist prior to 
their definition, in which case the 'definition' would be a 
specification of one object from an existing totality of sets, 
would predicative definitions be legitimate. l The ban imposed 
by constructivists on impredicative definitions is an outcome 
of how the mathematical objects - in this case, sets - are 
conceived. Constructivists would reject Tucker's contention 
that since impredicative definitions do not give rise to contradictions 
t diff lt th · 1 ·t· 2 here is no . icu y over e~r e~ ~cy. 
Similar constructivist arguments may be given for rejecting 
proofs involving the notions of 'all real numbers', 'all sets 
of positive inte$ers', 'arbitrary set', 'arbitrary law', etc. 
In all the cases so far considered there' have been no 
purely arbitrary decisions on what is to count as a constructive 
proof. There are differences between constructivists as to 
what constitutes a constructive proof but the differences can 
be traced to the different ways that the mathematical objects are 
seen by them. But the fact that differences exist does not imply 
1. It is odd that ~uine can treat the problem so lightly. There 
is no harm in impredicative specification, he maintains, for 'we are 
not to view classes as literally created through being apecified • 
•••• The doctrine of classes is rather that they are there from 
the start. This being so, there is no evident fallacy in impredicative 
specification.' (W. Quine, Set-Theory and its Logic, Cambridge, 1~ss., 
1963, p.243) The question here 1s, surely, whose doctrine of classes, 
Brower's? Wang's? 
2. J. Tucker, 'Formalisation of Set-Theory' p.514 
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that they are arbitrary. 
Tucker's notion of constructivity is not based on any 
previous view about the nature of mathematical objects. It is 
put forward to us as 'what can be carried out'. 'l'here is no 
attempt to expand this definition although he does give an 
example of a procedure which though it appears to be non-
constructive turns out to be constructive and an example vfuich 
though normally taken to be constructive (even by some 
intuitionists) turns out to be non-constructive under his 
definition. 
I shall deal with the former example first. It is an 
attB~pt to show that diagonal procedures are constructive in 
his sense. The attempt depends on his analysis of the term 
'indenumerable set'. 'Taken in the referential sense, the 
expression "indenumerable set" means an actual infinity which is 
greater than an actual denumerable infinity,l But there is 
another interpretation open to us, namely, 'a non-referential 
interpretation in which it means a set which contains an 
indenumerable element; where by an indenumerable element is 
meant an element which differw systematically from each element 
in an unending series whose generative recipe is given.,2 
1. J. Tucker, 'Constructivity, Consistency and Natural Languages', 
p.156 
2. ibid. p.l56 . 
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It is difficult to make sense of this interpretation. 
\/hat i8 needed is a clarification of the terms 'indenumerable 
element' and the terlJl on which it depends, 'generative recipe'. 
From a.:;la ter exposi tion that Tucker gi vesl it appears that D is 
an indenumerable element of S if D belongs to S and is different 
from each element of S given by some law determining an initial 
element and the successor of any element. Under this definition 
it will turn out that many sets thought of as denumerable 
will beindenumerable. . (Perhaps both denumerable and indenumerable, 
but Tucker does not define denumerable.) Even the set of 
natural numbers would become indenumerable. For the generative 
recipez - initial element 3, successor of an element x, x+l -
will give two indenumerable elements, 1 and 2. 1 and 2 belong 
to the set of natural numbers and yet differ from each of the 
elements given by the generative recipe. That the set of 
natural numbers is non-denumerable is an absurd consequence and 
makes nonsense of the distinction initially brought in by 
Cantor. 
It might be said that my example ignores the fact that 
there is a generative recipe for the natural numbers and if I 
had taken this recipe then I should not have succeeded in obtaining 
1. ibid. p.159 
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an indenumerable element. In general this would mean 
that there is only one proper generative recipe and the 
notion of a proper recipe would need to be defined. For 
non-denumerable sets (in the usual sense) there can be no proper 
generative recipe; in fact, there can be no generative recipes 
at all, for that is what the proofs of non-denumerability 
show. 
Talk of an indenumerable element of a set prompts the 
question: which element is an indenumerable element? But 
the production of an element D, purported to be the in denumerable 
element, would result in our being able to give a generative 
recipe in which D would occur. (By taking D as the initial 
element and:.tacking on the other elements given by the original 
generative recipe which left out D.) A denumerable totality 
does not become indenumerable by adding one element. 
Rather than talk of an indenumerab1e element, we could 
talk of an indenumerable element relative to a given generative 
recipe. Perhaps Tucker would then say that an indenumerable set 
would be one in which for any given generative recipe there 
remained an element of the set not included in the generative 
recipe. But does this mean that we have a 'non-referential' 
interpretation of 'indenumerable .. set'? The non-referential 
interpretation is the interpretation in which the sense of 
'indenumerable set' is a set that contains an indenumerable 
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an indenumerable element. In general this would mean 
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talk of an indenumerable element relative to a given generative 
recipe. Perhaps Tucker would then say that an indenumerable set 
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element. The only sense that can be given to this is an 
element which escapes every generative recipe. This is far 
stronger than Cantor's original definition and, if the Zermelo-
KBnig paradox is to be avoided, demands a precise definition of 
'generative recipe'. 
The non-referential interpretation that Tucker gives is 
unsuccessful. Again it shows a misunderstanding of 
constructivist objections to infinite sets. According to 
Tuc'ker, the referential sense of 'indenumerable set' is 
'an actual infinity which is greater than an actual denumerable 
infini ty' • But the meaning of 'indenumerable set' in most set-
theories, is given by some such definition as. a set which 
cannot be put in one-one correspondence with the set of natural 
numbers ~nd which contains a subset which can. Its meaning 
is fixed by this definition. The definition does not mention 
'greater than' or 'actual infinity'. It might be objected 
that even though this definition does not mention actual 
infinities it nevertheless presupposes them. In fact, the 
definition says nothing of whether the sets involved are 
infinite in the sense that they lie spread out before us in 
their entirity or in the sense that given any finite number 
of elements of the set there are yet others of the 
set. 
The diagonal procedure which, Tucker says, has been regarded 
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as non-constructive is, in fact, regarded as constructive by 
, t 't' 't 1 some 1n U1 10n1S s. It is the conclusions drawn from the 
diagonal procedures that are regarded as non-constructive. 
Take, for eAample, the proof that the set of all sequences 
of positive integers is non-denwnerable. First, suppose a 
correlation has been set up between the natural nwnbers and 
a set of sequences of positive integers. The usual diagonal 
procedure then gives a sequence which is not correlated to 
any natural number. It follows that the set of all such 
sequences cannot be correlated to the set of all natural 
numbers. Now, the intuitionist does not object to the diagonal 
procedure employed here. For, given a law which correlates 
the natural numbers with a set of sequences of positive integers, 
it is possible to construct a sequence of positive integers 
which is not correlated by the law. The construction needed 
is, of course, provided by the diagonal rule. It is the 
conclusion drawn from this to which the intuitionist objects. 
\Ie cannot concude that the set of all sequences of posi ti ve 
integers cannot be correlated with the set of natural numbers 
since, he would say, it does not make sense to speak of all 
such sequences. The diagonal procedure is not rejected because 
it appeals to an actual infinity, as Tucker maintains. 2 Nor 
1. see A. Fraenkel, Abstr~ct Set Theory, ~nsterdam 1961. p.55 
2. J. Tucker, 'Constructivity, Consistency and Natural Languages' 
p. 159 
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is it recarded as non-constructive. The reason for rejecting 
such sets as the set of all real numbers, the set of all sets 
of positive integers, etc. is not just that the sets involved 
are 'actually' infinite. As with predicative definitions 
constructivists argue that a set must be defined by a rule or 
a law. A real number must be defined by a law - for intuitionists, 
I 
spread laws. Wang argues that the totality of laws is ill 
defined. We can have no 'clear and distinct idea of the totality 
of all sets or laws defining enumerations,.2 In other words, 
the set of all sets of positive integers is non-constructive 
because each set of positive integers would have to be given by 
a law and we are never in a position to contemplate all laws, 
having knowledge of only a finite number at any time.' 
Similar reasoning applies to the set of all real numbers 
etc. 
To say anything of the set of all real numbers is non-
constructive, so to say of that set that it cannot be correlated 
with the set of natural numbers is non-constructive. 'l'he fact 
that a proof of Cantor's theorem involves the diagonal procedure 
does not mean that the procedure is non-constructive. Cantor's 
theorem would still be non-constructive even if it involved only 
the intuitionist propositional calculus, for the very statement 
of the theorem is non-constructive in that it refers to a non-
1. A. Heyting, Intuitionism - An Introduction p.,4 
2. H. Wang, 'The l!'ormalisation of lv1a.thematics' in 'A Survey of 
:Mathematical LoGic', p.580 
,. ibid, p.~80. 
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constructive set. Tucker's plan to rehabilitate the diagonal 
procedure as a constructive procedure is unnecessary and if 
he is to rehabilitate Cantor's proof as constructive, he will 
need to show that such phrases as 'the set of all real numbers' 
are constructive. Since, however, he has defined only 
constructive procedures it is difficult to see how he can 
cope with what have been regarded as non-constructive 
entities. 
These are hints of how he would deal with such entities 
in his discussion of the interpretations of '31,,'. Again 
he refers to the referential and non-referential interpretations 
of symbols. On the referential interpretation, according to 
Tucker, 'N: stands for an actual denumerable infinity of 
eleihents. But there is a non-referential interpretation, he 
says, in which 'the function of a class symbol is to express the 
notion "the elements of the class such that •••• " where the 
elements mentioned fall under the recipe for the generation of an 
unending series of elements. ,1 
Exactly what 'No' stands for can only be determined within 
some specified set-theory. There are theories in which 'l\{' 
o 
is the set of all sets which can be put in one-one correspon.lence 
with the set of natural numbers. 2 Here 'No' does not denote 
1. J. Tucker, 'Constructivity, Consistency and Natural Languages', 
p.158 
2. e.g. Cantor, Russell. 
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a denumerable set a.t all, since it is the set of all denumerable 
... 
sets, i.e. an indenumerable set. There are other theories in 
which ''No' will be a denumerable setl but because of such 
variety of usage it is unsafe to claim that 'No' has some one 
particular denotation. 
As all that can be said with the use of transfinite 
numerals can be said without their use, there are no extra 
difficulties brought in for the constructivist by their 
introduction. It is not to the introduction of transfinite 
numerals that the constructivists object but to the sets which 
have transfinitecardinals. Tucker should then deal with the 
interpretation of 'N' (the set of natural numbers) rather than 
wi th 'N.'. The remarks he makes about the interpretation of 
'w. ... ' must be considered as if they are about IN I • 
Interpreted in this way, the function of class symbols, 
instead of referring to an actually infinite number of elementsj 
expresses on Tucker's non-referential interpretation the 
notion 'the elements such that •••• , where the elements fall 
under the recipe for the generation of an unending series of 
elements. The distinction here, if indeed there is one, 
is very fine. 'H' does not refer to the set of all natural 
numbers but expresses the notion 'the elements such that ••• '. 
1. e.g. von Neumann 
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It would seem that Tucker wishes to escape by taking 'N' as 
a way of talking about the elements of a set rather than the 
set. Now there are things which we wish to say about the set 
'N' and other things which we wish to say of the elements 
of N. To say that each natural number has a unique representation 
as a product of primes is not to say that N has a unique 
representation. 'ro say that each non-empty sub-set of N has 
a least member is not to say something of each element. 
Perhaps Tucker means something other than the reading 
above by 'expresses the notion of' but I find it difficult to 
regard such a phrase as 'the elements such that •••• , as a 
notion at all. I can understand' the set of aU elements 
such that' or 'being an element such that •••• , as notions. 
But the first seems to be the referential interpretation of 
'If' and the second not what would be meant by 'N' in 
any theory. 
However, Tucker does talk of '~' as b~ing the claws of 
.. 
entities generated from 0 by the successor operation despite 
his analysis of transfinite class symbols in terms of elements 
1 
rather than classes. In this case he says th'l.t it cOTllmi ts a 
category a mistake to ask for this class to be constructed. 
The reason given is t~~t it i8 a class of classes of classes 
1. ibid. p.158 
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whereas the elements of the class are classes of classes. 
(Again this is only true in certain theories) But just because 
, W' (or 'N' to be safer) is of a different category from its 
o 
elements it does not follow that all question of its constructivity 
does not arise. A strict constructivist could say that the 
class of all natural numbers is not constructible because, even 
though each natural number may be constructed (in principle), 
there will never be a time when we have constructed all of them. 
To a constructivist classes have to be constructed. 'fhe fact 
that the elements of a class belong to a different category from 
the class is irrelevent. 
But the non-referential interpretation of class symbols 
that Tucker gives will not work for classes which are non-denumerable. 
There is no way of filling out the expression 'the elements 
such that ••• ' by any generative recipe giving an unending 
series of elements. What could be the generative recipe for 
the real numbers? That there is no such recipe is just 
What Cantor's theorem proves. Class symbols for non-denumerable 
sets cannot receive such an interpretation. If there could be 
an interpretation in terms of generative recipes then the 
construotivist who accepts as oonstructible sets given by a 
generative recipe would have no worries about the sets denoted 
by these symbols. One may look at the construotivist demand as 
a demand for generative recipes. It is the notion of a set 
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not given by any generative recipe, the idea of an arbitrary 
set, that worries the constructivist. 
It is not clear how infinite sets of greater cardinality 
are to be interpreted. Even if indenumerable sets could 
receive a non-referential interpretation in terms of containing 
an indenumerable element, there is no guide given by Tucker for 
finding a non-referential interpretation for such sets as the 
set of all real functions of a real variable. To show that 
this set is of greater cardinality than the set of real numbers 
it will not be possible to replace the usual 'diagonal' 
procedure by a procedure showing that there is a function 
different from each function in an unending series of functions 
given by some generative recipe. The most that the latter 
would show would be that the set of all real functions was 
indenumerable. Generative recipes are out of place here 
since the set of all real numbers itself is not given by a 
generative recipe. 
Similar problems arise when sets of the same non-denumerable 
cardinality are considered. \Vhat is Tucker's constructive 
interpretation of the proof that the set of all real numbers has 
the same cardinality as the set of all continuous functions? 
We could perhaps show that both are indenumerable in Tucker's 
sense of containing an indenumerable element but, since neither 
is given under a generative recipe and Tucker's non-referential 
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interpretation always mention the existence of a generative 
recipe, there would seem little chance of showing 'constructively' 
that they have the same cardinal. 
Lastly, the axiom of choice is dealt with swiftly by 
Tucker. According to him the axiom is non-referential in 
character. l But it is not at all clear what Tucker means by 
non-referential in this context as he has only discussed 
'non-referen tial' for the case of 'i~ • .' and 'indenumerable'. 
If he wishes to say that in addition to being non-referential 
it is also constructive - as it would seem from his allegation 
that it is the referential interpretation which makes the 
constructivist regard certain procedures as non-constructive ~ 
he must introduce some other notion than that of generative 
recipes, for the axiom is needed precisely when there is no 
generative recipe. If there were a generative recipe for a 
set with the property stated by the axiom of choice then there 
would be no need of the axiom of choice. The axiom of choice 
is a purely existential axiom of the form (~x) F(x). If 
there were a generative recipe giving a set with the property 
F it would follow from the predicate calculus alone that 
(tx)F(x) • 111e axiom of choice is needed only if there is no 
way of obtaining the set from the other axioms of set-theory. 
1. ibid. p.157 
2. ibid. p.156-157 
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In the case of a set of indenumerably many sets there could 
not be a generative recipe (in the sense of a recipe giving an 
unending series of elements) which Gives a set containing just 
one element from each set since there are indenumerably many 
of them. But even in the case of a set of denumerably many 
sets the axiom of choice could not be dealt with in Tuckerls 
terms for the existence of a generative recipe would imply that 
'there is no need to invoke the axiom. 
In conclusion, it would seem that each of Tucker IS attempts 
to rehabilitate the non-constructive as constructive fails. 
Also, his approach ignores what seem to me the main problems 
that the constructivists bring to the fore. Since he sees their 
problems as arising from the doctrine that class symbols 
refer to actual infinities he misses the most interesting and 
clearest of their objections - their objections to impredicative 
definition, the notion of an arbitrary law and the notion of 
arbitrary set. 
The example of a constructive proof which Tucker says is 
in fact non-constructive is proof by reductio ad absurdum. 
'All arguments to contradiction are non-constructive 
since the emergence of a contradiction shows th~t what has 
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been tried in the given argument cannot in fact be carried 
out.' 1 
There are different arguments which may be labelled as 
arguments to contradiction, some of which even intuitionists 
accept. Consider an argument of the form: tP .,:) (q • .., q)'~ :> '" p. 
This form of reductio 'ad: absurdum some intuitionists accept. 
(Indeed, as stated earlier in the chapter, NP may only be 
asserted after having derived a contradiction from the 
supposition that the construction denoted by p has been carried 
out. Some intuitionists would say that this is what' ,., p' means. 2) 
It would appear that this form of argument has certainly been 
accepted by constructivists. But there is another form which 
has been rejected by constructivists since it relies on the 
law of excluded middle. Consider an argument of the form: 
Clearly this is unacceptable on constructivist 
grounds, for the fact that a contradiction has been derived from 
the supposition that OJ p entitles us to say only that" P is 
absurd, i.e. "'NP. We could move to p from MOl p only if we 
assumed some such logical rule as N .. p ;) P which is tantamount 
to assuming the law of excluded middle. 
1. ibid. p.152 
2. It cannot be quite as simple as this since OJ q would have to be 
explained first, and so on. To break this infinite regress some 
intuitionists have two interpretations of negation. Kolmogorov 
speaks of a primary interpretation in terms of the :::ncompatibility 
of a subject with a predicate. Brower's notion of absurdity could 
then be defined in terms of this primary interpretation. See 
Kolmogorov, 'On the Principle of Excluded ~lddle' (first) 
published in 1925) included in From Frege to G3del, ed. J. van Heijenoort. 
Cambridge, W~ss., 1967. pp.420-421 
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Constructivists have certainly objected to the second of the 
two schemata mentioned abovel , but in general they have accepted 
the first. 2 
It remains to investigate why Tucker regards the first as 
non-constructive. His explanation rests on the idea that the 
appearance of a contradiction shows that 'what has been tried cannot 
be carried out'. In geometry one might, I suppose, talk in a rather 
imprecise fashion of 'trying to construct two tangents at the 
same point on a circle' and, from the contradiction that results from 
supposing this to be done, say that what we tried to do cannot 
in fact be carried out. Elementary geometry text books may be 
written in such language. To do so is to treat geometry as a 
description of the physical world and reductio ad absurdum proofs 
look as though they report that certain lines cannot be 
drawn etc. Such a view of geometry has long been abandoned. 
Talk of 'construction' in arithmetic, analysis or set 
theory remains metaphorical unless backed up by some definition 
or explanation. Tucker speaks of 'constructive procedures' 
1. e.g. R. Goodstein, 'Proof by Reductio ad Absurdum', Mathematical 
Gazette, vol xxxii, 1948 
2. Some intuitionists reject the whole idea of negation in 
mathematics, so that reductio ad absurdum as a legitimate proof 
procedure would be rejected. But their arguments are not 
directed against the reductio ad absurdum procedure in particular 
See the discussion of Griss's and van Dan~g's attitude in Fraenkel 
and Bar-Hillel, Foundations of Set-Theory, pp.2~9-244. 
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and 'non-constructive procedures', of 'procedures which can 
be carried out' and 'procedures which cannot be carried out'. 
Bu t what' procedures' are there in ma thema tics? Nia thema tics 
consists of proofs. Are procedures supposed to be different 
from proofs? 
In a reductio ad absurdum proof what is it that I 'try' 
and that I find cannot be 'carried out'? Both phrases suggest 
that it is some kind of action. Wba t happens in a reductio 
ad absurdum proof is that I suppose something to be the case and 
find that what I supposed cannot be the case. There is no 
mention here of something that I try to do and find that I cannot 
do. It is true that I indulge in the activities of proof-
making and supposing. But it is neither of these activities 
tha t I try and find that I cannot carry out. For I have 
successfully carried out the proof and, although what I 
supposed turns out to be impossible, it does not follow 
that I cannot suppose what I did suppose. If there is 
something else in the reductio ad absurdum proof which I tried 
and found I could not carry out Tucker has given no hint of 
what it might be. 
Apart from this difficulty, there remains the problem 
of finding out when a proof is of the reductio ad absurdum form. 
1· A discussion of reductio ad absurdum proofs by Goodstein will 
illustrate this problem. Goodstein, disliking reductio ad 
L R. Goodstein, 'Proof by Reduotio ad Absurdum' 
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absurdum arguments because of the lack of info rma tion tha.t they gi'! e, 
tries to give direct proofs of theorems normally proved by this 
method. As an example he considers a direct proof of the theorem 
that the square root of 2 is irrational. 
Starting from the fact that for all positive integers p and q 
\p2 _2q2\~I, it follows that \i/q2 - 2\~ l/q2. This, he 
says, is a direct proof that 2 is not the square of a rational 
. 
number. But this latter statement is surely an inference made 
from the above inequaiity. It may follow almost immediately but 
an inference does have to be made nevertheless. The inference, 
it seems to me, that has to be made here will be made in the following 
way. Suppose that 2 is the square of a rational number p/q. 
Then p2/ q2 _ 2 .. O. Therefore' p2/ q2 _ 2\ < 1/ q2 which contradicts 
the above inequality. In other words, the proof th at the square 
root of 2 is irrational still needs a reductio ad absurdum proof. 
Goodstein has not shown conclusively that the use of reductio 
ad absurdum in this example is unnecessary. 
When proving theorems in an informal way, without reference 
to any axiom systems, it is diffioult to say when reductio ad 
absurdum has been used. In the above example there is no indication 
of what we are allowed to assume. An axiomatisation of arithmetic 
would settle this. If, among the axioms, there occurred the schema 
'a)b ;:, a ~ b l then there would be no need to employ reductio ad absurdum. 
Suppose, instead of this schema, one of the axiom schemata was 
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' ... (a') b.a - b). Then the proof would continue as indicated in 
the previous paragraph. Whether we have to use reductio ad 
absurdum can be decided only after we have laid down an initial 
set of assumptions. 
Tucker, as can be seen from his talk of 'trying' and 'carrying 
out', takes reductio ad absurdum in its rule form rather than in 
its schematic propositional form. That is, in the form:-
if a certain hypothesis leads to a contradiction then the negation 
of that hypothesis holds. iii thout entering too deeply into the 
technical details of the propositional calculus, it may be pointed 
out that this rule corresponds to the rule of the propositional 
calculusl- if there is a hypothetical proof's \-t. '" t' then there 
is a categorical proof of 'NS'. In most systems mf the propositional 
calculus this will be derived as a subsidiary rule from the 
axioms and rules of the system. But the import of the rule is 
that a categoric proof of ~s' can be found whenever we have found 
a hypothetical proof of the form IS\- t ... t l • In other words we 
can prove categorically from the axioms alone the formula '., s' 
without the use of any hypothesis. Suppose some mathematical 
theory is formalised within the first order predicate caloulus. 
It is a short cut to use the derived. rule of reductio ad absurdum 
in order to prove a proposition NP of that theory. Nevertheless, 
there will be a categoric proof of #I P which will not involve using 
P as a hypothesis in a deduction. If we now consider the categoriC 
\ 
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proof of NP, what is it that has been tried and cannot be carried 
out in this prqof? Can it make any sense at all to talk of the 
categoric proof in this way? 
Tucker may still object that, even though categorical proofs 
as opposed to hypothetical proofs do not involve suppositions or 
hypotheses from which a contradiction can be derived, reductio ad 
absurdum has been used implicitly in the sense that the proposition 
{p ~ (Q. N Q)}::l N P or axioms from which this proposition can be 
derived have been used in the categoric proof. This may be the 
case. ~ucker then has to show that these axioms themselves are 
non-constructive. 
~ 
We may, for example, prove ~ P '.) (Q."'{).~ :.- '" P 
from the two axiom schems.ta '" (P .... p) and (P;:lQ) ":I (NQ :;,,,,,p) 
added to suitable axioms for the logical connectives ,~, and '.'. 
Which of these axioms is non-constructive? Which of these does 
it make sense to talk in terms of 'trying' to do something and 
finding that it 'cannot be carried,out'? 
Non-constructive procedures in general Tucker regards as 
impossible of execution because their execution would require the 
1 
contravention of already accepted constructive conditions. 
As I have argued above I am unhappy about Tucker's use of 'procedure' 
in the context of mathematical proofs. It is clear from his use 
1. J. Tucker, 'Constructivity, Consistency and Natural Languages' 
p. 153 
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of the word that it is not a synonym of 'proof'. Yet it is 
difficult to see what he can mean if it is not 'proof'. 
Reductio ad absurdum proofs, since they are non-constructive, 
cannot be admitted as proofs proper, he says, but should be 
regarded as arguments. 'rhey may provide us wi th the only 
information that we have. But they should be regarded only as 
'temporary scaffolding' from which we may later construct a proofs 
1 proper. 
The point that arises here is how these arguments manage to 
provide any information when they can only be made by breaking 
rules. 'The impossibility of the procedures is of a 
2 
rule-breaking character'. It seems odd, if not inoons~ent, 
to maintain that certain rules have been broken and yet that 
information is provided by breaking those rules. If 
information and correct information at that, for Tucker nowhere 
suggests that the ~nformation so given is wrong, can be gained by 
breaking the rules, what possible purpose do the rules oorve? 
One would expect to get mislea~ing information, in some cases, 
from rule-breakine, just as fallacious reasoning would produce, 
in some cases, incorrect consequences. 
From the arguments presented in (i) and (i1) it can be seen 
1. ibid. p.155 
2. ibid. p.153 
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that 'rucker has failed to make his new distinction between 
constructive and non-constructive procedures clear. It is 
not at all clear how the term 'procedure' itself is to be 
understood. It is true that we sometimes speak of Cantor's 
theorem as involving the diagonal procedure. But this way of 
speaking is harmless. It means only that a certain way of defining 
a particular object has been used. The intuitionists can make 
their notion of constructive proof clear in the examples they give. 
To say, for example, that an existence theorem in arithemtic lLas 
a non-constructive proof is to say that the proof does not tell 
us how to compute a number with the required property. Tucker's 
notion of constructivity is made no clearer by the examples he 
gives. It is essential that he makes this notion comprehensible 
if he is to go on and maintain that natural languages are constructive 
in tendency. 
Vihat is meant by a natural language being constructive in 
tendency is even more obscure than of procedures being constructive. 
The only evidence he gives for this conclusion about natural 
languages is that the paradoxes of set-theory are produced by 
breaking constructive conditions. He gives the Russell paradox 
as an example. The condition '",a€a', he maintains, is a constructive 
condition, as is '£.£lc if and only if .. a£a'. \{hat is meant by 
a constructive condition is never enlarged upon~ '.J:he solution of 
the paradox is then given as described in chapter II of this Section. 
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Since the paradoxes are generated by breaking constructive 
conditions, natural languages, in which tile paradoxes can be 
expressed, must be constructive. 
Because of the undefined notion of a lan6~ge being 
constructive, it is difficult to see what indeed has been established 
by this argument. Even if the phrase 'constructive condition' 
were defined it would still be difficult to see what Tucker means 
by 'a natural language beinG constructive in tendency'. 
It seems to Tucker that this is 'a significant discovery and one 
I 
which is contrary to Tarski's thesis about natural languages'. 
But it is hard to see what the discovery is or how the discovery 
contradicts Tarski. Certainly Tarski says th at natural languages 
seem to preclude a consistent use of the expression 'true 
sentence,2 and, further, that natural languages must be inconsistent. 3 
But there is no indication in Tarski's paper of what it would mean 
to say that a natural language is constructive (or non-constructive). 
Consequently, reference to Tarski's paper fails to clarify Tucker's 
contention. 
1. ibid. p.145 
2. A. Tarski, 'The Concept of Truth in Formalised Languages' in 
Logic, Semantics, and I1Ietamathematii3s, Oxford, 1956, p.165 
3. ibid. p.164-165 
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Throughout Tucker's papers there is constant reference to 
his view that the contradictions have to be explained. 
'The paradoxes have to be explained, they have to be fully 
understood, and the manoeuvres of formalisation cannot provide 
any such information or inSight,l 
, •••• in any satisfactory account of the paradoxes of set 
the ory a founda ti onal accoun t mus t be an exp 1 ana tory account. For 
this reason the usual devices for avoiding the paradoxes of set 
theory are unsatisfactory since they do not satisfy the explanatory 
requirements of the foundational level.,2 
His insistence that the paradoxes ~ to be explained shows 
that he believes there is an explanation. What sort of explanation 
is made clear by his purported explanations critiCised in chapter II 
of this section. The explanations will be in terms of the rules 
of language. Now these rules of language must already be 
embeddied in the language before the appearance of the contradictions. 
The rules which have been laid down by philosophers and logicians 
to prevent the occurrence of contradictions he regards as evasions 
and not explanations. They are rules designed solely for the 
purpose of avoiding the contradictions. Since this is the 
1. ibid. p.165 
2. ibid. p.150 
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only reason for the rules' existence they lack any explanatory 
force. Instead of such ad hoc rules Tucker says that we must 
find rules which can be seen to hold before the contradictions 
arise. 
'There is the view that the appearance of a paradox is quite 
unpredictable, that nothing can be done beforehand, that we just 
have to wait for them to turn up and then avoid them.' This, 
Tucker claims, is not the case. Instead, W4 Can investigate 
the constructive working conditions of these words prior to, 
and independently of, the appearance of contradictions. The 
view that the paradoxes are unpredictable is irrational since 
we could in each case have avoided the contradictions by giving 
due attention to the constructive working conditions of the words 
involved. 1 
The paradoxes can always be explained by drawing attention 
to the linguistic rules of language. Underlying this thesis is 
the thesis that natural languages are consistent; that the rules 
of language never give rise to contradictions. He offers 
solutions to the paradoxes by locating a linguistic rule which 
has in some way been broken in the 'proof' of the supposed paradox. 
If natural languages did produce contradictions, and, in particular 
these contradictions as has been maintained in the past (for example 
by Tarski2), then Tucker's search for an explanation would be totally 
1. ibid. pp.164-l65 
2. A. Tarski 'Concept of Truth in Formalised Languages' 
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misplaced. I have tried to show in a previous chapter that 
Tucker's attempts to solve the paradoxes are each lU1successful. 
He has not, so I maintain, located a linguistic rule wbich has 
been broken. How does the thesis that natural language is 
consistent stand up? If it could be shovm that such a language 
is inconsistent without breaking any linguistic rule, then we should 
have less reason to continue looking for 'explawitions' of the 
paradoxes. 
In another paper1, Tucker claims that 'formalisers reject 
infonnal language because it gi. ves rise to contradic tions. Yet 
there is ho evidence whatever for their view. 1 He goes on to 
demand 
••• an 0xawple of an intraUncui stia contradiction whicll 
is obtained by conforming to the working condi tiona of a 1'1'1 tural 
language. Formalisers do not back up their faith with mere examples. 
They are committed. 2 They do not look at the facts.' 
If the phrases 'working conditions' and 'linguistic rules' are 
interchangeable, this is the lU1derlying assumption that Tucker 
has been making throughout his other papers. 
The inclusion of the word 'intra-linguistic· in the above 
quotation succeeds only in confusing the issue. According to 
Tucker 'extra-linguistic' contradictions can occur in natu.ral 
lan~lages without a breakdo\Vl1 of working c~nditions, though it is 
-1. J. 2,'ucker, 'Philosophical Argu..'!lent I Supplementary Voiume XXXIX 
1965, The Aristotelian Society. 
2. ibid. p.51 
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by no means clear how this comes about. The only example of an 
extra-linguistic contradiction that he gives is of a man who says 
tha tit is raining and it is not raining. Both the assertion that 
it is raining and that it is not raining have empiric content. 
r.rhey assert contradictory things about an extra-linguistic state 
of affairs. 'Each has content. Each is well-used. They simply 
contradict each other head on.,l In this example I cannot see 
how, at the same time, this can be a contradiction and for both 
expressions to be well-used, for either it is meant as a report 
of light-drizzle, in which case it is not a contradiction or 
one of the expressions is not well-used, at least in any sense 
of 'well-used' with which I am familiar. 
If 'extra-lingufstic' and 'intra-line'llistic' are to be 
distinct mutually exclusive categories into which vH;J can divide 
propositions and in particular contradictory propositions, then 
we need more of a guide than is given by one exainple. Into 
the intra-linguistic category Tucker wishes to put the set-
theoretic paradoxes and into the other every contradiotion which 
has not been labelled a paradox. If we did not know that this is 
the division he wants we would not be able to see which propOSitions 
belonged to which category. It may, however, be the case that the 
distinction is between a p:dori and empirical propesi tiona, but , 
L ibid. p.58 
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this would be unlikely as this \'10 uld render the two new terms 
superfluous. In order to see the inadequacy of the purported 
distinction, has the man who says that two and two are four ru1d two 
and ~vo are not four made an extra-linguistic or an intra-
linguistic oontradiction? Certainly both are well-formed and 
each has con tent. So it would appear from Tucker's example that 
it is extra-linguistic, but so too would Russell's paradox appear 
as an extra-linguistic contradiction. Clearly, he would like to 
separate out the arithmetic contradiction from the paradoxical 
ones of set-theory, but he has not given any oriterion to enable 
us to do so. 
Leaving aside the question of the precise meaning of 
'intra-linguistic', we can return to the thesis contfulned in a 
previous quotationa- that there is no evidence that contradictirons 
occur in ordinary discourse when conforming to the w'orking oondi tions 
of that language and that formalisers overlook this fact. 
For anyone committed to the belief in the consistency of 
natural languages, as Tucker is, there is no way of refuting him. 
Each time an apparent contradiction turns up which does not seem 
to violate the working conditions of that language, it is always 
open to him to say that althou~l it does not seem to violate any 
of the working condi tiona that we have found~ heverthHess ,1 t does 
violate some condition, but it just hhppens that we l~ve not found 
it yet. The thesis is irrefutable. Unlike fomal languages 
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where the 'working conditions' are laid down in advance in 
the form of rules of inference, informal languages have 
to be inspected after their use for their working conditions. 
Vie have no guarantee at any time that we have found all these 
conditions and that since a given contradiction does not break 
any of these cond! tions it m-gst be a contradiction which does 
not violate any working condition of that language. 
The reason why some philos ophers have rejected such a thesis 
in the past is the existence of several contradictions which do 
not seem to break any linguistic rule. The existence of these 
contradictions,is the fact which formalisers look at. They are 
the evidence which formalisers produce. To accuse them of not 
producing evidence and of not backing up their faith with 
'mere examples', is to ignore the amount of research into the 
paradoxes in the last sixty years. If some philosophers maintain 
that informal language is inconsistent then it is because the 
'explanatory' solutions offered in the last sixty years fail to 
satisfy them. The justification such a philosopher would b'1:ve 
then for, saying that informal language is inconsistent. though 
not of oourse oonolusive, is reasonable and not the result of 
an irrational beli ef. 
In passing, it may be noted that many of those Tucker refers 
to as formalisers have themselves offered solutions of the ps.radoxes 
in inforrnal terms and maintainedtbat they do arise from the 
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violation of some implicit linguistic rule. Even the formalists 
themselves have given an explanation of the paradoxes in terms of 
an unjustified extension of the usual rules of logic from finite 
domains to infinite donains. 
'Does material logical deduction somehow deceive us or leave 
us in the lurch when we apply it to real things and events? No 
1~terial logical deduction is indispensible. It deceives us only 
when we form arbitrary abstraot definitions, especially those which 
involve infinitely many objects. In such cases we have illegitimately 
used material logical deduction; i.e. we have not paid sufficient 
attention to the preconditions necessary for its valid use.,l 
This quotation shows that even Hilbert, the foremost formalist, 
believed that contradictions occurred only when the rules implicit 
in the language were forgotten. Indeed, if the word 'preconditions' 
in the above quotation were to be changed to 'working conditions' 
then its last sentence would not look out of place in Tucker's paI~r. 
Russell also is included.in Tucker's list offormalisers and 
the theory of types which Russell devised to deal with .the paradoxes 
Tucker regards as an evasion and not an expla~ltion. Now, 
although Russell does say that the main recommendation for the 
theory of types is that it solves the paradoxes he also believes 
it to conform with common sense. 2 But behind the theory· of types· 
1. D.Hilbert, 'On '11 he Infinite', in Philosophy of li[;l.thematicfih ed. 
P. ~enacerraf and H.Putnam, Oxford, 1964. 
2. B. Russell, Principia Mgthematica, Cambridge, 1913 p.37 
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there is the vicious circle principle which is the justification 
for the theory. The vicious circle principle is derived in turn 
'from the principle that in a definition the definiendum must not 
appear in the defininiens, which has been considered a sound 
principle from the time of Pascal at least, and may be found in 
elementary logic: textbooks. It is true that belief in the 
principle does not by itself lead to a theory of types. Hintikka's 
more recent work on applying the vicious-oircle principle in its 
simples~ form does not lead to the theory of types. l • The 
theory of types cannot be derived from the vicious circle 
principle alone: it needs Russell's analysis of classes in terms 
of propositional functions, for example. 
The reasons for accepting the theory of types as put forward 
by Russell are philosophical. The theory of types was no't just 
an evasion but an outcome of the vicious-circle principle and 
Russell's philosophical doctrine of propositional functions. 
The subsequent rejection of Russell's theory of types by 
sympathetic logicians was cau~ed not by the lack of any philosophical 
justification for the theory but by the unsatisfactory nature of 
, 
the axiom of reducibility and the doctrine of propo$itional 
functions. 
1. J. Hintikka, 'Identity, Variables and Iropredicative Definition', 
Journal of Symbolic Lorlc, 21, pp.225-245· 
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The so-called formalisers have looked at the facts and have 
presented examples. It would seem that the implicit rules of 
informal language do b~ve rise to contradictions. The set-
theoretic paradoxes provide good evidence for this. Their 
existence cannot of course show conclusively that informal language 
is inconsistent, i.e. that the implicit rules of language allow 
a situation to occur where ~vo sentences one of which is the 
negation of the other both appear to have the same truth value. 
For the rules of informal language are not open to our inspection 
as the rules of formal languages are. We may inspect a formal 
language and show conclusively that it leads to a contradiction, 
the rules of inference and any axioms that it may have are precise 
and explicit. For natural languages the rules have to be found 
and even then preCision cannot be expected. One may draw the 
analogy between extracting the rules of natural languages and 
extracting the rules of a game from the observation of the game 
itself. If the only guide to the rules of that game was our 
observation of that game then we could never be sure that the 
rules we had extracta.:l were the complete rules of the3'8.l!le, nor 
that any of the extracted rul~s corresponded with precision to 
any actual rule of the game. For there may alwayabe the 
possibility that some rule has not been employed while the observer 
was watching and that the rules have the disjunctive form; do. 
A or do B or •••• for some finite number of.' possi bili ties At B, •••• 
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Since the observer may only watch for a finite time the disjunctive 
rule may have been employed for doing only a finite number of 
these possibilities and at no time could the observer be sure he 
has listed them all. 
The analogy breaks dOi'm when we oonsider that, unlike the 
hypothetical observer, we are not only extracting the rules but 
at· the same time playing t J:e game, Nevertheless, the point 
brought out by the analogy is that it cannot be proved that informal 
language is inconsistent. The most that we can say is that there 
is evidence for this conclusion. 
It may be that Tucker believes that not only is it the case 
that natural languages are consistent but also that they ~ 
be consistent. But if i~ is correct to talk of language rules, 
as Tucker does, then it does seem possible that these rules could 
conflict. The rules we use have been made by us, and, as we are 
unable to see all the consequences of these rules straight ~{ay, 
it may turn out that they confliot. In designing a game or a 
system of laws we may find that the rules or the laws are such· 
that direot us to do contradictory things. In ohess, for example, 
there are ~{o rules, one of which says that the king must be moved 
out of check and another which says . that the king must not move 
into check. On oertain oocasions these rules confliot; they 
conflict when a post tion of checkmate is reaohed.·' Suppose. that 
winning .the game of chess consi stedt not in ,forcing cheokmn.te, 
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but in removing all the opponent's pieces from the board. 
Then the rules would create an impasse when the checYJllate 
position was reached. If language is thought of in this way, 
as a system of rules which we have Ill.::'1.de, then it seems not unlikely 
tha t such conflicting rules should 0 ccur. Perhaps the classic 
example of this is frior's introductionl of the propositiona~ 
connective 'tonk' by means of two rules of inference. From a 
proposition A one can derive the proposition A-tonk-B and 
from the proposition A-tonk-B one can derive the proposition 
:B. Consequently, from A one Can derive the proposIiltion tv A. 
The rules for the connective 'tonk' are such that two contradictory 
propositions can be derived. It is, of course, easy to see that 
these two rules allow the derivation of contradictory proposi tiona, 
but the example does show that in talking of lan~~ge rules the 
possibility of rules which allow contradictory propositions to be 
derived may exist. 
In the case of the set-theoretic paradoxes one could regard 
the axiom of comprehension (in its naive form) as a rule for the 
introduction of the phrase 'a.-belongs-to-b '. What is sh~wn by 
the appearance of paradoxes is that one cannot cadopt such a rule 
(along with others) without falling into inconsistency, justa.s 
one cannot adopt the rules for 'tonk' without falling into 
1. A. Prior, 'The Run-about Inference Iricket t, Anal:ysis ,vo1.21, 
1960, pp.38-39 
- 157 -
inconsistency. 
As I have argued earlier in section 1 of thi s thesis, the 
appearance of contradictions in set-theory reveal only that we 
cannot operate consistently with the axiom of comprehension in 
its naive form. We are forced to change the rules for the use 
of the word 'set'. 
To ask, as rrucker does, for some explanation of why certain 
purported sets lead to contradictions is as futile as asking for 
an explanation of why there is no greatest prime number. 
Since each paradox of set-theory can bC;3tated in a natural 
language there may be a temptation to think of solutions of paradoxes 
in terms of spotting a fallacy, rather as one spots that an aritr~etic 
contradiction is produced by a fallacious move of dividing by O. 
To spot such a fallacy it is necessary to recognise the rule that 
division by 0 is illegitimate. To spot some fallacy in set-theory 
we need to recognise the rule that has been illegitimately disregarded. 
In what sense there are such rules in abstract set-theory has been 
discussed in section 1. rrhere I tried to show that the rules of 
abstract set·theory were our own creation, utilising certain 
analogies from a pre-formalised notion of collections of objeots. 
A first attempt at set-theory included the axiom of oomprehension. 
It produced contradiotions in the field of abstract sets. 
Consequently it was necessary to abandon the axiom if we desired a 
oonsistent system. The rules introrulced for the word tset' would 
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have to be revised. To look for wxplanatious in terms of ordinary 
linguistic rules seems to me a mistake as they could at most guide 
us in choosing the axioms of set-theory. In abstract set-theory 
we may use the words f set' and I class t but it must be remembered 
that we have chosen to use them in a certain way, the way laid down 
by the axioms we have chosen. 
Perhaps the simplest solution in terms of linguistic rules 
~R 
would be that the phrase 'abstract set' is itself illegitimate 
for whenever we speak of sets we must speak of sets of something, 
e.g. numbers, students, chairs etc. To talk of 'abstract sets' 
is to forget this rule, to think that there could be sets wlllch are 
not sets of something. l But this demolishes not only the paradoxes 
but the whole edifice of set-theory. There would be no paradox6rl 
of set-theory since there would be no set-theory. 
1. I am not suggesting that this is a rule of language. although 
it seems to me just as acceptable a rule as those cited by Tucker in 
his solutions of the paradoxes. 
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Seotion 3 
In this seotion I shall be oonoerned with Tarski's definition 
of truth for formalised languages. This definition is the subjeot 
of his two papers, 'The Conoept of Truth in Formalised Languages,l 
and 'The Semantio Conception of Truth,2. In the former, Tarski 
oonstruots a definition of truth for a formalised language and 
explains how, and Within what limits, this definition may be modified 
for other formalised languages. In the latter paper, the construction 
is only outlined but there are, in addition, replies to various 
oritioisms made of Tarski's definition. 
Whenever a definition is given for some stated p~pose, one 
method by which that definition can be judged is to see if it does 
achieve the purpose intended. Tarski's definition is in this 
catagory sinoe he states the aim of his definition and the oonditions 
that it must satisfy. In the examination that follows I smll 
show that he has not suooeeded in oonstruoting a definition 
which accomplishes the task that he has set for it. To show this, 
is not to show that the definition is either wrong or valueless. 
A definition may be regarded, for example, as a proposal to treat 
the definiendum as a synonym or an abbreviation of the definiens; 
the definition may then be accepted or rejected on other grounds than 
1. A. Tarski, 'The Conoept of Truth in Formalised Languages' included 
in Lode, Semantios and Metamathematios, trans. Woodger, 1956, pp.152-278 
2. A. Tarski, 'The Semantio Conception of Truth' t Philos()'Qh;,! and 
Phenomenologioal Research, vol. 4 (1944). 
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accomplishment of purpose. It may be held that acceptance of 
such a proposal might lead to a confusion or that the definition 
is fruitless because it allows few or no relevant consequencies 
to be drawn. Considerations like these may enable the definition's 
worth to be evaluated and, in general, they will be independent of 
those concerned with its satisfaction of the author's purpose or 
purposes. In the present section I shall leave aside all 
considerations that do not directly affect the question of whether 
Tareki'sdefinition of truth fulfils, or fails to fulfil, his 
programme. 
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I 
By means of quotations from his papers t I shall begin by 
isolating the purpose Tarski's definition of truth has to fulfil. 
'The present article is almost wholly devoted to a single 
problem ... the definition of truth. Its task is to construct -
wi th reference to a. given language ... a flk1.terially adeguate and 
formally correct definition of the term "true sentence". This 
problem, which belongs to the classical questions of philosophy, 
raises considerable difficulties. ,I. 
'The desired definition does not aim to specify the meaning of 
a familiar word used to denote a novel notion; on the contrary, it 
.. 2 
aims to catch hold of the actual meaning of an old notion.' • 
Tarski elaborates further this 'old notion'a 
' ••• throughout this work I shall be concerned exclusively 
with grasping the intentions which are contained in the so-called 
classical conception of truth (rttrue_ corresponding with reality") 
''lIe should like our definition to do justice to the tntu! tions 
••• 
which adhere to the clas,sical Aristotelian· conce:pt1on of truth ...... I 
,3 
To say of what is that it is not, or of wh.:'lt is not th7't it 1St is f&ls~, 
while to say of wha.t is th~t it is. or ofwhl\t is not that itisnot, 
is true. ,4 
1. .A. Tarski, 'The Concept of Truth in Formalised Languages t, 
Introduotion. I SMll refer to this work as OTF. 
2. A.Tarski, 'The Semantic Conception of Truth', seotion 1; I 
shall refer to this work as s~r. 
;. CTF. Introduction 
4. SOT, section 3. 
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The definition of truth must be conformable to this classical conception 
of truth, if the definition is to fulfil the aims Tarski has set for it. 
According to Tarski the definition must have as consequences, such 
equivalences as the following: 
"Snow is whi te"' is true if and only if snow is whi te." 
He maintains that in this equivalence "Snow is whi te" occurs as a 
name of a sentence and not as a sentence itself since the subject 
of "is true" can only be a noun or an expression funotioning like 
a noun. 
Tarski holds that the problem of construoting a definition 
conformable to the classical conception of truth becomes the problem 
of construoting a definition the consequences of whioh will be 
equivalences of the forma 
X is true if and onll if p. 
In these equivalences, "pit will be replaced by a sentenoe and .'IX" by 
a name of that sentence. 
For natural languages such as English, the oonstruction of a 
definition which will imply oonsequences of the above type raises 
several problems •. ' One of these is the diffioulty whioh is produced 
by generaliaing such sen tenoee as the followingt "Snow is whi te" is 
true if and only if snow is white. The natural generalisation would 
be a sentence of the following form: 
for all p, "p" is a true sentenoe if and only if p. 
(lip" is here a. name of the sentence Uplf). The diffioul ty lies in 
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the function of names in such sentences, for if names like "Snow 
is white" are treated as syntactically. simple expressions (like single 
words of a language) then parts of the name may not be r~placed, 
just as parts of a word (the letters) may not be replaced in a 
natural language. Under these conditions, "p" denotes the letter 
of the alphabet, p. Consequently, the sentence 'For all p, "pit is 
a true sentence if and only if p' will have such implications as 
'''p'' is true if and only if it is snowing.'. Clearly, this treatment 
of quotation-mark names leads to undesirable results. Similar 
considerations applied to other forms of names force Tarski to give 
up the attempt to construct a definition of truth for a natural 
language. Apart from the difficulties entailed by the function of 
names in such a definition of truth, there occurs in the application 
of the term "true" in a natural language a variant of the tliar'. 
antinomy.' In view of these problems Tarski turns his attention away 
from natural languages to formalised languages. 
For such formalised languages Tarski tries to construct a 
definition of truth, consequences of which he desires to be sentences 
of the following form~ 
Xis true if and only if p. 
(Here "X" is a name of the sentence "p".) 
It is seen tha. t this attempt is analogous to the previous, 
attempt to constructs. definition for a natural language. Tarski 
contends tha. t for some formalised la.:ngua.ges, a definition which would 
fulfil the above condition can be constructed and moreover 
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is possible to give a precise condition, which these languages 
must fulfil if they are to allow of such a definition to be tonstructed 
for them. 
Tarski then constructs a definition for one formalised language 
in some detail and shows how other definitions of truth may be 
constructed for other formalised languages. 
The above is an outline of Tarski's paper 'The Concept of 
Truth in Formalised Languages', the details of which I shall 
consider later. At present it will be sufficient for my,purpose to 
extract from this outline the several aims that he has met for his 
defini tiona 
Firstly, the definition and the investigations relating to it 
should be concerned with concepts dealt with in classical philosophy 
· ile. be such that they have philosophical value and not only ,technical 
1 1. va ue." 
Secondly, the definition should be conformable to the classical 
conception o£truth, i.e. "true ~ agreeing with realitylt. 2• 
Thirdly, the definition should have as consequences sentences 
of the following type. Xis true if and onlxif p, inwh!ch IIpH is 
',a sentence and "X" is a name of that sentence. 3• 
Fourthly, the definition should satisfy several formal conditions, 
e.g. the definiens should be in terms whose sense is precisely known, 
4. or in ,terms which are reducible to other known terms., 
1. ,CTF, Introduotion. SCT. paragraph,3. 
2. CTF, Introduction. SOT, section 3. 
, ,,,. CTF t ,section li, seotion 3, paragraph4. 
" 4. CTF, Introduction. SOT t section 1. .. 
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Now, if· the investigations are to have any concern with the 
philosophical problems of truth then that part of the papers which 
is concerned with defining truth for formalised languages should 
not only be a concern of mathematicians but a concern of philosophers, 
since this part is the main subject of the paper. Implicit in 
the first aim is that the definition of truth for formalised 
languages should be of some philosophic value, since it is not to 
be supposed that classical philosophy has been concerned merely 
with a technical term related to formalised languages only, 
the study of formalised languages being of more recant origin than 
classical philosophy. Implicit in the second aim ia that the 
'correspondence' theory(or whatever Tarski understands by this 
term) should be applicable to formalised languages, for there would 
be little support gained for his contention, that he is dealing 
with a problem that.has occupied philosophers, if he were constructing 
a definition of truth conformable to a theory which is inapplicable 
in the domain of formalised languages. 
The third aim presupposes that consequences of the type .~ 
true if and only if p, should be conformable to the Aristotelian 
conception of truth. But Tarski does not elaborate on what he under-
stands by 'confoxmable'. Presumably, he wants these consequences to be 
consistent with the Aristotelian conception of truth, i.e. such that 
acceptance of the Aristotelian conception of truth implies aooeptan.ce 
of the schema a X i§! true if and only if Ih where "X',· and "pit are 
.. replaced acoording to the conventions mentioned above. 
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The fourth aim is of a formal nature and its fulfilment may be 
determined by inspection of the definition Tarski constructs. 
In connection with the second and third aims listed above, the 
defini tion should have no consequences which are in,:,conflict with 
the concept of truth with which Tarski is concerned. For, if the 
definition is to be conformable with (which is interpreted here as 
'consistent with') such a conception of truth, then, besides givir~ 
consequences of the fonn X is true if and only if 12, the defini ti on 
should not imply sentences which would be unacceptable to anyone 
allowing those consequences. 
In the past criticisms of the definition have been directed at 
the suitability of Tarski's procedure for natural languages and 
have ignored the prodedure for formalised languages. After a 
discussion of these criticisms I shall show that Tarski bas not 
fulfilled all of the above aims for the more limited domain of 
formalised languages. 
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II 
In this chapter I shall consider cri ticisrns of the defini tion 
made by Black, Strawson and Kneale. 
Black has arguedl that Tarski's definition of truth for formalised 
\ 
languages would be inapplicable to any natural language and that 
conse~uently Tarski's investigations are without philosophic 
relevance. 
Firstly, he maintains, Tarski's definition would necessitate a 
complete enumeration of the terms occurring in the lanb~ge for which 
the definition is being constructed. But natural languages have 
an 'open' character, that is, they can have added to them new terms. 
There would have to be some rule that would stipulate that no new 
terms were to be introduced into those languages, if a definition 
" -' 
based on Tarski's procedure were to be possible, The fact that 
there is no such rule would condemn any such attempt to failure. 
Secondly, Tarski's definition of truth applies' to only one 
language at a'time. In other words, Tarski does not give a 
definition of truth in general, but gives a definition of truth for 
a language, 'Li , say." If the definition of truth fol' Li is known, 
then how is a definition 'of truth for another langUage !'j to be 
constructed? . To extend the principle of the d~fini tion'to' another 
- - '., " - ",~', - - -r 
language, Black says, it is necessary to understand that principle. 
1. Max Black, 'The Semantic Definition of Truth', =:;;.;:..,~~ 
Vol. 9. No.4, 1946, pp.49-6, 
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But to state that principle will only be a crude reformulation 
of the sentence: For anp. lip" is a true sentence if and. only if p. 
This sentence was found to be unacceptable by Tarski because of the 
difficul ty involved by the function of the name "pit. It is 
impossible to state a general criterion or definition of truth by 
Tarski's procedure. Black contends that the philosopher is searching 
for a eeneral criterion for truth. 
Thirdly, the philosophio problem of truth is left untouched 
by the definition that Tarski proposes, since adherents of the 
correspondence, coherence and pragmatist titeories of truth would 
all agree (subject to certain qualifications) that "it is snowing" 
is true if and only if it is snowing. 
Black t s conc lusion is that Tarski' s pro cedure has no philosophio 
relevance, since it is inapplicable to natural languages and also 
neutral to conflicting theories of truth. This conclusion, however, 
does not follow from Black's arguments. 
Assuming his arguments are valid and he is entitled to say 
that the definition cannot be applied to natural languages, that 
, -. . 
a general cr! terton for truth based on Tarsk! t s lines oannot be 
stated consistently and that the definition of truth which Tarski 
gives is ne1,1.tral to conflicting theories of truth, do these statements 
imply the conclusion that the investigations'ofTarskiarewithout 
any philosophical relevance? It very much depends on what Black 
understands by 'philosophical relevance'. If he regards MY 
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definition as without philosophical relevance which is neutral 
to conflicting theories of truth, then there does seem to be some 
support from his arguments for his conclusion. But to say that 
the definition is neutral to mutually inconsistent theories, 
because those theories would all accept sentences of the following 
forma "It is snowing" is true .. if and onlI if it is snowing'., is 
incorrect. For there may be other consequences of the definition 
which are incompatible with these theories. For example, there 
is, the conclusion that Tarski's definition implies, 'It turns out 
that for a disCipline of this class (a very comprehensive class of 
mathematical disciplines) the notion of truth never coincides with 
that of provability. ttl. It may be the case that this consequence 
might be incompatible with some theory of truth; it is not 
sufficient for BlaCk's conclusion to examine just those consequences 
represented by .the sche~at ~_is true if ~~d only if p_ 
If Black understands by 'philosophical relevance' the 
relevance, of the definition for natural languages • in which case 
consequences of the definition of the type quoted above, having 
reference to formalised languages only, would be ignored,. then 
it still seems that the conclusion doesl'lot follow. For 
even though Tarski's procedure may not .be applied to natural 
languages, there are consequences about them which can be infered 
1. SOT. Section 12. 
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from his investigations. One such consequence is that no 
definition can be constructed, consistent in the language, which 
will imply all sentences of the form. X is true if and only if p. 
Again, whether this has 'philosophical relevance' depends on what 
Black means by that term, but Black's paper contains sentences of 
this same negative type of which he does not wish, presumably, to 
deny 'philosophical relevance'. Also, the claim that Tarski's 
investigations have only philosophical relevance if his 
procedure is applicable to natural languages seems to be an 
unwarranted restriction. If, as is the case, a term such as 
'true' is used in connection with sentences of a formalised 
language as well as with sentences of a natural language, then 
there seems to be no reason why this term should not be of philosophical 
interest. In the same way, a philosopher may consider some term 
which is used mainly in connection with SCience, e.g .. 'theory', 
'hypothesis', 'model', without ceasing to. be a philosopher. In·· 
addition, there is the philosophy of mathematics which, in general, 
is not concerned with applications to natural languages. 
The arguments which Black proposes are not ones which 
Tarski would contradict. The first argument, that Tarski's procedure 
is inapplicable to natural languages t Tarski has made himself. 
Tarski contends that· it is' b~cause of'1;he ind~iini te-character· . 
ora natural language which makes any definition of truth,materially 
adequate and formally correct in Tarski's sense, inapplicable in a 
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natural language. 'The problem of the definition of truth 
obtains a precise meaning and can be solved in a rigorous way. 
only for those langwlces whose structure has been exaotly 
specified. ,1 
Secondly, Tarski does not claim that his definition has 
anything to do with the philosophical problem of truth 
he writesl 'In general, I do not believe that there is such a 
thing as "the philosophical problem of truth". I do believe 
that there are various intelligible w1d interesting (but not 
necessarily philosophical) problems concerning the notion of truth, 
but I alBobelieve that ,they can be exaotly fonnulated and possibly 
solved only on the basis of a precise conception of this notion. ,2 
Tarski might not object to any of Black's arguments, it is only 
with Black's conclusion that he might disagree. This conclusion, 
I have shown, rests, for its~alidity, on the extension of the 
term. 'philosophica.l relevance', which Black appears to have restricted 
unduly. 
Strawson has argued that the Semantio ''cheery of, Truth is a 
misconception. 3• He maintains .tha.t the word 1 true I is not 
normally used in the way the semantic theory describes, though 
it may be so used for some teoltnioal purposes. 
1. SCT. Section 6 
2. SCT. Section 18 
,. P.F. Strawson, 'Truth' t Analysis, 1ol~9; No.6, 1949 pp.83-97 
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the semantio theory has its probable genesis in a oonfusion. 
the confusion between the use of 'true' in a phrase employed 
metalinguisticallyand the use of the word 'true' when isolated 
from this phrase. Strawson considers the meta-statementsl 
(i) "The monarch is deceased ll is true if and only if 
the king is dead. 
(ii) "The monarch is deceased" is.. true in English if and 
only if the king is dead. 
In these two statements lIis true if and only if"ls used synonymously 
by Strawson for the phrase "means thatlt. (the case of a queen being 
. 
disregarded by Strawson). He stutes that this use of the phrase 
"is true if and only if II is metalinguistic. lIe next considers 
the follo\nng sentence, 
(iii) liThe monarch is deceased" is true in English if and 
only if the monarch is deceased. 
. 
Sentences like (iii) he considers as degenerate cases of metalinguistic 
statements of the type of .. (i) and (11). He then notices the 
similar! ty between the us e of the phrase "1f and only it''' in. this 
type of metasta. tement and its use in expressions ot' the .. following 
type I 
(iv) The monarch is deceased if and only if the king is 
dead. 
In sentence (iv) ttif and only if" occurs. but the sentence is what 
Strawson calls a: 'necessary or. defining formula " whereas in 
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, , 
(i), (ii) and (iii) Itif and only if II occurs as part of "is true 
if and only if" in contingent metastatements. (They are contingent 
because. it is a contingent matter that the sentences mean what 
they do mean.) The similarity of the use of the phrase "if 
and only if" in necessary formulas to the use of it as part 
of the phrase "ia true if and only if" in contingent metastatements, 
Strawson contends, may have constituted a strong temptation to 
regard what follows the phrase "if and only if It in the degenerate 
cases of metastatements as the definiene of what precedes 
it. 
Having analysed a probable source of the misconoeption " 
involved in the Semantic Theory of Truth, Strawson argues that the 
normal uses of the word "true" are those in which the word 
might be'replaced by some such phrase as "I confirm it". 
These criticisms are not directed against Tarski in 
particular, but, as Tarski and Carnap are the only two writers 
mentioned by Strawson in his attack on the semantio oonception 
of truth, I shall understand that Strawson does mean them to be 
included among those that he crt tioises. I shall now offer "'!!!lOme 
objections to Strawsonts arguments. 
The premiss of Strawson's argument is thatthesemantio 
, oonception of truth rests on a mistaken idea of the aotual or 
normal use of the word "true ll • This implies that those who 
put forward the Semantio Theory of Truth have either been unaware 
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of the uses of the word "true", other than those proposed in the 
theory, or in some way have confused the uses. But in fact 
Carnap is well aware of the different uses of the word "true". 
Carnap writes in his 'Introduction to SenL~nticslt 
'It is to be noticed that the concept of truth in the sense just 
exp~ained - we may call it the sem~ntical concept 9f truth - is fundamentally 
different from concepts like "beHeve", "verified", "highly confirmed", 
etc. The latter concepts belong to pragmatiCS and require a refe]9nce 
to a person. ,1. 
Strawson's contention that "true" may be adequately replaced by some 
such phrase as "I confirm it", If I concede that" etc. ensures that 
these uses belong to what Carnap calls pragmatics, that is, they 
require reference to a person. Consequently, the uses of the word 
"true" which Strawson takes to be the normal uses of it fall outside 
the Semantic Theory of Truth, but at least there is no confusion 
involved since the uses are clearly demarcated by Carnap. Tarski 
also accepts that there may be other uses of the term "true" and 
maintains that this will make no difference to his thes1s~,l. 
'A time may come when we find ourselves confronted with several 
incompatible, but equally clear and precise, conceptions of truth.' It 
will then become necessary to abandon the ambiguous usage of the word' 
"true lt and to introduce several tenls instead, each to denote a different 
2' 
notion.' • 
1. Rudolf Carnap, Introrulction to Semanttc~ 1942 p.28 
2. SCT. Section 14. 
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'We should reconcile ourselves with the fact that we are 
confronted, not with one concept, but with several different concepts 
which are denoted by one word; we should try to make these concepts 
as ~learl~s possible (by means of definition, or of an axiomatic 
procedure, or in some other wa~.,l 
It is clear from the above quotations from both rrarski and Carnap 
that the semantic theory does not claim to be the only theory of 
truth. The concept of truth with which the semantic _ theory is 
concerned may be different from Strawson's concept of truth, but, 
nevertheless, Strawson does not argue that the semantic theory 
offers merely a differen~ concept of truth. Strawson is arguing 
that the semantic theory of truth is based on a misconceptign. 
I think that I have made it sufficiently clear that Carnap. 
and Tarski,have taken considerable care to disentangle the semantio 
concept of truth from other concepts of truth and to guard 
themselves against the accusation of misconceiving the notion of 
truth. The claim that Strawson IllS.kes, that the semantio theory 
involves a misconception of the ordinary use of the word "true lt 
can only, be substantiated if ,those who put forward the-theoryc :. 
contend .that their definition of "truett results in a use of trnt 
word which is coincident with its ordinary use. ThiS, however, is 
not the case, for Tarski writesl 
1. SeT. Section 14. 
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trrhe problem of assigning to this word ("tr\le") a fixed and exact 
meaning is relatively unspecified, and every solution of this problem 
implies necessarily a certain deviation from the praotice of everyday 
language. ,1. 
This is not just a reiteration of the statement that more than one 
concept falls under the word "true "; it asserts that the replacement 
of a vague ooncept by a precise one necessitates a deviation from the 
ordinary use of the word that expresses that vague concept. Tennesson 
2 has argued that verbal communication is dependent upon the use of 
linguistio locutions that are either a) suitable for some special 
purpose or b-) clear or c) in aocordance with ordinary language. If 
either of the first two conditions is considered most important, then, 
he ooncludes, the locution in question will no longer be in accordance 
with everyday usage. (He mentions in this context Strawson's use 
of "presupposition".;) Tarski's aims of clarity and precision ensure 
that his definition of truth will give a use of the word II true " that 
is not ooincident with its everyday use. 
MOre important still, the definition that Tarski has tried 
to oonstruot for everyday. language would not only imply a deviation , 
from the standard use of the word "truett, it is not even 
intended to make precise the normal use of the word, for Tarski 
writes. 
1. SCTSection 17 
2. H. Tennesson, 'Permissible and Impermissible Looutions' in Studies 
,Dedicated to Pro.f.!t~sor Carnap on his Seventieth BirthdnI: 1962 
;. P.F. Strawson, Introduction to 10&98.1 fllheon. 1952, p,175f£. 
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'A thorough analysis of the meaning current in everyday life 
of the tem "true" is not intended here. • •• I would only mention 
that throughout this work I shall be concerned exclusively wi th grasping 
the intentions which are contained in the so-called classical conception 
of truth. ,1 
It is true that Tarski believes that the semantio conception of truth 
do es conform to some exten t with common-senseusa.ge , but he regards 
this as unimportant for his thesis. In the passage in which Tarski 
states this belief2 ., he takes oare tod1fferentiate between the 
aims of the semantic definition of truth and his belief about the 
semantic definition. It would be wrong to suppose that trde belief 
is part of the semantic theory's claims; it is only an opinion about 
the semantic definition of truth, an opinion which may be mistaken 
as Tarski admits. If Strawson had wanted to show that the semantic 
theory of truth involves a misconception, then he would have had to show 
that this misconception was of the Aristotelian conception of truth 
which is the only conception of truth with which Tarski was concerned. 
It may be that Strawson is correct in asserting that his own use of ' 
the word "true" is more prevalent than the metaling-gisticuse of the 
word, ,but this is no criticism of the semantio theory for .the semantic· 
theory does not aim at offering adefini tion that is in aoco rdance 
with everyday usage. 
l. 
2. 
Introduction· 
section 17 
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The foregoing arguments have shown that Strawson's criticisms 
are misguided for they are directed against clairr$ that the 
semantic theory doesnot in faot make. These are my major 
arguments agiinst Strawson but there is one point of detail in his 
paper that I should like to consider further. 
V7hen Strawson shows what he believes to be a probable genesis 
of the 'misconception' he emphasises the importance that sentences 
like '''It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snoWing' play in 
the semantio theory of truth. He calls these sentences degenerate 
metalinguistic sentences because they are degenerate forms of sentences 
like t "The monarch is deoeased" is true if and only if the king is 
dead' which are metalinguistio sentences. His main argument in this 
section of his paper is based upon the assumption that the semantic 
theory of truth is concerned primarily with such 'degenerate' sentences. 
Strawson writes. 
'To read the degenerate cases, then, as specifications, or parts, 
of some ideal defining fonnula for the phrase "is true II is to separate 
the phrase from the context which alone confers this meta-linguistic 
use upon it, and to regard the reaul t as a model for the general 
use of "is truett.,1 
And againl 
••• the muddle of reading a degenerate case of contingent, 
statements meta11nguistically employing the phrase is true if ~donll 
1. Strawson, . 'Truth 1. 
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if,as a pseudo-defining formula of which the definiendum consists 
of a quoted sentence follows by the phrase is true 
contributed to the plausibility of the theory. ,I 
••• may have 
The 'muddle' that Strawson attributes to the adherentw of the semantic 
theory should not be ascribed to either Tarski or Carnap since they 
do not consider it necessary to insist on 'degenerate' cases like 
'''It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing'. In 'The 
Semantic Conception of Truth' Tarski does consider such sentences 
throughout his paper, but it should be remembered that this paper 
is only expositary in character and is limited to the non"technical 
aspects of his earlier investigations. Yet, even, here he 
writes. 
'(This reqUirement that every sentence which occurs in the 
objeot-language must also occur in the metalanguage can be 
somewhat modified, for it suffices to assume that the objeot-
language can be translated into the metalanguage)t. 2 
I.e. it is not neoessary that "it is snowing" ooour on the:right 
of "if and only if" in the sentence .. IItIt is snowing" is true 
if and only if it is snowing'~; it is only necessary that there 
should be some translation of IIi t is snowing" on the right. The . 
problem of oonstruoting a definition which will have as consequenoes 
sentences represent ed by the tlchema t ~~X is true it and only if p" •. 
1. 
2. 
... Stra:Wlion, 'Truth', section II 
. SOT. seotion 9 . 
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where "X" is the name of a sentence, is not concerned solely with 
those cases in which "p" is that sentence; it is equally 
concerned with those sentences in which "p" is a 'translation' of it. 
~arski has made a simplification of his arguments contained in 'The 
Concept of Truth in Formalised Languages' and, in doing so, leaves 
aside the extra complication which would arise from the consideration 
of such sentences as '''The monarch is deceased" is true if and only 
if the king is dead'; but this simplification should not be 
seen as a:ny part of the muddle to which Strawson ::re fars. Indeed, 
when Tarski comes to construct a definition for an actual language 
in 'The Concept of Truth in Formalised Languages', he no longer 
considers 'degenerate' cases even as part of his criterion of 
1 
adequacy for a definition of truth. I shall discuss this actual 
defini tion later; for the moment I should jus t like to show that 
Tarski, in the main body of his work, dispenses with these 
'degenera te', ,sentences. It seems unlikely, rather than plausible 
as Strawson maintains, that such sentences which play eo little 
part in Tarski's investigations should have been the basis Qf a. 
muddle in the semantic theory. 
Carnap also pays little attention to sentences of the 'degenerate' 
type for he wri tea. 
fA predicate pro in M is an adequate predioate for the concept , 
. l. 
of trl.lthwi th respect to anobje,ct language S -df froID' the 
1. I shall not discuss this criterion further a.t this 'Point as it 
involves a certain knowledge of Tareki's terminology. ' 
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definition of pri every sentence in M follows which is construoted 
out of the sentential function "x is F if and only if p" by sub-
sti tuting, pri for "F", a translation of any sentence~ k of S 
into M for "pit, and any name ofr6 k for "x".l 
It is only as examples in the expositary sections of Tarski's 
paper that these degenerate sentences occur, and, Carnap treats 
them as special cases of a more general type, not as sentences to 
which special importance is attached. It may be the case t~lt 
some confusion of the kind Strawson points out may be the source 
of the semantic conception of truth, but it does not appear from 
the investigations of Tarski and Carna.p. Vfhat does appear is 
that Strawson has exaggerated, if not mistaken, the role played 
by such sentences as 1 "It is snowing" is true if and only if it is 
snowing' in the semantic theory of truth. 
Strawson has chosen to ignore the domains to which the semantic 
theory has been applied in detail by Tarski. Straw80nis 
concerned only with empirical statements; the truth of "sentenoes 
in a formalised language does not concern him inthis:Particular 
paper. He states, however, that "truelf'is certaillly used meta~" 
, . ;, ,<:. ,< 
linguistically for some teclU1ical purposes and presumably he considers 
that the definition of truth for formalised.la~ges' as given by 
Tarski is constructed for such a purpose. If this is SOt then a 
1. R. Carnap, Introduction to Semantics, pp.27-2S 
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more thorough analysis of the term "technical purposes" is needed • 
• 
It appears that there are at least two ways in which "technical 
purposes" may be interpreted. Fir:jtly, a' term may be used in a 
technical field e.g. mathematics or physics. Thus the definition 
of "force", "work", "energy and "mass" in physics and "group", "field" 
and "set" in mathematics are technical definitions, the definiens 
of which belong to symbols and terms of a technical subject. These 
words in a physical or mathematical context are certainly defined 
for a technical purpose; their definitions have little oonnection 
with their use in everyday language. It is not in this catagory 
that Tarski's definition of truth falls. for it is not constructed 
Wi thin any techni cal language. Seoondly, the definition may be 
constructed for some purpose conneoted with a technical field but 
not as part of that technical field.· Such terms as IImodel" , 
"hypothesis" and "explanation" in oonnection with physios, "proof" 
and "implies" in conneotion with matherna tics and "complete", 
"consis tent l ' and "independent It in connection with formalised 
languages are used in this technical way. Tarski's definition of 
"true" should come intl1is catagory rather than the fonner. :But 
it is still not clear for wb.e.t technical purposes the word "true" 
is defined oruaed by him.· It lahia intention to make more 
accurate the notion of truth that is oontained in the classical 
oonoeption of truth for actual languages or for artificial languages.· 
There is no change of procedure when he considers formalised 
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languages; there is a change in the results of applying this 
procedure to formalised languages but it is the same conception of 
truth in both cases with which Tarski is concerned. The use of the 
term "true" that his .definition would imply would be the same whether 
for formalised or actual languages. Tarski 's use of "true lt 
differs in this respect from the use of those terms that I have 
listed in the second catagory, for they are terms that are used in 
oonnection with their technical fields in a way that is not intended 
for everyday usage. Tarski intends to use the word "true" in the 
same way for both the technical field of formalised languages and 
for the non-technical field of everyday language. That is, his 
criterion for the adequacy of a definition of truth remains unchanged 
whether he is considering formalised or inforDlS.l languages. If 
it is the case that Strawson is willing to allow the metalinguistic 
use of the word "true" in connection wi th formalised languages , then 
he should allow that it is so used in conneotion with everyday 
language. I shall not oonsider this point further as it may. be 
that Strawson is referring to some other use of "true" when he talks 
of 'ttechnioal purposes lt • 
K'neal&.e makesona objection against Tarski's definition in his 
discussion of truth. l • He contends tha t truth is applicable 
1. W. Kneale and M. Kneale, The Development of Lor,ic 1962, ch.X 
.. section I. 
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primarily to propositions and that Tarski holds that it is applicable 
primarily to sentences. He argues further that Tarski's assumption 
that truth is primarily concerned with sentences leads to difficulties 
in the case of those sentences that contain token-reflexive words 
(i.e. words which locate things or events by relation to the circumstance 
of their own utterance). A sentence may be uttered on one occasion to 
express a true proposition and on another to express a false proposition. 
For example, the sentence "I am hungry" may be used at the same time by 
two different people to express two different propositions, one of which 
may be true, the other false. 
To defend himself from these difficulties, an adherent of Tarski's 
conception of truth, Kneale suggests may say that truth is aSCribed 
in some primary sense to token utterances. (A token utte~ance in 
Kneale's sense is a passing event of speech, as, for example one 
might say that someone stuttered in his last sentence.) If it is to 
token utterances that those who subscribe to Tarski's theory attribute 
truth, then the diffioulties of a sentence cranging its truth value with 
varying circumstances are met. But then it becomes impossible to use 
1arski 'sdeviceof saying "if and only ii'n followed by the sentence 
under consideration as a condition of the truth of that sentence. For 
it is impossible to use quotation-mark names for token utterances or 
to use the structural-descriptive narr,es, ile. narues given to the sentences 
by some such device as spel1in;;. Also, it .is imposei'bleto .. usethe 
same tOken utter",nce following "if and only if" since a token utteranoe 
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is not a form of words but a passing event. 
I shall attempt at this point to answer Kneale's 
objection. 
Firstly, Kneale appears to be wrong on a question of fact. 
As indicated above, he maintains that Tarski assumes tl~t truth 
or the adjective "true" is applicia.ble primarily to sentences, 
whereas "true" is properly applicable to proposi tiona. He 
writes I 
'We hold that the adject! ve "true" is applicable primarily to 
propositions, whereas he (Tarski assumes that it is applicable 
primarily to sentenoes. ,1 
In the same paragraph he makes the stronger aocusation: 
t ••• the source of the trouble seems to be Tarski'sunguestioned 
beli~f that truth is primarily a property of sentences. ,2 (the under-
lining is mine.) 
In fact, rrarski makes no olaim that "true'l is applicable mainly to 
sentences, at least, in neither of the papers referred to in my 
discussion nor in those referred to by Kneale in his book.. .. It, 
does not appear that Tarski, although nOWhere st;.:Gnsthattruth is 
primarily a property of sentences, might still be assuminathat it is 
such a property. On the contrary, Tarski is quite explioit onthie 
matterl 
1. Kneale, The Development of Logic, p.;88 
2. ibid, p.;89. 
.. 
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't.Che predicate "true" is sometimes used to refer to psychologi.cal 
phenomena such as judgements or beliefs, mmetimes to certain physical 
objects, namely, linguistic expressions and specifically sentences, 
and sometimes to certain ideal entities called Itpropositionslt. 
By "sentence" we understand here what is usually meant in grammar 
bylldeclarative sentence"; as regards the term "propositionll, its meaning 
is notoriously a subject of lengthy disputations by various philosophers 
and logicians, and it seems never to have been made quite clear and 
unambiguous. For several reasons its appears ~ost convenient to 
1 §.Ri!ly the term "true" to sentences t and \ve shall follow this course.' 
(The first underlining is mine.) 
'Of course, the fact that we are interested here primarily in the 
notion of truth for sentences does not exclude the possibility of a 
2 
subsequent extension of this notion to other kinds of objeots.' 
(The underlining is mine.) 
From these quotations it can 'easily be seen that Taraki does not hold 
that truth is primarily a property of sentences. ¥fh.a.t he says is 
that he is primarily interested in truth as applied to sentences, not 
that it is applied primarily to sentences. For the-waY'in which 
fl'arski,considers "true", .it is most convenie:r~:~;to applythe'term to 
sentences; he does not say tha. t it is the only application of the term 
Ittrue lt nor the prima.ry application of it. No drubt the. difficUlties 
1. SeT. seotion 2. 
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. of extending his treatment of the word "true lt from sentences to 
propositions involves considerable difficulties, both philosophical 
and technical, but Tarski does not consider it impossible or 
incorrect to extend his trea truent to propositions. It appears that 
Kneale' is mistaken when he aocuses Tarski of assuming t.hat truth is 
primarily a property of sentences. It is true that Tarski's papers 
deal' only with sentences, but it is equally clear from the above 
1 quotations that he does not assume what Kneale sug&~sta. 
Secondly, Y..neale write:') of the diffioulties that treating 
sentencds as the objects to which the attribute "truallts applied. 
But he does not say explimitly What these diffioulties area 
'\Vhen we are concerned with mathematical formulae ••• or with 
other phr'e'tses that resemble his example in not containing. token-
reflexive words .... , Tarski's assumption'leads to no serious 
difficulties. . .... But thesearespeoia.l cases. A sentence of the 
oommonest kind may be uttered at different times and in different 
ciroumstances to express different propositions, some true and Bome 
false. .. Wba t Jones asserts by saying "I am hungry" is not the .same 
proposi tion as that Smith asserts by uttering the words at the same 
time, nor yet the'same as that uones asserted. by uttering the words 
1. I should qualify. this remark. .Although it is olear from these 
quotations that Tarski has not assumed that truth is primarily a 
property or sentences , it may not be olear from the];laper CTF, both 
quotations being taken from SCT.· Indeed, the:l"eader mayg€l't this 
impression fremCTE, but seotion 2 of SOT does appear to deny exp]oitly 
the charges of such an assumption or "unquestioned. beliefll • 
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yesterdayl And when we say, as we sometimes do, that a sentence was 
true at the time of speaking or wri t:l.ng, we obviously mean that it 
was used then to express a true proposition though it could not be put 
to that effect now. ,1 
The next paragraph begins: I In order to escape from these difficulties 
••• '. As no difficulties have been specified, it may be assumed that 
Kneale is referring to some difficulty entailed for Tarski'a procedure 
by the changing truth-value of sentendes containing token-reflexive 
words. But in what way does the changing truth-value of a 
sentence affect Tarski'a method? Tarski' is not trying to establish 
a criterion of truth for sentences that will automatically decide 
whether that sentence is true. ,It is not the form of words that 
establishes the truth or falsity of the sentence by Tarski's definition 
of truth2; the truth of a sentence like "It is snowing lt is decided 
eventually by making an observation. Tarski does not intend that 
the truth of "It is snowing" to be divined by looking at the form 
of the sentence. The fact that "I am hungry" has a. cbangingtruth .. 
value in no way conflicts with Ta.raki's definition or prooedure. 
He does not intend to fix the truth-value of all sentences for all 
time. The most that Tarski's definition allows as inferences a.re 
1. The Development of Logic p.589. 
2 •. Although I speak of "Tarski t s definition", it must be remembered 
that he has not given a. definition of "true" for ordinary langl.1<'lge, but 
only 1I0utl1ned" it. 
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such sentences as '''I am hungry" is true if and only if I am hun€,TY". 
I do not see that any extra difficulty is entailed by the fact that 
"I am hungry" is now true and now false, for it is still the 
case that '''I am hungry" is true if and only if I am hungry- f is true. 
The same 'difficulty' applies to all sentences of the English language, 
since all such sentences contain verbs and all these verbs are tensed. 
Tensed verbs are token-reflexive words according to Knealel , therefore 
the same argument applies to "It is snowing" as to "I am hungrylt. 
If he is to be consistent then he should place "It is snowing" in 
the same category as "I am hungry" rather than in theca teg-ory of 
mathematical formulae. Similarly, however, mathematical formulae 
may also change their truth-value, i.e. they nlaY be 'true I in one 
mathematical system and 'false' in another. (This will be the case 
when both mathematical systems have the same rules of sentence 
formation but differ in the rules of transformation, e.g. by taking 
different axioms for the two systems.) Y~eale should conclude 
from these considerations that all sentences whether of ordinary 
language or of some formalised language are susceptible"to the sarne 
or related fifficul ties; but this is perhaps wandering from the 
point. What is in question at the moment is whether the changing 
truth-value of a sentence is of any importance to Tarski 'a procedure. 
1. 'The Development of Lo~c, PI'. 51 .. 2 
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I have shown above the reasons why I do not consider that it is 
relevant to Tarski' s method, but I shall perhaps make my point more 
clear by giving an example. Carnap has given a simple semantic 
system which contains token-reflexive words in the form of tensed 
verbs 11. 
'We construct a semantic system S in the following way. S 
(that is to say, the object language of S) contains seven signs: 
three individual constants, i~, in2, in3, two predicates, pr1, and 
pr2, and the two parentheses "(,, a.nd ")". ••• Sentences of S are 
expressions of the form pr(in). The truth-conditions are given 
separately for each sentence by the following rules I 
1. prl(inl ) is true if and only if Chicago is large. 
2. prl (in2) is true if and only if New York is large. 
3. prl (in3) is true if and only if Carmel is large. 
4. pr2(inl ) is true if and only if Chicago is a harbour. 
5· pr2(in2) is true if and only if New York is a harbour. 
6. pr2(in3) is true if and only if Carmel is a harbour. 
This is very similar to Tarski's procedure very much reduced in 
application. It is to be noticed that "Chicago is large'! contains 
a token-reflexive word, namely, "is". If pr1 denotes the. word "large" 
and pr2 denotes "a harbour" (or "is large" and "is a harbour" respectively) 
and in a similar fasion inl denotes the word "Chioago" etc., then the 
1. Carnap, Introduction to SemantiCS, pp.23-4 
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pri are nBllles, in Tarski's phraseology, of the worda "is large", "is 
a harbour", "Chicago" etc. The system S is then Tarski's procedure 
exactly applied to the six sentences pr.(in.). 
~ J As can be clearly 
seen, there is no contradiction or difficulty involves in the semantic 
system S by the fluctuating truth-value of "New York is large'! or, 
It is not part of the semantic 
system S to fix the truth-value of the pri(in j ), the semantic system 
fixes only the truth conditions of the pri(inj ). The SBllle applies 
to Tarski I s procedure; it is only the truth condi tions of sentences 
in which he is interested, it is not his intention to give a truth-
value for each sentence that will : .. remain unchanged for all 
time. 
Thirdly, Kneale argues that to escape from these difficulties 
anyone who agrees with Tarski.'s prodedure might take refuge in token-
sentences or utterances. That is, he might say that "true" is 
primarily an attribute of token-utterances. Apart from the difficulties 
involved in the use and mention of sllch an utterance which Kneale 
has indicated, it seems an unlikely hypothesiS, bearing in mind what 
Tarski has written. 
'Statements (sentences) are always treated here as a particular 
kind of expression, and thus as linguistic entities. Nevertheless, 
when the terms "expression", lIstatement", a.re interpreted as names 
of concrete series of printed signs, various formulations which occur 
in this work do not apPear to be quite correot, ani give the appea.ranoe . 
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of a widespread error which consists in identifying expressions of 
like shape. This applies especially to the sentence '''It is snowing" 
is a true sentence if and only if it is snowing.', since with the above 
interpretation quotation-mark names must be regarded as general (and 
not individual) names, which denote not only the series of signs 
in the quotation marks but also every series of signs of like shape. 
In order to avoid both objections of this kind and also the introduction 
of superfluous complications into the discussion, ••• it is 
convenient to stipulate tba t terms like "word", "expression", "sentence", 
do not denote concrete series of signs but whole classes of such 
series which are of like shape with the series given; only in this 
sense shall we regard quotation-mark names as individual names of 
expressions. ,I 
From the above it may be deduced that Tarski would not apply his 
procedure to token-utteranoes. He ia well aware of the difficulties 
that would arise if he were to do so. But (referring to the second 
argument) he is fortunately nmt obliged to use any Bueh Bubterfuge. 
It must first be shown that the chaning truth-values of certain 
sentences do lead to real difficulties for his procedure. 
believe that Kneale has shown satisfactorily that they do. 
I do not 
I have now dealt in some detail with the criticiems of Black, 
Strawson and Kneale. There is one point that may be notioedl in 
their objectionsl they all consider the semantic conception of truth 
1. CTF, Loa:1.c Semantics and lvIathematics, p.156, footnote I 
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truth in connection with ordinary language, but as I l~ve said in the 
first c~pter of this section, if Tarski's claims are to be discussed 
then it will be necessary to investigate the main part of his work, 
which is devoted to formalised langu~ges. I shall leave the foregoing 
criticisms for the moment. In the next chapter I shall discuss in 
more detail Tarski'a aims and purposes and then reoonsider these criticisms 
in the ilght of that chapter. 
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III 
Carnap asserts that the semantic conception of truth is intended 
as an explication of the concept of truth as used in everyday lan(~ge 
and in all of traditional and modern logic,l By "explication", 
Carnap understands I the task of making more exact a vague or not 'lui te 
exact concept used in everyday life or in an earlier stage of scientific 
or logical development, or rather of replacing it by a newly constructed, 
more exact conceptt. 2 In this task of explication, the earlier 
concept is called the explicandmn and the new, replacing concept, 
the explicatum. Carnap enlarges further on the notion of 
explication. 
'Generally speaking, it is not required that an explicatum 
have, as nearly as possible, the sruae meaning as the explicandumt it 
should, however, correspond to the explicandum in such a way that it 
can be used instead of the latter." 
Although Carnap states that the semantic conception of truth 
is intended as an explication of the everyday concept of truth, it 
is not certain whether Tarski intended hi! definition of truth as 
an e~plication or if Carnap chooses to regard it as such. Since I 
have said that I shall consider Tarski's definition a success or a 
failure if it achieves or fails to ~chieve its intended purposes, it 
1.Carnap, Mee,n;frng and Necessit;z, 1956, p.e 
2. ibid p.8-9 
,. ibid p.e 
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will be necessary to take some care over this point. 
It is not necessarily the case that Tarski did intend his 
concept of truth to be an explication of any earlier concept or to 
be an explication of the everyday concept in particular, even though 
Carnap may regard his own approach to the semantic concept as explic-
atory. For example, Strawson's analysis of the actual usages of 
the word "true" could be regarded as an explication of the ordinary 
concept of truth, but, to judge from the number of categorical 
statements contained in his paperl" it is extremely doubtful if it 
was intended as such. 
It is, however, the case that Il'arski is engaged on a task of 
clarification, thus fulfilling Carnap's definition of explication, 
and, moreover, from a reading of The Semantio Conception of Truth 
or from the quotations on pages 175, 1'76 and \'7'7 of this thesis it is 
clear that Tarski, in maintaining that his conception of truth is 
not the only one possible, intends to give what is called by Carnal' 
an explication. For itis one of the properties of an explication 
that it allows other explications of the same concept. (This 
distinguishes the t,ype of analysis given by Strawson from that 
given by Carnal'; the former analysises the actual uses of the word 
"true", the latter replaces the aotual use by another.) 
The further condition that Carnal' gives in order that a 
clarification should rank as an explication is that the explicatum 
1. Strawson, Truth. 
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'should ••• correspond to the explicandum in such a way that it 
can be used instead of the latter'. As a condition, this is still 
very vague. Quine enlarges on and clarifies this notion. l He writes 
of explica hon I 
'We do not claim synonymy. We do not claim to make clear and 
explicit what the users of the unclear expression had unconsciously 
in mind all along. We do not e.{pose hidden meanings, as the words 
"analysis" and "explication" would suggest; we supply lacks. We 
fix on the particular functions of the unclear expression tha. t make 
it worth troubling about, and then devise a Bubstitute, clear and 
couched in terms to our liking, that fills those functions. Beyond 
those conditions of partial agreement, dictated by our interests and 
purposes, any traits of the explicans come under the head of "don't 
cares". ,2. 
He continues further, 
'ile have, to begin wi th, an expressio~ or form of expression 
that is somehow troublesome. It behaves partly like a term but not 
enough so, or it is vague in ways that bother us, or it puts kinks 
in a. theory or encourages one or a.nother confusion. But also it serves 
certain purposes that are not to be abandoned. Then we find a way 
of accomplishing those same purposes throu~hother channels, using 
other and less troublesome forms of expression.'; 
1. Q,uine, Word and Object, 1960, p.257 ff. 
2. ibid, p.258 
,. ibid, p.260 
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As an example of an explica.tion ~uine uses the ordered pair. 
I shall use this example here, as it will serve as a model of 
explication with which to compare Tarski's definition of truth. 
According to Quine, the ordered pair, when first introduced by 
mathematicians, was subjected to the single postulate 
(i) (x,y) • (z,w) implies x = z and y = w. l 
There are many "explications" of the ordered pair. It is only necessary 
that they fulfil the condition (i). Thus, (x,y) may be taken as 
2x.3Y or as x+(x+y)2 or as {lx1, {x,yE' They are all adequate 
explications of ordered pair (with the reservation tl~t the first two 
are only explications of an ordered pair of numbers) because all satitfy 
(i). Quine contends that the utility of "orderad pair" depends on 
there being denoted objects for it. Any of the above explicantia 
will suffice. Not only do they fulfil condition (i), but they also 
define ordered pairs as numbers or classes which may be admitted as 
objects. 
To return to Tarski's definition of truth, the sit~tion is 
found to be similar to the definition of the ordered pair. The 
problem for Tarski is to construct a definition of truth for a 
language L which will be formally correct, that is, a definition 
the definiens of which is expressed in clear and unequivical terms 
or terms which are .reducible to euch. The difference.between the 
1. ~uine may be right here but modern mathematioians would use 
logical equivalence rather than implioationin (1). 
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explication of the concept of ordered pair and the concept of 
truth lies in the conditions that they have to satisfy. For the 
ordered pair the condition is clear and unambiguous as stated in 
(i) above; for truth the condition or conditions are not obvious 
nor unambiguous, Before any explication can be attempted it is 
necessary to specify the conditior~ that the explicatum must 
fulfil. 
At this point Tarski fixes his attention upon sentences as 
opposed to propositions and upon the correspondence thoory of truth 
as ~pposed to the coherence theory of truth, the pragmatic theory 
of truth etc. But the formulations of the correspondence theory 
of truth are insufficiently precise for Tarski's purpose. He 
finds it necessary to fonnulate a clearer condition than, for example, 
T,l1e truth of a sentence consists in its agreement wi th reality or 
A sentence is true if i tdesir;:nates an exi.sting state of affairs. 
Finally, he formulates the condition thus I 
(T) the sentence X is. true if and only if p 
where up" is to be replaced by any sentence in the language and 
IIX" by any name of that sentence. He modifies this condition to 
allow a translation of the sentence named by "X" to replace up". 
The definition must have as consequences of t,rpe T. (T) functions 
as (i) in the case of the ordered pair. The explicatum of ordered 
pair must have as a consequence (i); the explicatum of truth must 
have as consequences sentences schemat1sed by (T). It 1s to be 
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noticed that (T) does not offer a definition of IItrue" but only 
furnishes what Tarski calls a condi tion for the material adequacy 
of any definition of "true". ~'his explains why the criticisms of 
Strawson, Kneale, and Black appear to be misdirected. 
Leaving aside the arguments Black proposes about the 'philosophical 
relevance' of Tarski's definition, with which I have already dealt, 
I shall now consider another of his arguments. Black argues th at 
even if a complete enumeration of words in a natural language could 
be achieved and a definition of truth constructed for it, the definition 
would still be unsatisfactory because no extension of it to other 
languages would be legitimate. For suppose that a definition of "true 
in the English language as of January 1, 1940 "could be constructed, 
then the difficulty remains of extending the definition to cover, for 
example, "true in the English language as of January 1, 1941". 
According to Black it would be impossible to extend the definition 
of truth to this second language without involving the difficulties 
which were noted in the discussion of quotation-mark names. Black 
writes. 
'Anybody who is offered a definition of "true in the English 
language as of January 1, 1940'1 must, therefore, resolutely abstain 
from supposing that he "understands'! the principle of the datini tion, 
in the sense of being able to give an explicit definition of the 
concepts defined. If he tries to give such a formulation, he will 
succeed only in talking nonsense (uttering a sentence which breaks the 
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syntactic rules of the language to which it belongs.)l 
This argument seems to confuse the definition with the 
condi tion, a. confusion tha t Black has been careful to avoid elsewhere. 
Blac~ states the generalisation of the sentences, "'It is snowing" 
is true if and only if it is snowing', "'London is a. ci ty" is 
true if and only if London is a city' and so on in the following 
fOrIna 
'(0) For all x, if x is a sentence, then "x" is true if 
and only if x. ,2 
(Black should have written "if "x" is a sentence" instead of "if x 
is a sentence" in the above.) The sentenoe e is unacceptable for 
reasons that have already been given in connection with quotation-
mark names. J31a.ck agrees wi th Tarski that defini tiona of type (a) 
would fail to fulfil the condition whioh states that a materially 
adequate definition of truth must give as consequences "'It is 
snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' etc. Black continues I 
'In default of a simple defintion expressing the intent of 
the condition, the best we can do is to write a sChema. 
(8) s is true if and only if x • 
. We may say, infornally and 7;nexactly, that an aooeptable definition 
of "true" must be such that every.sentenoe obtained from (8) by 
replacing 'x' by an object-sentence and's' by a name of definite 
1. Black, ''llhe Semantic Definition of Truth' section 7 
2. ibid, section 3 
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description of that object-sentence shall be true. But we must 
remember tl~t to talk in this way is equivalent to paraphrasing 
the unacceptable formula 9. At all events, (S) is not a definition 
of truth, but at best a criterion to b~ide us in the search for a 
definition.,l Black's formula (S) is the same as the condition (T) 
gi ven above. If Black's assertion is correct then Tarski is unable 
to formulate condition (T). But (T) (and likewise (S) ) do not seem 
to be 'paraphrases' of (9), for (e) uses an instance of a name. 
function, in faot quotation-roark-names, and is only an attempted 
definition of truth which is found not to satisfy condition (T). 
It may be the case that a name-function cannot be found that could be 
used in a definition of truth and would satisfy condition (T), but at 
least condition (T) can be stated without inconsistency. If a 
defini tion were to be constructed in some language L1 then it may 
be the case that the definition could be extended to another language 
L. without involving the formula (e) either explicitly or 
J 
implicitly. This is the case when Tarski extends his procedure from 
the calculus of classes to the caloulus of relations and the calculi 
of many-termed relations. On the other hand, it may be the case 
that the definition is not extendible to other languages, as would be 
the case of extending Tarski's definition of truth for the calculus of 
classes to the general theory of classes. But it cannot be extended, 
1. ibid, section 3. 
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because of the peculiarities .involved in the 1anb'Ullge which 
expresses the general theory. It is not because it involves the 
formula (e). In this respect it resembles the definition of the 
ordered pair, for, depending on the language in which "ordered 
pair" is to be defined, ordered pair may be defined as \lX~ txYl~ 
x y 
or 2 .3 • If it is to be defined in the calculus of classes then 
{\x\ ~X:YH will serve, 'if in the theory of numbers, 2X.3Y• The 
only requirement is that the definition should have the consequence, 
(x,y) • (z,w) if and only if x=z and y=w 
Similarly, for the definition of truth the only requirement is that 
it should give as consequences sentences schematised by (T). 
As can be seen from the case of the ordered pair, it is not necessary 
the. t the definition be capa bl e of extensi on to ana ther language, 
but only that the condition it satisfies should be. 
Strawson too has mistaken the condition for a definition. He 
writes I 
••• the muddle of reading a degenerate case of contingent 
statements meta-linguistically employing the phrase is true if and 
only if, as a pseudo-defining-formula of which the definiendum 
consists of a quoted sentence followed by the phrase ia true ••• t l 
The objeotions of Strawson against the definition of truth, should. 
be directed against the condition for the mat.rial adequacy of 
1. Strawson, 'Truth' seotion II 
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such a definition, for, gTanted the condition, any objection against 
a proposed definition would be that it did not satisfy tIns condition. 
"What ar~ents may be put forward against a condi tion? The argument 
of Strawson from actual usage may show that normal uses of the word 
"trueu do not coincide with Tarski' s use of the word "true", but 
it is clear that Tarski deals with none of these uses. Tarski is 
content to find a definition that will satisfy condition (T). It 
may certainly be objected that the condition is of no use for ordinary 
language because any definition that satisfies it will be inconsistent 
or that no definition can be found that will fulfil it. But such 
objections can only be discovered after the formulation of the 
condition and they do not stem from. such conSiderations as Strawson's 
Condition (T) does not act as the conclusion of Tarskifs investigations, 
it acts as the starting point for all later discussion. 
turn shows that Kneale is inoorrect in his assertion that: 
' ••• he (Tarski) even goes on to argue that the possibility 
of construc.t:i;ng the paradox: of the Liar wi thin ordinary. language 
shows that for this. as distinct from a formalised language of SCience, 
there can be no satisfaotory definition of trut};!:. ,I 
To make this into a correct assertion 'that satisfies condition (T)' 
should be added at the end of the quotation. . Tarski makes such 
assertions only about those definitions that would satisfy condition ~). 
1. Kneale, The Development of Lop;ic, p.589. 
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It is not his critics alone who exaggerate Tarski's claims. 
Russell has written: 
'Tarski ••• has shown that the words "true" and "false", as 
applied to the sentences of a given language, always require another 
language, of higher order, for their adequate definition. ,I Unless 
Russell means by 'adequate definition' the same as Tarski's 'materially 
adequate definition' in the sense that the definition satisfies 
condition (T), then this too n~y be incorrect, for Strawson's use 
of the word "true" does not need a hierarchy of languages or even 
another language. If the role that explication plays is overlooked, 
it is possible that statements made by Tarski about definitions of 
truth which satisfy conlU tion (T) may be confused with eta tements 
made about "true". Tarski has guarded himself against allegations 
that he is making categorical statements about the use of the word 
"true", by accepting the existence of uses other than his own. 
he writes in one paperl 
'The concept of truth also is to be included here, (among 
semantic concepts) at least in its classical interpretation,2. 
Although 
It is not such a definite assertion as it appears, for by "semantics" 
\ 
Tarski in this context means. 
' ••• the totality of considerations concerning those concepts 
which ••• express certain connections between the expressions of a 
language and the objects and states of affairs referred to by these 
1. . B. Russell, An Enquiry into Meaning' and Truth, 1940 ch.4 
2. A. Tarski, 'The Establishment of Scientifio Semantios' inoluded 
in Lop;ic, Semantics, Metamathematics. 
- 205 -
expressions.,l 
Thus, what appears to be a dogmatic assertion about the nature of 
truth turns out to be tautologous. 
In the remainder of this section I shall consider Tarski's 
definition of truth as an explication and I shall judge it accordingly. 
In the next two chapters I shall be concerned with the definition 
of truth for formalised languages in which Tarski's investigations 
are conducted in more detail but which the above critics have 
neglected. 
1. ibid. 
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In this chapter I shall give an exposition of Tarski's 
procedure for the construction of a definition of truth for a fcrn~lised 
language.l It will be necessary to give this exposition in some 
detail since my criticisms of Tarski's definition will require 
it. 
Firstly, Tarski characterises formalised lanroutges as artificially 
constructed languages in which the sense of every expression is 
unambiguously determined by its form. The essential properties 
possessed by all formalised languages are the followinga 
a. for each language a list or description is given of all 
the signs with which the expressions of a language are formed; 
b. by purely structural properties those expressions called 
sentences are distinguished from all other expressions of the 
language; 
c. a list or description is given of the sentences called 
axioms; 
d. in special rules, called rules of inference, certain 
structural operations are embodied which permit the transformation 
of sentences into other sentences; in particular, sentences which 
can be obtained by the application of this operation on the axioms 
are ca~led provable sentences. 
1. Tarski's procedure may be found in CTF, section 2. 
- 201 -
Tarski adds that he is not concerned with formal languages 
the expressions of which have no material sense. The problem of 
defining truth for such languages is not even meaningful. He 
writes' 
'We shall always ascribe quite concrete and, for us, intelligible 
meanings to the signs which occur in the languages we shall consider. 
The expressions which we call sentences still remain sentences after 
the signs which occur in them have been translated into colloquial 
language. The sentences which are distinguished as axion~ seem to 
us to be materially true, and in choosing rules of inference we are 
always guided by the principle that when such rules are applied to true 
sentences the sentences obtained by their usa should also be true. ,I 
Before passing to a specific language, Tarski distinguishes 
an object language from its metalanguage. The metalanguage is the 
language in which we speak about the object language. lJ.~us, the 
description of expressions of the object language and the name s of 
expressions of the object language belong to the metalanguage. 
For his object languace Tarski chooses the calculus of 
classes which, he says, can be regarded as an interpretation of the 
algebra of logic. 
I shall briefly summarise Tarski's description of the object 
language (which I shall call "011) and metalanguage (which I shall 
call "lUff). 
1. CTF, section 2 
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Among the si gns of 0 are "N", "A'I, "1T", II I" which oomprise the 
oonstants of ° and the variables "x,", "XI I", "x" ," and analogous 
signs oonsisting of "x" with a number of small strokes added below, 
whioh funotion as the variables of O. These are the primitive signs 
of 0, all other oonstants being introduoed by definition in terms of 
these. 
In the meta-language M, there are 'translations' of the 
expressions of 0 and what Tarski calls 'struotural-descriptive' names 
'of those expressions. Thus I 
"N" has the translation "not" in !vI and the name "ng" , 
"A" has the translation "or" in M and the name "sm", 
''IT"'' has the translation "for all" in M and the name "un", 
"I" has the translation "is included in" in M and the name "inll • 
"x" followed by k sUlall strokes has the translation "vk" in M 
and is translated in Iv~ by one of the class variables of M, 
"a", "b" etc., 
and "st ll where "s" and lit" are expressions of ° has the name 
"s"t'l. 
It oan be seen that every expression of the object language 
has both a translation and an individual name in M. For example, 
uIIx,lxlx," has the na~e "((un"vrY'in)"'vI)"vI " and the translation 
"for all a, a is included in a". 
In addition to these names and translations of the expressions 
of 0, the metalan~lage requires expressions of a general logical 
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character, e.g. "if and only if", and expressions from the theory 
of equivalent classes and the arithmetic of cardinal numbers, e.g. 
"infinite cardinal number". 
By means of definitions the following signs of the metalaneu~ge 
are introduced. 
1. x ... ik,l if and only if x .. (in(\vk)" VI 
2. x .. Y if and only if x .. ng~y 
3. x .. y+z if and only if x .. ( sm~y)~z 
4. x ... ~ tk if and only if t is a finite n-ter.med sequence of 
expressions which sa tisfies one of the following condi hons : 
~n-I 
a. n=I and x-tI , b. n>I a~x ·~k tk + tn' 
5. x .. y.z if and only if x ... y+z. 
6. x .. () k y if and only if x .. (un"vkr y. 
7. x - \J k y if and only if x ... «( (ng"un) ling)" vkY' y • 
. Next, therefollows the definitions of sentential function and 
of sentence. 
x is a sentential function if and only if x satisfies one of 
the following conditionsl (a) there exist natural numbers k and 1 
such that x - ik,l' (b) there exists a sentential function y such 
that x .. y; (c) there exist sentential functions y and z such that 
x .. y+z; (d) there exists a natural number k and a sentential function 
Y such tha t x -f\y, 
x is a sentence if and only if· x is a sentential function 
and no variable vk is a free variable of the function x. 
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The latter definition depends upon the concept of 'free variable' 
which is defined as follows. 
Vk is a free variable of the sentential function x if and only 
if k is a natural number f 0, and x is a sentential function which 
satisfies one of the following conditionsl (a) there is a natural 
number 1 such that x .. ik,l or x .. il,k; (b) there is a sentential 
function Y such that vk isa free variable of Y and x .. y; (c) there 
are sentential functions y and z such that vk is a free variable 
of y and x .. y+z or x .. z+y; (d) there is a number 1 distinct from 
k and a sentential function y such that vk is a free variable of y 
and x =(\lY. 
The following are the axioms of M. 
1. ng, sm, un and in are expressions, no two of which are 
identical. 
2. vk is an expression if and only if k f 0; vk.is distinct 
from ng, am, un, in, and from each of the expressions vk if k f 1. 
3. x~y is an expression if and only if x and yare expressions; 
x"y is distinct from ng, sm, un, 'in and from each of the expressions 
4. If x,y, z, and t are expressions, then x~y .. zfttif and 
only if one of the following conditions are satisfied. (a) x .. z and 
y .. t, (b) there is an expressionu such that x .. z"u and t • uny; 
(c) there.is an expression u such that z -xPu and y. uftt. 
5. Let X be a class which satisfies the following conditioruu 
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(a) ngeX, am~X, uneX, in~X; (b) if k is a natural number distinct 
from 0, then vk~X; (c) if x~X and Y6X, then xAyeX. Then every 
expression belongs to the class X. 
The Axioms of 0 are. 
(d) (\ I 112 U 3(i3 ,r i ,,2'1\ 4 (i 4, 1+i 4,~+i 4,3» 
(e) 1\ I \.l2( () ; (\4«3':3,1+3':3,2 +i;, 4)' (iI, 3 +I2, 3 +i4,;»' r\ 5(i5, 2+ 
together with the logical axioms schematisedby the followingt 
(a) "ANA ppp II , 
(b) 1t.Al1pApq" , 
(c) "ANApqAqp", 
(d) 11,AN,ANpqANArpArqlt • 
In these schemas the sentential variables p,q,r are replaced by 
sentential functions, the resulting expressions, if they are not 
already sentences, being converted into sentences by universal 
quantification ~ver the free variables contained in them • 
. 'Tarski then defines the notion of consequence and of provable 
sentences.' I shall not give the definitions here, as I shall not need 
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them in the later sections of this thesis. 
Having constructed the definition of provable sentence, 
Tarski turns his attention to the definition of truth for the 
formalised language 0, the calculus of classes. Tarski rejects 
the identification of "true sentence U with "provable sentence". 
"Provable sentence" has been defined (in M). but in such a way that 
there remain sentences which are not provable and the negations of 
which are unprovable. For example, the sentence (\1 r\ 2ir,2 is not 
provable. nor is its negation (\ r (\ 2ir, 2' Such an identifi ca ti on 
would result in the contradiction of the law of excluded middle. 
Tarski is impelled to construct some other definition of "true 
sentence" in order to avoid this contradiction of the law. Reverting 
to the semantio conception of truth, he formulates the condition of 
material adequacy in the following convention •• 
'CONVmfrION T. A fomally correot definition of the symbol 
'Tr' (denoting the olass of all true sentences)! formulated in the meta-
language,will be called an adequate definition of truth if it has 
the following consequences: 
(a) all sentences which are obtained from the expression 
fIX ~Tr if and only if pIt by subat! tutingfor the symbol "x" a 
structural-descriptive name)of any sentence of the language in 
question and for the symbol "pit the expression which fOrIna the 
translation of this sentence into the metalanguage, 
(b) the sentence "for any x, if x (; Tr then .x: " S (where· "s" 
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denotes the class of sentences).l. 
The definition of "true sentence" depends on the concept of 
satisfaction which Tarski defines thus: 
'The sequence f satisfies the sentential function x if and 
only if f is an infinite sequence of classes and x is a sentential 
function and these satisfy one of tile following four conditions: 
(a) there exist natural numbers k and 1 such that .x ",. i k t 1 and 
fk ~ f 1 ; (b) there is a sentential function y such that x = y and 
f does not satisfy the function y; (c) there are sentential funotions 
yand z suoh that x • y+z and f either satisfies y or satisfies z; 
(d) there is a natural number k and a sentential function y such that 
x • f\ kY and every infinite sequence of classes which differs from f 
in at most the k .. th place satisfies the function y.2. 
(In the above definition Itf It and "f It denote -the k .. th and I-th members k ,I 
of the sequence f.) 
From this definition it follows that a sentential function with 
no free variables (i.e. sentenoes) is satisf~ed either by all 
sequences of classes or by none. The definition of lItrue sentence" 
follows. 
IIX is a true sentence if and only if x E. S and every infinite 
sequence of classes satisfies x';, 
1. CTF, section; 
2. CTF, section 3 
3. ,ibid. 
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This d~finition is materially adequate in the sense of 
convention T, but that it is so may only be shown in the meta-
metatheory. It implies the following consequences, 
(1) for all sentences x either xfTr or i ¢ Tr; 
(2) for all sentences x, either x ~ Tr or i € Tr. 
These last sentences (1) and (2) may be proved in the metatheory 
and they show that the class Tr is a consistent and complete dernlctive 
system. Thus, for every sentence of the language of the calculus 
of clas:::es it will be either true or false and the law of excluded 
middle will not be violated. 
Tarski proceeds to define a related concept, the concept of 
correct or true sentence in an individual domain. 
'J3y.this is meant (qUite generally and roughly speaking') 
every sentence which is true in the usual sense if we restrict 
the extension of tile individuals considered to a given class at 
or .. somewhat more prelhisely ... when we agree to interpret the terms 
"individual!f, "class of individuals lf , etc., as "element of the class 
a", "subclass of the class all etc., respectively.t l • 
With this restriction on the individuals considered, it is necessary 
to interpret expressions of the .type '11" xl? I as .1 for everysubolass 
x of the class a we have pl. and expressions of the type 'Ixy' as 
'the subolass x of the subclass a is contained in the subclass y of 
the class at. 
1. CTF, section 3. 
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There follows the prcise definitions of the concepts of 
correct sentence in an individual domain of k elements and correct 
sentence in an individual domain a. These depend upon the 
definition of satisfaction, defined in accordance with the 
limitation of the individuals to a class a. The definition of 
the satisfaction of the sentential function x in the individual doma;i~n 
a by a sequence f is the preceding definition of satisfaction with the 
single modification that the sequence f must be an infinite sequence 
of subclasses of the class a. 1~en follows the definition of 'correct 
sentence' in two forms: 
DEFIlfflIon 251. x is a. correct (true) sentence in the individual 
domiina if and only if x t S and 'every infinite sequence of sub-
classes of the class a satisfies the sentence x in the individual 
domain a. 
DEFINITION 26. x.is a correct (trme) sentence in an individual 
domain with k elements - in symbols x E Ctk - if and only if 
there exist a class a such that k is the cardinal number of 
the class a and x is a correct sentence in the individual 
domain a. 
DEFIlU'rION 27. x is a correct (true) sentence in every 
individual domain - in symbols x f at - if and 'only if for every 
olass a x is a correct sentence in the individual domain a. 
. . 
1. The numbers of the definitions given here are those in the text 
of CTF. 
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At this point in Tarski's paper there follows a number of 
important definitions and theorems, a knowledge of which I shall 
need in the next section. 
DEFINITION 28. x'" f k if and only if 
x .. \\k+Iik,k+I t \\k+I«(\k+2ik+I,k+2+ik+I,k+ik,ktI). 
(This states that the class denoted by the variable vk consists of 
only one element.) 
DEFINTrION 29. x... ~ if and only if 
(This states that every non-null class includes a one-element 
class as a part.) 
DEFInITION ;0. x'" 0 n if and only if either 
n ... 0 and x ... \\ I € I or 
(Pn states that there are at most n distinct one element classes.) 
DEFIHrrrON 31. x .. 'On if and only if either 
n III 0 and x OIl poor 
<pn states that there are exactly n distinotone-element classes.) 
DEFINrrrOU 32. x is a quantitative sentence (or a sen'cence 
about the number of individuals) if and only if there exist a 
finite sequence p of natural numbers suoh that ei th:er x..- t! .. ~ "'61\ 
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TEEOREM 8. If a is a class of individuals and k the cardiml 
number of this class, then in order that x should be a correct 
sentence in the individual domain a it is necessary and sufficient 
that x t Ctk • 
TI{EOREa~ 9. For every cardinal number k the class Ctk is a 
consistent and complete deductive system. 
THEOREM 10. For every cardinal number k, Pr C;Ctk but C\ 11'r. 
(rtpr" is the symbol denoting the class of provable sentences). 
THEOREM 11. If k is a natural number, and X the class con-
siating of all the axioms together with the sentences d. and ~k' 
then Ctk • Cn(X). 
~Cnt denotes the class of cOl~equenoes of the class denoted by tt& 
symbol in the brackets.) 
THEOREM 12. If k is an infinite cardina.l number, and X the 
class consis ting of all the axioms together with the sen tence d.. 
and all the sentences ~l (where 1 is any natural number), then 
Ctk - On(X). 
Theorems 11 and 12 depend on these three important 
lemmas t 
LEI..ni:1A H. For every cardinal number k ol'O\_ 
LEMMA. I. If k is a natural number and 1 a cardina.l number 
distinct from le, then '! k t Ctk and '6 k f Otl , but ~ k f Ctk and 
'Ok ( etIo l • 
1. See Appendix II. of my M.A. 
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If xES and X is the class consisting of all 
the axioms together with the sentence~, then there is a sentence 
y which is equivalent to the sentence x with respect to the class 
X and suc~ that either y is a quantitative sentence, or y € Pr or 
y. e Pr. 
THEOREM 13. If k is an infinite cardinal number, then 
there is no class X which oontains only a finite number of 
sentences which arenot axioms and also satisfies the 
formula 
Ctk ... Cn (X). 
TF.EOREM 14. If k is a natural number and 1 a cardinal 
number distinct from k, -then Ctk $ Ct~ and Ctl $ Ctk• 
TEEOREII'I 15. If k and 1 are infi nite cardinal numbers t 
then Ctk "" Ctl , 
THEOREM 16. If k is an infinite cardinal number and x t Ctk, 
then there is a ns\. tural number 1 such that x. " C\ (in other words 
the class C~k is included in the sum of all the classes Ctl ). 
f.rllEOREl'J 17. If X is a consistent class of sentences which 
contain all the axioms together with the sentence ~ t then there 
is a cardinal number k such that X ~ C~; if X is a oomplete 
deductive system, then X ... C~. 
THEOHEl1 18. In order tba t x Eo Ct it is necessary and sufficient 
that for every cardinal number k, x " C~. 
TBEOREM 19. In order that x: E. Ct it is necessary and suffici.e nt 
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that for every natural number le, x ~ Ctk • 
THEOREM 20. For every cardinal number k we have Ct c::: C~, 
but Ctk ~ Ct. 
Trm:OREM 21. The class Ct is a consistent but not a complete 
deductive system. 
THEOREM 22. Pr!:: Ct, but Ct f Pro 
LEMMA. L. .;,. t Ct, but 01,. ~ Pro 
THEOREM 23. If x is a quantitative sentence then 
x t Ct. 
THIDREM 24. If X is the class consisting of all the axioms 
together with the sentence d.., then Ct .. Cn (X). 
T}EOREM 25. If x (. S, x , Ct and i f Ct, then there is a 
quantitative sentence y, which is equi~lent to the sentence x 
with respect to the class Ct. 
THEOREM 26. If a is the class of all individuals then 
x ~ Tr if and only if x is a correct sentence in the domain a; 
thus if k is the cardinal number of the class a, then Tr - C~. 
THEOREM 27. Ct S Tr, but Tr $ Ct. 
THEOREM 28. In order that x ~ Tr, it is necessary and 
sufficient that x is a consequence of the class which consists of 
all the axioms together with the sentence ~ and all the sentences 
'6 , where 1 is any na tIlral number. 
1. 
Tarski has been able to find a structural charaoterisation 
of true sentences, but, he says, this is purelyaocidental. 
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It is owing to the specific peculiarities of the calculus 
of classes ru1d such a charaoterisation could not be carried 
over to other formalised languages. 
In the next chapter I shall discuss in detail the preceding 
theorems and Tarski's arguments. 
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v 
In a short discussion of the Tarski definition of truth 
Luschei has written: 
'It is not incorrect to stipulate, for instance, tp~t (an 
expression of the form) "It is snowing here now" is a true 
proposition in English if and only if it is snowing here now; 
indeed, any definition that yielded an incompatible consequence 
or failed to satisfy this criterion would be wrong or inadequate; 
but neither is it illuminating.,l. 
This would be so if Tarski's definition allowed no other 
consequences than those illustrated by the above example. Luschei 
shares with Black a total disregard for the important and 
interesting results of Tarski's investigations. rrhere is one 
such result, which I have mentioned in the discussion of Black's 
criticisms, namely, that for certain mathematical disoiplinesl 
'.,. the notion of t~lth never cOincides with the notion of 
provability; for.all provable sentences are true, but there are 
true sentences which are not provable. ,2. 
That there are true but unprovable sentences follows from 
Lemma L and Theorem 28. Lemma. L states that the sentence d.. is 
not provable and from Theorem 28, together with thadefini tiO!l of 
1. Luschei, The Loajcal Systems of Lesniewski, 1962,p.314 
2. SGT, section 12 
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consequence for the language 0, it follows that ~ is true. 
Similarly, the quantitative sentences ~., are true but not 
. 
provable. The fact that these sentences have such propertlos 
is surprising. It is surprising when the attitude of !rany 
mathematicians is considered. Einstein has written. 
I A proposi tion is then correct ("true") when it has been 
derived ••• from the axioms,. The question of the "truth'! cf 
the individual geometrical propositions is thus reduced to 
one of the "trudlh" of the axioms. Now it has long been knOl'ln 
that the question is not only unanwerable by the methods of 
geometry, but that it is in itself entirely without meaning. 
We cannot ask whether it is true that only one straight line 
goes through two points. •••• The concept "true" does not 
tally with the assertions of pure geometry, because by the 
Vlord "true 11 we are eventually in the ha bi t of designating 
always the correspondence wi tha "real" object; geometry, however 
is not concerned with the relation of the ideas involved in 
it to the objects of experience, but only with the logical 
connection of these ideas among themselves. l • 
ThiS a tti tude is found in a modern book on logic1 
1 ••• it has become more and more widely .accepted during 
1. A. Einstein, Relatiyity, translated R.W. Lawson, 1920, p.2. 
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the past hundred years, with the result that it is now the 
orthodox doctrine, that to say of a mathematical proposition 
P that it is true is merely to say that p is true in some 
mathematical system S, and that in turn is merely to say that 
p is a theorem in S. Thus, the semantic notion of truth of 
mathematical propositions is replaced by a syntactical one; 
instead of the ordinary meaning of truth, there is offered 
a criterion of "truthlt solely in terms of logic ... formal 
1 deducibility within a given postulational system.' 
Tarski has stressed the importance of Ids result (the second 
quotation of this section was italicised in the original) so 
that, in view of the above considerations, it would be useful 
to investigate how the result was deduced. I have already 
given the theorems from which the result that ~ is true but 
unprovable follows but I shall now investigate in more detail 
the assumptions necessary for suoh a deduotion. 
It follows from Lemma H that cA. E. Ctk for every oardinal 
number k and thus from Theorem 19 tha.t « € Ct, which, in combination 
wi th Theorem 27 yields the consequence that «€ Tr ot, in othe'r 
words, d.. is a true sentence of the calculus of classes.. The 
origin of the theorem that C\ is a true sentence may therefore be 
1. P.ll. Nidditch, Elementaru Lo~ic of Science and t~thematicB. 196Q 
pp. 286-287_ 
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traced back to Lemma li, which, trarski wti tea, is 'almost 
iDmlediately evident I. Ij.lhe problem now is to prove Lemma H, for 
although Lennna Ii may be almost immediately evident it requires 
more than this for Lemma H to be asserted as a theorem. It 
is easy to see that Lemma. II is "self-evident" if the procedure 
that Tarski illustrates in the third section of "The Concept 
of Truth in Formalised Languages" is followed. In this 
procedure, the sentence under consideration i.e. c{ It Ctk is 
submitted to a succession of transformation rules, which remain 
implicit in the unfor.malised meta-theory, until the following 
sentence is reached& 
c\ f. Ctk if and only if for all sub-classes a of a class 
g with cardinal number k either (for all classes b a. is included 
in b) or (there is some class c such tha t t (c is includ.ed 
in a) and (not for all classes d is c included in d) and (for 
all classes €I €I is included in 0 implies lOis included in 
€I or for all classes f €I is inoluded in f)J ). 
Raving obtained this translation, the seoond part of 
the equivalenoe being inferred from the theorems of the 
.caloulus of classes, it can be deduoed tha.t ~is a correot 
sentence in a domain with k elements. This procedure is exactly 
analogous to that given belowa 
I () I \J ~iI,2 f. Tr if and only if f~; all olasses a. there 
is a class b such that a S b. 
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From this we infer without difficulty, by using the 
known theorems of the calculus of classes, that ~ I V 2iI,2 
is a true sentenoe.,l 
At this point it can be seen why" d.. £ Ctk
lt is irnme dia tely 
evident. It is because a translation has been effeoted into 
a more familiar language. But such a procedure is dangerous 
as it tends to slide over the question of how the trcmslation 
is established as a theorem of the calculus of classes. This 
is not only the case of" t\ E C\1t but also of any other sentence 
of the formalised lanb"U8.ge. Such sentences as It {\ I \j 2i r, 2 €. 
Tr" can be established by reading off the translation of w:ba. tever 
procedes " E Tr" and checking to see if it is in fact the 
case. 
Finally, the~, the investigation of how it is deduced 
that ~ is a true sentence leads back to an examination of the 
initia.l assumptions of the meta-theory. It is quite clear what 
Tarski intended, the analogy with I"Snow is whi tel' is true if 
and only if snow is white' is aPPlrent. Although there is 
no paraphrase in the last mentioned sentence, there is a similarity 
of approach - a meta .. linguiatic sentence is aaserted. by appeal 
to an extra-linguistic fact. In the case of f ItSnow. is whi tet! 
is true I (a meta-linguistic statement), it is asserted or denied 
1. CTF, section ,. 
- 226 -
after an empirical enquiry. In the case of " 1\ I V 2i I, 2 e rrr" , 
it is asserted or denied after it is known whether, for all classes 
a, there is a class b such that a is included in b. It is 
here that the analogy breaks down, for how is it to be established 
that this is the case? Unlike "Snow is white" there is no 
empirical fact to which a statement about classes can correspond. 
There are only three ways in which such a statement could be 
established.- ]'irstly, by an appeal to intuition; secondly, 
by appeal to some model of the calculus of olasses; thirdly, 
by an investigation to discover whether it is a proven sentence 
in some axiomatised system incorporating the calculus of classes. 
It is unlikely that Tars~i intends that intuition should 
participate in the establishment of theorems, for intuition is 
a notoriously bad guide for the calculus of classes. If, 
as in the second case, it is assumed that the translations can 
be checked against some model (for example, the statements could 
be interpreted as being "about" the regioll$.of a square) then 
generality is lost. (I do not use the.word "model" in its 
tect~ical mathematical sense as this would imply a postUlate 
set for the translation statements, 01 use the term in the sense 
that each statement can be read as a. statement about the regions 
of a square). The last case presents what appears to be a 
r~asona.ble alternative, bute~en '~isis not'without its difficulties. 
If the translation statement can be asserted if and only if it is 
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a theorem in some axiomatised system, what system is it? 
Bec~use the translation is written in terms of "classes", 
"is included in", "for all" and "there is" it would be na tura,l 
to assume that the axiom system would be the calculus of classes. 
The difficulty of this approach is that the axiom system would 
then be the calculus of classes, differing only from the 
formalised axioms (given already as the axioms of 0) in its 
notation. l 
Unfortunately, this would not allow for true but unprovable 
sentences such as ~ or ~ .• 
1 
That this is so can easily be seen 
from the fact that the axiom system 0 yields exactly the same 
theorems as the axiom system from which the translation statements 
are deduced. So the new axioms system cannot be equivalent 
with the axiom system 0 if it is to give as a consequence the 
(translation of) the sentence ~ • These axioms, whatever they 
may be, will form part of the axiom set for the meta-language, 
some of which have beel'! given in the last seotion. Tarski does 
not indicate what axioms they are in particular, he does say 
that they are e~neral logical axioms which suffice for a· 
sufficiently comprehensive system of rna thematioa,l 10f.t;l.C. 
rrhe conclusion of the preceding parab'Taph is that the meta, ... 
1. Of course, the ~xiom sets n~y differ but if both are to 
be called ~ calculus of classes it would be necessary 
that they be equivalent axiom sets. . 
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theory has as its axioms those axioms of the meta-theory listed 
in section IV together with axioms of a general logic which 
allow as theorems ~ and ~i. Amongst the axioms there must 
be some from which the aXioms of 0, when translated, can be deduced 
since it is one of the theoren~ of the meta-theory that all 
provable sentences (of 0) are true sentences. But the result of 
the meta-theory that there are true but unprovable sentences of 
o would then say little more than that the calculus of classes 
(given by the axioms of 0) is incomplete, i.e. there are 
sentences of 0 which are unprovable and the negations of 
which are also unprovable, but can be completed by the 
addition of sentences as axiOlLS (in this case the sentences ~ and 
~. ). 
I 
This is the import of Theorem 28. Tha. tit is pOBS! ble 
to complete the axiom set by additional axioms which are again 
provable from a more comprehensive axiom system is a peculiarity 
of the caloulus of olasses. It is so because the oalculus 
of classes is part of a larger general system of logic. It 
would not be possible in the case of a geometry of "lines It 
and "points", for then the prinCiples of logic employed would 
be the same in the fonnalised geometry as in its unformalised 
counterpart. (I shall show this later). It is apparent that 
in the case of the calculus of classes, there are two different 
logios employed. In the formalised language 0, the only axioms 
specified are the axioms for the calclllus of classes and certain 
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axiom schemata which are limited to the axiom schemata of the 
1 proposi tional calculus. In the meta-language lVI, not only 
are the axiom schemata for the propositional calculus allowed 
as axioms, but also the whole set of primitive propositions 
that are included in Principia 1v18.themaUca. 2 This accounts 
to some extent for the difference between the theorems of 0 
and the theorems of M. But this raises yet another question. 
,That makes the axioms of 0 form an axiom system for ~ calculus 
of classes? Why are there just those axiom schemata belonging 
to the propositional calculus and no other logical axioms such 
as those used for the meta-theory M1 'l'he question is now 
removed to more fundamental grounds and the relationship between 
the formalised calculus of classes (called by Tarski lithe 
a.lgebra of logic") and the unforrnalised language in which the 
formalised calculus finds an interpretation must be investigated 
further. 
Besides the proof that ~ is a true but unprovable sentence 
of the calculus of classes, there are other proofs embeddied 
in the meta-theory that raise different though related 
problems. 
1. cf. section IV of this thesis 
2. I have assumed this as Tarsk~ directs the reader to the 
f1:rincipia l\{'tthematica for the general logical axioms; he 
does not, however, specify anyone part of that work, cf. 
CTF, section ,. 
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Theorem 28 is proved from Theorems 12 and 26, but only 
because: 
'We can show, on the basis of the system of assumptions 
here adopted, that the class of all individuals is 
infini te. ,1. 
These assumptions must be derived from the general logical 
axioms of the metatheory since the specific axioms of the 
meta theory (see section IV) do not include any axioms about 
'indi viduals I • These auxiliary axioms do not occur as 
axioms of the object langouage O. Again the legitimacy of 
the approach depends on the relationship bet'ween the formalised 
axiom system 0 and the axiom system for the unformalised 
interpretation of O. 
At this point it will be necessary to look more closely 
at the nature of the terms 'formalised language', 'interpretation', 
'the calculus of classes f, and 'the algebra of logic' t all of 
which playa fundamental role in Tarski's investig~J.tions. 
Unfortunately, Tarski is not very explicit about his use of 
these terms. At the beginning of Section IV I tk~ve given a list 
of what Tarski considers to be the essential characteristics 
of a formalised language. The one characteristio that is 
1. CTF, section ,. 
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important for the present enquiry and serves to distinguish 
formalised languages from formal lanb~ges is the existence of 
an interpretation of the symbols of the formal language. 
'We shall always ascribe quite concrete and, for us, 
intellib~ble meanings to the si~1s which occur in the language 
we shall consider. The expressions which we call sentences still 
remain sentences after the signs which occur in them bave been 
translated into colloquial language. The sentences which are 
distinguished as axioms seem to us to be materially true, 
and in choosin(j rules of inference we are always guided by the 
principle that when such rules are applied to true sentences 
1 the sentences obtained by their use should also be true.' 
The above quotation still leaves a certain vagueness for 
what does 'ooterially true' mean? Surely it cannot mean 
'intui tively true' nor 'true for some model' since the'se 
terms are also surrounded by difficulties, as I have already 
indicated. The 'materially true t must refer to provability. 
in some axiom system. It is the same for the term "concrete 
and ••• intelligible meanings' - how much more concrete and 
intelligible is ffor all classes x, :x: is included in x~ 
than 'nxilx.:x:.'? It is true that 'for all cla.$ses Xl x 1s 
;]. ;]. 
1. CTF, section 2 
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included in Xl has the appearance of being more lll1derstandable, 
but for the reason that it is written in everyday English. 
It must not be forgotten, however, tl1.atthe terms in this sentence 
differ in their use in a rna them tical context from thei l' use 
in colloquial language. They are subject to exact rules in a 
mathematical context; their use in colloquial language is not 
exactly defined. l It is a false impression of 'intelligibility' 
that is gained. There is a psychological impression of 
'intelligibility' because of the paraphrase into colloquial 
language; it is a false imFression because it ic~ores the 
essential difference between the colloquial and mathematical 
uses of the terms. The rules whi ch govern 'for all classes X', 
lis included in' etc. in the mathematical sense would turn out 
to be those rules already formalised in the axiom system from 
which tJ;;le paraphrases were made. 
It may be assumed then tm t I the concrete meanings t 
ascribed to the signs of the formalised languaee are elements 
of another axiom system. It remains to discover between whi oh 
two axiom systems the semantic rules establish this 'meaning' 
rela tionship_ There is no doubt that the formalised language 
1. Ryle, Dilerrunas, 1954, chapter VIII; F. vfaismann, 'Vel'ifiabili tyl 
in Ess!3.:'[s on LoMc and L..qngu8.,ee, edited by Antony It''lew, 
1951. 
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o is one of the axiom systems and, in fact, the one to which 
meanings are ascribed. I£he other is the axiom sys tem for a 
general logie, for example, the set of primitive propositions 
taken from the Principia 1i;atheIlk1.tica, suitably translated into 
the language of the meta-theory. Thus, if the calculus of 
classes is interpreted as a part of this larger general lODic, 
certain sentences of the calculus of classes follow from ti1e 
general logical axioms alone. In this way, the sentences 01, 
and ~. can be proved as theorems in the calculus of classes 
I 
in the metatheory. That this is possible in the meta-theory 
and not in the object language is because of the l~stricted 
number of logical axioms allowed in O. It must be remembered 
that 0 contains only a limited number of loeical axioms schemata, 
namely, an axiom schemata set sufficiant for the deduction 
of all true sentences from the sententia.l calculus. 
This explains the difference in extension of "true" 
and "provable", a different set of logical axioms is taken 
in the meta-theory. The additional assumptions aocouht for the 
fact that Q, appears as a theorem in the mata-language.1 • 
The validity of this approach now rests on thera baing 
good reason for the restriction on the logical assumptions employed 
-1. I have written. It ~ If and It 'lSi"; when atrict].y I should. have 
wri tten "translation oflil. 11 and Htranslation of "i It; but whioh 
one is intended should be apparent from the oontext. Sometimes both 
are understood by ft 0,. It, but here again it should be apparent from 
the context. 
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in the object language. 
Ultimately, it must be decided which axioms are necessary 
and sufficient for the calculus of classes. This in turn 
demands that f~ calculus of classes' be adequately defined. 
It is Tarski's responsibility to provide a precise and 
rigorous definition of the calculus of classes so that there 
may be no doubt as to which assumptions are made for 
it. 
Unfortunately, Tarski nowhere defines what he means by 
the calculus of classes. Trill only reference that is made 
which relates to this point is as follows: 
'The calculus of classes is a fragment of mathematical 
logic and can be regarded as one of the interpretations of the 
1 b f 1 . ,1. a ge ra oogJ.C. 
By "the algebra of logic" Taraki means the follovnng: 
A class K of elements with v and ~ elements of combination 
subject to the set of postulatest 
Ia) a \J b is an element of K when a tl.'1d b are elements 
of K. 
Ib) a C'\ b is an element of K when a and b are elements 
of K. 
1. CTF, section 2. 
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IIa) There is an element 1\ of K such the. t 
a~A =a for all elements a of K. 
lIb) There is an element ~ of K such tbat 
al'l V =a for all elements a of K. 
IlIa) a \J b ... b \J a whenever at b, and a v bare 
elements of K. 
IIIb) a 1\ b = b f\ a whenever a, b, and a f\ bare 
elements of K. 
IVa) a \J (b " c) III (a \I b) 1'1 (a v c) whenever a, b, 
c, and a v (b (\ c) are elements of K. 
IVb) a f'\ (b \J c) - (a f'I b) v (a. " c) whenever a.t b, 
c, and a f'I (b v c) are elements of K. 
V) If f\ and V exist and are unique then for all 
all elements a,of K, there exists an element 
.. a of K such that a 1J .... a -Y and a. f1 -a ... )\.. 
VI) There are at least two elements x and yof the 
class K such that x ~ y.l. 
At least the algebra. of logic is rigorously defined. 
It cannot be said that the sarre is true of the calculus of classes. 
Tarski's readers know only that the calculus of classes is an 
1. Tarski indicates this by referring to Vlhitehead and Russell, 
Principia Ifl8.thematica 2nd. edition, Vol. i, pp.205-12 from which I 
have taken the postUlates in the above forll1_ They are due to Huntington, 
'Sets of Independent Postulates for the Algebra of LogiC I, ::eransla tiol1s 
of the American lTathematical Societ;y;, V, (1904), pp.288-309. 
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interpretation of the algebra of logio defined above. It 
is not clear what is meant by an "interpre ta tion". Presumably, 
"interpretation" is used hare in the sense of "model", Le. 
A is a model of B if and only if there is a oorrelation 
between the elements of A and the elements of B and between 
the operations of A and the operations of B such that the 
elements of A satisfy the axioms of B under these operations. 
But this does not necessarily imply that the algebra of logic 
exhausts the calou1us of olasses. E'or example, the postulates 
of group theory have a model in the domain of integers but not 
all properties of integers are provable from these postUlates 
alone, e.g. the oommutative law of addition. In the latter 
case the postulates of the group theory would not be called a 
formalisation of the theory of integers. Analoe;ously, unless 
all the theorems of the calculus of olasses Were given by 
the postulate set for the algebra of logic, the algebra of 
logic should not be regarded as a formalised theory of t}~ 
calculus of classes. For it is not with the truth of 
sentences belonging to the algebra of logio that Tarski is 
concerned but the truth of the sentences of the calculus of 
olasses. 
Russell also writesl , that the caloulus of classes is 
1. Whitehead and Russell Principia lI'Tathematica, vol.i, p.205. 
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an interpreta.tion of the algebra of 10g1.c and with the introduction 
of definition of 'c I, I V I , tnt, t ... 1 proves that the 
calculus of olasses satisfies the l~stulates of that algebra. l 
But this is no help in the takk of olarification. It does not 
say what the calculus of classes is taken to be. Does the 
calculus of clas:3es include the axiom of infinity for ex:ample'? 
(The axiom of infinity is crucial for the proof of ~. in the 
\ 
meta-theory M). 
There are two alternative explanations that now account 
for the difference between the extensions of "true" and IIprovable". 
Either there is some axiom set in the calculus of olasses which 
has as consequences the sentences 0( and ~i or there is some 
extraneous logical axiom set, which, together with the axioms 
of the calculus of classes, allow' the deduction of the sentences 
d. and ~ .• , Neither alternative is satisfactor,y. 
first alternative is the case then the axioms should appear in 
the formal axioms of 0 and if, on the other hand, the second 
alternative is the case then the lOb~cal axioms of 0 would be 
unduly restricted. 
The resulting confusion between the a~ioms of 0 and the 
axioms of the meta-theory l\iI is due to one peouliarity of the 
1. ibid. Definitions *22.01 - *22.05 
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formal ma thema tical discipline considered by 'farski. '1' lie 
calculus of classes is part of a more general logic. ('l'he 
other disciplines that Tarski considers in this paper 
possess the same characteristic. The calculus of two-term 
three-term, and n-term rGlations and the generalised theory 
of classes all fall within the province of mathematical logic). 
To place the problem in a clearer light it will be sufficient 
to consider some formalised language, the content of which 
does not form part of logic. rfhere seems no reason why 
this should not be done as Tarsld does not indicate that only 
formalised languages belonging to mathema. tical lOgic can be 
trea ted in this manner. I shall consider some axiom set 
from the axioms of pla~ projective geometry. 
I wish to consider the following propositionsl 
a) for any two lines there is a point that lies in both, b) there 
is at moet one point belonging to two distinot lines and c) for 
any two points there is a line which passes th:rough. them. If 
these three propositions are treated aSaxion~ of some projective 
geometry, they will form a set of axioms of incidenoe for that 
geometry. In order to bring these considerations into closer 
analogy with the pre ceding, I shall call .proposi ti ons a.) t b) 
and c) Itaxioms of incidence theoryttin the same way . that the axioms 
of 0 aTe called ttaxioms of the caldulus of classes lt • 
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I may now formalise these axioms thus: 
Axiom I (Li )(LjXE x0 (I~Li .I~Lj)' 
Axiom II (Li)(Lj ) (Li ~ Lj ) 
(The difference of type indicates difference of semantic 
categoryl) • 
In a similar way, other propositions from projective geometry 
. may be forma.lised. An approach analoguus to that adopted 
by Tarski for the calculus of classes may be made to this 
calculus of incidence theory, treating the latter as an object 
lano~ge. A newmeta.languaee may be constructed in which 
the objec·c language may be talked about. Following the 
procedure outlined in section IV of this paper it is possible 
to ·construct in the metalanguage the definitions of sentential 
func tion and sentence. The definition of "axiom'· (in the meta .. 
language) will be such that Axioms I, II, and III would be 
axioms under the definition. Also included in thedefini tion 
of "a.xiom" would be axioms from the sentential calculus (as in 
1. For a further discussion of semantio categories, see 
crrF, section 4. 
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the previous definition for the calculus of classes) and axioms 
governing ":". 
The axioms for the metatheory would be similar to the 
axioms for the metatheory M of the calculus of olasses, that 
is, axioms relating to expressions of 0 and the formation 
of these expressions. The notion of consequence and provable 
sentence may then be defined in the metalanguage; the 
definitions would not be difflfi'rent, in principle, from those 
of the same notions for the cla.ss calculus. (The logic of 
quantification theory would be incorporated in the definition 
of consequence) 
After this meta-language has been constructed it becomes 
possible to formulate a convention similar in outline to 
Convention T (Section IV of this pa.per). In fact, Convention 
T may be transferred to the new metatheory exactly as it 
I 
. stands , if it is remembered that the language referred to 
in the Convention is, what I have called, "incidence thaoryll. 
It still remains, however, to construct some notation 
in which names of the various expressions in the new object 
language could be formulated. This offers no new difficultiesJ 
a procedure analob~us to that exemplified in 1 - 7 on page 
1. CT~', section 3 or section IV of t!'liS thesrlil. 
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of this paper could be adopted. 
The concept of satisfactioh is more complicated 'because 
of the difference of semantic category between the variables 
of the object language. This difficulty may be overcome by 
employing the method of two-rowed sequences which rrarski 
eXPlains.1. The definition' of satisfaction would then be formulated 
as follows, 
The sequence f of points and the sequence ]1 of lines together 
satisfy the sentential function x if and only if these 
satisfy one of the four following conditions: (a) there 
exist natural numbers k and 1 and fk lies on Fl and x = ik,l; 
(b), (c) and (d) as in the previous definition of 
satisfaction2 but with relevant changes made as in (a). 
(It should be noted that "lk ,l" in condi tion (a) is the 
structural-descriptive name of IIIx. L It and not ItIx. x II as it 1.<1· . Kl 
was in the last section of this paper. Also, condition (d) 
will now be divided into two divisions correspondin,'S to the 
two distinct operations of universal quantification over 
points and universal quantification over lines. The symbolism 
employed in Axioms I~III may be transfonmed into a symbolism 
oloserto that employed by Tarak! in his paper by using the 
Lukasiewicz-Tarski notation rather than the Peano.Russell, 
reduoing the sentential cOlmeotives to "A" and UN" ,changing 
1. CTF seotion 4 
2. Seotion IV, p.54 
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the notation of the quantifier flC )11 to "n" and defining all 
other logioal terms by means of these. Axiom I would then 
read: 
Strictly, these changes would be neoessary for the conditions 
(0) and (d) above to be transferred to this theory simply and 
directly. I shall, however, continue to use the Peano-Russell 
notation as I think it is easier to understand in longer 
sentences). 
Results follow which are analogous to the consequences 
of the definition of satisfaction for the calculus of classes. 
"True sentence" may now be defined: .x: is a true sentence if 
and only if x is a sentence and every i.nfinite sequence of points 
and every infinite sequence of lines together satisfy x. 
It follows that the class of true sent,:nces is c'onsistent 
and complete.. . The class of provable sentences, on the other 
hand, although consistent is not complete. There remain 
sentences which are not provable, the negations of which s.re 
also unprova.ble. Such an example is provided by Desargues' 
Theorem or Pascal 'a Theorem. Desa.rguea' Theorem may be written 
in the notation employed for Axioms I-III as. 
(~) (x2) (X;) (x 4) (x5) (x6) ( ( (~=f.x';x;ix;xl~6) .EL7 (Ixl L7 .Ix 4 L7) 
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oE1a(IX21a·Ix51a)·E19(Ix319Ix619)·E110(IX1110·Ix2110) 
.E~l(Ix4111·Ix5111)·E112(Ix2112·Ix3112)·E113(Ix5113·Ix6113) 
oE114(IXI114oIx31l4)·E115(Ix41l5·IX61l5)·EX16(Ix1617oIxl61soIx1619) 
.Ex17(Ix17114·Ix1711S)·EXlS(IxlSLr2oIxlS113)·Ex19(Ixl91lO:Ix19111» 
(E120(Ix17L20·IXIa120·Ix19L20»)· 
The trans 1a. tion of tbi s sent enoe in the metalarlguage 
would bea if two coplaner triangles are in perspective then 
the intersections of their correspondi~~ sides a.re collinear. 
It is known that this sentence may not be deduced from Axioms 
I-III f nor its~negation be so deduced. It is undecidable relative 
to these axioms. It is possible to construct theories for 
wl"J.ch Desargues' theorem does not hold. In the meta-theory, 
therefore, any additional geometric assumptions rous t be arbitrary 
to some extent. ,The adoption of any such assumption as Pascal's 
'l'heorem from which Desargues I Theorem may be deduced is decided 
on grounds outside the bounds of the cons tructed meta-
theory. 
For example, it may be proved that Desargu.es' Theorem 
is a consequence of the axioms of incidence for three-dimensional 
projective geometry. This will, of course, necessitate the 
introduction of more axioms dealing with the inCidence of planas 
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with planes, lines and points. If it is wished that the 
geometry under consideration be a special case of the geometry 
of three-dimensions subject to the axioms of incidence, 
then the inclusion of Desargues' r.rheorern or some logically 
equivalent or stronger theorem is no longer an arbitrary 
decision. But, considerations such as these were not taken 
into account in the construction of the meta-theory, 'rlhe 
semantic definition of truth for this lan~3ge does not give 
a truth-value to all the sentences that may be constructed 
in it. It does not give a truth-value for the sentence sta.ting 
Desargues' Theorem, nor does it give a truth-value for the sentence 
IIExlEx2(xlfx2)'" 
Unlike the case of the calculus of classes extra-logi~~l 
axioms in the meta-theory .. are unable to determine the truth 
or falsity of the sentences mentioned in the last paragraph, 
for the translations of them, namely, lIif two triangles are 
in perspective then the intersections of their corresponding 
sides are collinear" and "there exist two different points" 
oontain the words "points" and "oollinear" which are not part 
oftha logical vocabulary of the meta-theory. (I do not 
maintain, I should like to point out, that there is any 
definable distinction between 'logical vocabulary' and some 
'extra-logical vooabulary' of which "points" and "lines" form 
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part; but only that those branches of mathematical logic 
assumed in the meta theory would be insufficient for the deduction 
of such sentences).l 
From the semantic definition of truth constructed for 
,"incidence theory" it may be deduced that '''EXlEX2(X:l~X:2)'' is 
true if and only if there exist two dis tinc t points t but neither 
fIlExIEx2(~fx2)1t is true' nor '"EXIEx2(xl~X2)1t is false' may 
be deduced. If these conclusions were all that the semantic 
definition of truth involved then there would be little 
to argue against, for there would be no sentence tha t could 
be produced which would be both tl~a and unprovable at the same 
time. This was not the case with the calculus of classes; 
both do. and the sentences "6 i were true hut unprovable. 
I have shown that in order to establish the exis tence 
of true but unprovable sentences for the calculus of classes, 
it was necessary to make in the 11lsta-theory addi tioml 
assumptions, that is, to have in the axiom set of the meta-
theory sentences which may be translatable into the object 
language 0 but which occur there neither as axioms nor 
theorems. For the calculus of classes it was neoessary to ., 
introduce some axiom from which the transla. tiona of the sentences 
~.i could be deduced in the meta-theory~ 
I 
In the case or· 
1. For arguments against the theory that there is a division. 
between logical vocabulary and scientific vocabular~, vide ~uine. 
'Carnap and Logical Truth' t in Lo5io and Lanr,u .. "te;e, 1962. p.53 et 
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the geometry sketched above, additional geometric ass~~ptions 
may be brought into the meta-theory only with a subsequent 
loss of generality for the application of the geometric 
theory embodied in Axioms I-III. Since IIExlEx2(Xlfx2)II is 
independent of these axioms, it would be possible to have the 
translation of it, namely, "there exist two distinct pOints" 
as an axiom of the meta-theory. On the other hand, for 
exactly the ~~ reason it is equally possible to have the 
negation of it as an axiom. To do either would result in 
The point to notice is 
that the truth-values would be different depending on the 
axiom chosen. It wo~ld thus be possible to constn~ot a 
semantic definition of truth reslllting in a contradiction without 
altering either the definition or the semantio rules of 
translation from the object'language into the meta. ... la.l1e,'l'I.1age. 
Of oourse, it is possible to say that a 'sensible' geometry 
demands that there exist two distinot pOints, but this is to go 
beyond the object langua&"e and the meta-theory designed for 
the construction of the definition of truth. 
It may still be objected that this is merely playing 
with words for Tarski has said that the ,language to ,be investigated 
ha~ a vocabulary which has 'quite concrete. and. for us, intelligible 
meanings,1 ascribed to its constituents, whereas in considering 
1. CTF, seotion 2 
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the geometrical theory I have merely offered a translation 
of the expressions occurring in the formalised language in 
terms of a vocabulary which is part of another fornnlised 
language. 
In answer to thiS, it is possible to ask for some 
concrete and intelligible meanings to the terms of the object 
language to be produced. 'I have given an outline of how 
the semantic rules of translation give a 'meaning' to the 
terms of the object language, and in this case I have (~ven 
points and lines as the 'meanings' of the signs occurring 
in it. Now I do not know what Tarski had in mind by the term 
'quite concrete and intelligible' but it seems to me th~t 
expressing the meanings of the sentences of the object lal1t:,oouage 
in terms of points and lines is as far as one rr~y safely go; 
to demand more would be dangerous, As I have said earlier in 
this section, the translation of the object langua.ge in terms 
of points and lines at once gives the impression of 'concrete 
and intelligible meanings' attached to the signs of that 
language. But the impression is a false one, for although 
"points" and "linesu are words in common currency and. thereby 
gain in intelligibility if not in 'concreteness', it must 
not be for&,utten tba t for the object language "points" and 
1I1ines" are used subject to exact rules. in ordinary discourse 
they are not. Nor should there be any confusion between the 
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mathematical use of the word "point ll (as an element of a 
Ira thematical sys tern) and its use in a perceptual sta it.ament, 
since there would be a confla tion of empiric and non-empiric 
concepts. K8rner has pointed out that to do so would be to 
overlook the difference in kind between the two concepts; tl~ 
former is an exact concept ani the latter an inexact 
1 
concept. 
The only alternative to giving 'concrete and intelli6,"ible 
meanings' to the signs of the object language is to give another 
na thematical 'meaning' to ea.ch of the signs. 'l'his entails 
that the semantio rules of translation from the sentences of 
the object language to the metalan@lage will effect a 
transla tion between tvrc axiomatic sys tems. There is no way 
of deciding whether there are tlYO distinct points, when "point" 
is used as in the translations in the meta-theory of Axioms 
I-III. To ask 'Are there two points, distinct from one another?' 
is to ask what Carnap calls an internal question. 2 • By an 
internal question Carr~p means a question which may be 
answered by reference to a linguistic framework, in this case 
the framework being an axiomatic system of geometry, since a 
1. K8rner, The Philosophy or 1t'lthematlcs 1960, pp.58 ... 62 , 101 ... 111 
2.. Carnap, 'EmpiriCism, semantics andontology' in Se~lntics and 
the Philosophy c.r Lang'lll.1r:e, edt LifiSky.1952, p.209 at seq,. 
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linguistic framework for "points" and "lines" considered as 
physical entities would not be satisfactory, as I have 
shown. 
Other languages, and in particular, the system S 
1 
which Carnap constructs do not need an axiomatic system 
for their meta-language. Carnap's 'rules of truth' for the 
system S allow the truth-value of any sentence of S to be 
found wi thou t recourse to any axioms of the meta-theory. 
But this is so because the 'rules of truth' are also 
translation rules which translate the sentences of S into 
sentences about the physical world. 
is true if and only if Chicago is a harbour" allows the 
establishment of "pr2 (in1) is true" on the basis of 
observation. 
I > 
For formalised ~~thematical languages, on 
the other hand, no observation will provide sufficient grounds 
for asserting sentences of the type "Exl EX2 (Xl',{X2)" ~ 
I think I r~ve said sufficient to show the impor~~nce 
of having axioms in the meta-theory when the object language 
is mathematical in content (lncontrast to an object language 
of 'physical object' content as in system S above). On this 
point, however, I think Tarski would agree, for he writes: 
1. For the system S, see of this thesis. 
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'Corresponding to the three groups of primitive 
expressions, the full axiom system of the meta-theory 
include three gro:'ps of sentences: . (1) axioms of a general 
logical kind; (2) axioms whi oh have the same meaning as 
the axior.,s of the science under investign Han or are 
lord.cnlly stronger than them, but which in any case suffice 
(on the basis of the rules of inference adopted) for the 
establishment of all sentences having the same meaning as 
the theorems of the science investigated; finally (3) axioms 
which determine the fundamen tal properties of the primitive 
concepts of a structural-descriptive type. ,1 (The underlining 
is my own) 
Even though Tarsld admi ts the need for some axioms of 
the second type, it is hard to understand on the hasis of 
the previous discussion in this section how logically stronger 
axioms may gain ad~ission into the meta-theory whilst not 
admitted into the object theory. It ieat this point that 
I disagree with Tarski for I do not understand how the 
stronger logical axioms are to be justified. It is relevant 
to consider what Tarski says on the Sllb j ect of these axioms. 
1. CTF, section 4 pp.210-211 
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He writes: 
••• 
we are here interested exclusively in those 
deductive sciences which are not 'formal' in a quite special 
meaning of this word. I have, moreover, brought forward 
,various conditions - of an intuitive not a formal nature -
which are satisfied by the sciences here investigated: 
a strictly determinate and understandable meaning of the 
constants, the certainty of the axioms, the reliability of 
the rules of inference. An external characteristio of this 
standpoint is just the fact that, among the primitive 
expressions and the axioms of the meta-theory the expressions 
and axioms of the second group occur (of (2) above). For as 
soon as we rei§ard certain eX'Qre ssions as in tellil'si ble t or 
believe in the truth of certain s~ntences, no obstacle exists 
. '1. to using them as the need arises. (The underlining is 
my own). 
To be.fair to Tarski, however, it should be pointed out 
that the sciences he investigates are t:1ken from general logic 
and not from a:ny geometric eye tem. For geometry, although 
it is not strictly impossible to believe in·the truth of 
certain sentences, such a belief would constitute a very weak 
1. CTF, section 4, p.211, footnote 1. 
- 252 -
foundation for the use of those sentences in the meta-
theory. Even if the case of 'there exist at least two 
distinct points' seems pathological, other sentences may. be 
brought forward which are less so. For exam~le, if some 
axiomatised Euclidean geometry were formalised by means of 
some procedure analogous to Tarski's for the calculus of classes 
with the single exception of the axiom corresponding to the 
parallel postUlate, then it would be clear that belief in 
the truth of thG parallel postUlate would be irrelevant. 
For, if the axioms of that system are independent, and in 
particular if the parallel postUlate is independent of the 
other axioms (as in the system given by Veblenlo ), the 
sentence that is the translation of the postUlate in the object 
language is unprovable but will still be a sentence of that 
object language (providing that the rules of sentence formation 
fOT.the language allow for its construction). In this case, 
as in the case of Desargues' 'llheorem considered previously, 
an appeal would have to be iia.de to an axiom in the meta-theory 
that has no counterpart in the object theory. It is not 
possible to appeal to a belief in the truth or falSity of 
1. . Veblen, 'Foundations of GeometrY't in f,ionor;raphs on 'J.lop:1cg 
from Modern Mathem'1tics, 1955, pp.3-49. 
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this sentence to determine its truth, for the existence 
of alternative geometries, Lobashevsky's or Riemann's, 
allow a contradictory sentence to replace the parallel postulate 
and still retain the consistency of the axiom set. In this 
case no help is given by an appeal even to applicability 
since both Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry may be used 
in physics. 
I shall now give a brief sununary of the preceding 
paragraphs on the subject of geometry. For 'true but unprovable' 
sentences to occur in the formalised language of a geometry , 
that geometry needs to be incomplete and also a logically 
stronger axiom set must be included in the meta-theory. 
The question then arises of how to justify tile stronger axioms. 
An appeal cannot be made to an intuitive belief in the truth 
of these axioms; the 'intelligibility' of the translations 
in terms of the ordinary use of the words occurring in the 
meta-theory was found to be illusory; perceptual points and 
lines as translations of the expressions of the object theory 
were unsatisfactory. 
Returning to the calculus of classes in which Tarski has 
shown the existence of 'true but unprovable' sentences, the 
argument loses a little of its weight, since here, .. axioms 
were introduced in to the meta .. theory which were members of a 
set taken from a general mathematical 10&io. In this case t 
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there may be some defence in appealing to 'intelligibility' 
or 'belief in the truth of certain sentences', since logical 
principles could be said to be self-evident. Such a 
view of logic would be a little naive in the light of the 
history of mathematical philosophy. Even the more 
sophisticated notion of the 'analyticity' of logical truths 
and Carnap's 'L-true' have their critics. l • 
For the calculus of classes, extra axioms were needed 
in the meta-theory in order that the sentences cJ... and of could 
be proved to be true. The latter demanded that some axiom 
of infinity, or a modified version of that axiom be included 
in .the meta-theory 1II so that the existence of an infinite 
number of individuals could be proved. But the axiom of 
infinity or the statement that there are an infinite number 
of individuals has itself been doubted by Russell. 
'From the fact that the infinite is not self-contradiotay, 
but is also not demonstrable logically, we must conclude 
that nothing can be known a priori as to whether the number 
of things in the world is finite or infinite. ••• The axiom 
of infinity will be true in some possible worlds and false in 
others; whether it is true or false ill this world, we cannot 
tell. ,2 
1. vide, Quine , From a Lo~cal Point of View, 1953 pp.45-46. 
also M.G. White, !.(.lhe Analytic and Synthetic I in John Dewell 
Philosopher of Science and Freedom, 1950, pp.;16-330 
2. Russell, Introduction to lTatherra tical PhilosophY,1930 p.143 
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There are still other difficulties involved in the 
assumption that there are an infini te number of individuals. 
Kneale writest 
'What are the individuals of which Russell speaks, 
and how can we tell whether there are infinitely many of them? 
Russell says that he intends to refer to those things, ma tever 
they may be, which can be named by logically proper names and 
cannot occur in propositions except as subjects. But he 
admits that it is difficult to indicate such things directly, 
and he even suggests that there may possibly be none because 
everything which appears to be an individual is in fa.ct a 
class or complex of some kind. l • 
As in the case of the geometries considered above, there 
is little to be hoped from an appeal to a belief in the truth 
of the additional assumptions made in the meta-theory; Tarski 
is not more explicit than Russell about the term 'individual'. 
I shall now summarise the oonclusions of this section. 
It was found by examining the proofs of some of the theorems 
in the last chapter that the exitence of 'true but unprovable 
sentences' could only be deduced in the meta-theory by the 
assUlllption of additional axioms whi ch, though statable in the 
vocabulary of the object lallb~ge, were not assUllled there. Since 
1. Kneale, Vi .M. rr"le Development of Logic p.669. 
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these axioms were principles of general logic, there seemed 
no satisfactory reason why they should not appear in the 
object theory as well as the meta-theory. Also, it was 
found that for geometrical theories the existence of true 
but m1provable sentences would be extremely artificial since 
additional axioms in the meta-theory would be hard to justify. 
The calculus of classes was put in the same predicament by 
the assumption of the axiom of infinity which was necessary 
for the deduction that the sent,mces 0" are true. 
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Section :1 
I 
In the last section I described Tarski's work on the semantie 
conception of truth for a cart in formalised lan::;uLl.ee - the calculus 
of classes. In the last chapter of that section I gEtve my criticisms 
of Tarski's definition based for the most part on the apparent 
difference between what is cOlmted a.s the oalculus of classes in 
the object la'1g'L'k1.0'8 and what is counted as that calculus in the 
metilanguage. In :r;articular t I disagreed wi tIl Tarsld I s conclusion 
that for this lcm,').l.:'1ce there could be tru.e but unprovable ~)entE.nces. 
'1'he remi::l.ining sections of rrarsl:i' s pa:per deal with thep::coblern 
of definin;; the sema,ntic conception of truth for other Ian [;'Ucl/:,e8 • 
Pirstly he succeeds with tho language he calls the calculus of 
relations, defining f1true r: in ternL; of satisf,~,ction analogous to 
the definition for the calculus of classes. LIe then deals. wi th 
the lOGic of li:any-terr::eJ. relations which resembles tho ,~;econd-
order predicate calculus. Again a definition is given. 
The last laJ:1b'Ua..;e with which he deeds is wMt he colIs lthe 
general theory of classes', a language resembling that of Itasce1l1 s 
in the pr:ill.£.:iJ2.ia L:at.h;ematica bu.t without the axiom of reducibility 
and the SyTIlbols for many-termed relations.1 Thelaneua;:;e considered 
1. Instead of the axiom of reducibility, there are an infinite number 
of axioms vlhich Tarski cil.lIo pseudo-definitions. rany ... termed relatidms 
ce.n be i11troduced by the Kuratowski-Wiener device of classes of ordered 
pairs, which are in turn defined as classes of clas$es. 
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is then a set-theoretic lan.;uage com]:ur3.ble to those of 
Russell, Quine, Zerme 10, etc • ,':hich were'; discussed in the first 
two sections of this thesis. 
'1'ransla tin!5 Tarski IS lan[,'1W.ge in to a more fo.railiar one, the axioms 
he chooses are: 
1. (Exn+1)(lX~'h:n+l;: p) (nxiom scherrlE1.) 
where p does not contJ.,in xn+1 free. 
(axiom of il1finityl) 
The superscripts indicate tYpe-levels. 
, ]'01" this langua.,.-;e Tarski o.ttt;mpts to construot a (lefini tion of 
truth in terms of satisfaction, but finds th.,-~ t such Cl. definition 
is oblJtructed in the meta-theory by the lack of variables of bigher 
type than any in the object language. 
'In the language with which we o,re now dealing variables of 
arbi tarily high (finite) order occur: consequently in applying 
the method of unificition it would be necessary to operate with 
expressions of 'infinite order'. Yet neither the meta-laneuCl.0'e' which 
1. l1:hi8 translation h3.8 been male in terms of class membership so that 
it can be seen "'oS set-theoretic. Tarsid's o,m formu.lation allows two 
readings of ~C(Y): IX has as an element the object Y, oI'thE objeot Y 
has· the property X' (CrrF p.243) i:tuine' s objectior1l3 to the notation X(Y) 
in co:n.~ection Vii th Ell bert and Ackerrna,.vm, Prinoiple.s of .t[,} thepla tical to:,:io, 
viOuld apply equally to Tarski I s notation and the dual reaJing of it which 
Tarski gives. vide. W. ~uine, Sei-'rl18orya,11d its I,00ic. Cambridge, 
lrass. 1963. In connection with this axiom of infinity see the a:ppendix 
of this thesis. 
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forms the basis of the :present investic.>'S tion~~, nor G.ny othel' 
of the ezisting lcll1gtlas.s, cont,,:.ins such expressions. It :is 
in fact not clear \Iihat intuitive meaning could be Given to 
1 . ,1 sue '1 e~{press~ons. 
He then enquires whether tho di::ficul ties he encounters 
in trying to define the notion of truth are accidental or if 
they are a consequence of the lan::.;Ui1gG studied. In other 
words: is it loc;ically impossible to construct a definition 
of truth for this languz..:;e which satisfie;; convention 'r? 
He then g:i. ves a much simplified account of Gl:3del' s theorem 
and concludes that no !.latter how a class of e::r.:preGsions 
is defined in the met a-la.'1gua se , this class must have members 
which are not in accord wi th condi tion ~ of convention 'r. 
I. e. Suyrpose a class, r.er, of eXl)ressions is defined, then 
there must be an expression in the object In.nt).lilge such 
that: 
x ~ Tr if 0.1'1,1 only if p. 
'X' is here the name of an expression and 'pI the translation 
of that expression into the meta-lan,sl.w:;;e. As a result no 
definition Y!'.r.1.y be Ci ven for the semantic concept of truth which 
does not contravene convention '1'. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
1. C'rF. p.244 
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In the post-script to his paper, 'J:arski abandons the 
idea that to talk of expressions of infinite order has no 
clear meaning. InstE):ld, by utilising the theory of transfini te 
ordinal numbers he then talks of allovring in the rneta-1al1i;uage 
variables of order greater t:b.fln any in the object lanf!,'ullt;e. 
For the object lanc;uaS8 under investigation where the variables 
that occur r1..ll1 through all fini te types the meta-l8,n[;uag'e nee,is 
a variable of order (.) • A definition of truth whicr, ;sj~tisfies 
convention T can then be C;i ven successfully. As a consequence 
of this definition sentences of the follow"ing kind r£ay be 
proved: 
• X €. lI'rue if and only if p. 
where ';{' is the name of a· sentence of the object lan(:;ul1ce 
which tra.nslates into the meta-lan::;uage as 'pt. Tbe class of 
provable sentences may be defined without the use of these 
variables f and GtHel t s theorem;i ves for this class (Pr) 
the result noted on the previous page tInt there is a.."1 expression 
of the object languBe0 such tr~tl 
X ~ Pr if and only if p 
where 'X' is the name of that expression and '1" its translation 
into the meta-laneuage. Since it also follows that if 
X E. Pr then X Eo Tr and if (III X) ~ Pr then (AlX) E:. Tr, the expression 
designated by 'JE' must belong to the class of tru<,; sentences but 
not to the class of provable sentences. 
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There are for this langu.age, if Tarski t s reasoning is 
COl'-Teet, true but lli"1provable sentences. The proof of this 
assertion rests on G~He1' s theorem appli e(1 to the general 
theory of classes. G(5del, independar:tly of 'rarski, came to 
the same conclusion that such sentences erist, but G1:ldel relied 
on a naive notion of truth rather tha.n any technical concept 
of the kind Tarski defined. From GCldel onwards, it has been 
taken for granted that there are uri trJ1letical sentences which 
a.re tru.e although they ar(3 lU1provable in a formalisation of 
tha t ari thme ti c. Since the ari tbrIletic notions of 0 and 
successor can be defined \vi thin se ~;-theory it has been assumed 
1 that Calel's theorem carries over to set-theory: there are , 
sen tencen of set-theory vihich are true but cannot be rroved in 
1. e.g. 1.1. Dummet, 'In view of the fact tha,t Gtlu.",lt s theorem 
applies to any systern which contains ari tbmetic t there YlOuld be 
an ari ti1lJl.etical statemcnt expressible but not provable in this 
system, which we could recognise to be true. 1 1.~. Dumrnett, 
'The Philosophical Significance of Ged.el' s r.1:heorem', 
'Every axioma.. tic theory, rich enuugh to contain a formalisation 
of aritbIlletic, is either inconsistent or contains a fonnula such 
that n8i ther it nor its ne,c,"atiOll is rJrovable wi thin the theory and 
such that its truth can be demonstrated. by extra-theoretic arguments.' 
S. Kerner, 'On the relev0..:.'1.ce of Post-G8delian Mathematics to 
Pb.ilosophy', Problems in the PhilosoDlrr of },Ir:,them'EL ti.cs, edt 
I. Lakatos, Amsterdam 1967 t p.124 
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a formalisa.tion of set-t:1eory. 
In the last section I cri ticizcu 'rardd':3 definition 
because i·t led to the odd conolusion tha.t for tl1G Iml,) .. l.:i,:.;e 
oon8ide1'8(1 in that section there "<,teTG tru·:;; tnt i111l.lTOVable 
sentences. 
\Ias due to the different sets of axioms which seemed. to be 
elilployed in the t",r;o 1 all L;Uci,{So S : the meta-languai.se und the 
object lant';'llD.ge. 
I shall argue tha t Tal'sj~i Call110t aS~~Ulae 
that oertdn inri:ilicr3,ti0l1S of Gl;l d.e 1 I s theOl~'em on the incol;'l;letabili t;y 
of arithmetic c.:1rry over to the set-theory in which that a.ritJllEetic 
is expressed. I shall 1:;e;"1n b,>, ef_n .. mining GCliel t s theor£;)il for 
arithmetic in some detail. 
Gl,Well establishes ~ oorresp0l1denC0 between the expr,:,)0sions 
of tb.e fOI'f.1alise'd ari tJ:ll:cetic lanS'W1E:e and sequer;,ces of such 
expressions Yli til the natural nUiilbe. s. He then shows that certain 
• mata:rIlD.thematical relations betv.reen expressions of thcobject 
lan,:;uaeEl hold if an,d onlr if an a:d tlmatic relation holds bCltween 
tho nwu'ber,:J corresponding to the ox:pros3ions. 
corrGsponding to an expre3sion of the object lanb1..lllge is cS\.lled 
1. K. G8de1, "Uber formal unentsclleidbare Slftze del' Principia 
l"athernatica und vel'i'Jamite Syste11l8 I l\;ol1atchefte fUr Il1.thematik und 
HlYick, vol. 38 Pl).173-198; the foliowing is a paraphrl3.se of " .. 
Geidel's a.r;::'''Lm,ent, follo-Iving KleGh'l€l t ,Intro,iuctlon .t~ !\~et::;fJath.€:1\ati..c8 t 
,Amsterdnm 1952. 
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the Gedel number of tl1il t expression. Consider the fo110'11n;; 
metamathematical relation bat,/cen aYl expre3sioYl of the object 
lal1g'l111{Se ani a sequence of expressions of the object 
P(A, :a): A(x) is a,;ell-formed forr;mla with free 
variable x and B is a sequence of v/ell-formed formulas Guch 
tha t n is a proof of A(ll) whe'r'e .n is the l1tuneral of the object 
languaGe exprGssing the Gddel nUIitber of A(x).l 
To this metamathenk":l. tical reI a tion there corresponds an 
ari thmetio relation that holds bet,/e(;n the Oeie1 numbers of A 
and B, when and only when the rata,mathennUcal x'elation holds. 
If the aritbJriotic relation is denoted by tR' the above equivalence 
is e~c:pressed by '?(A,:a) if and only if R(c(A) , g(:8» I where g(A) 
is the G~Liel number of A. 
Gadel introduces the concdpt of numerioal 9xpressibility. 
An n-terrn ari thmeUc relation F(xl , ••• xn) is muncrically expressed 
in the object lar1g1Ulge if and only if there is OJ well-formed 
formula of th'3 object laTIt~age wi th :n free variables 
,,,~ ~, 
'l(xl, ••• ,x )~that if F(a.l, ••• ,a ) holds then ~ F(~lt •••• ,a ) 
- -n n ~-xl
and if F(al , •••• ,a ) does not hold then'r NF([l'I, ••• a ) for n . ---n 
2 
each n-tuplet of numbers. Since the definition of the arithmetic 
1. frha object lanp-uaze has terms which fu.'1ction as nUi11erals e.g. 
0,11'(0), F[F(o)l, Ftli'(F(O)]~ , ........ (GCMel of cit.p.177) and these 
e:.;;:press the numbers 0, l,:2, 3. • •• • • • Thus, the nUIllber ,is e :<:pressed 
by l!'{F tp( 0 >l! 
2. From here on expressions of the object 18l:l.t\Ul,s·(~ a:re underlined 
vrhenever oonfu;310n coull arise i3etwecm expressions of the objeot languat'El 
and expressions of the h,e'ta-langua.ee. 
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relation R is primitive recur;~ive and sinoe all primitive 
recursive relations can be munerically expressed in tl1e 
object lant£,uage, it follows tl13.t there is a vrell-fo:rr.'1ed 
formula of the object lant':,ruage liCy,]') such tha:t 
if, for two numbers a l ,a2 ,R(al ,a2) holds then 
\- g,(ill 'il2) and 
if, for tvvo l~umbers a l ,a2 ,Il(al ,a2) does not hold 
then \- N gGl ,1?2) 
'rhe incompleteness theorem t£1y noV{ be proved. 
SUi:Jllose \- (:r)IIIE,(lh,;y) where :p is the Gl1del nu.r!lber of 
Cl!)"'E(.;;;,;[) then there would be a sequence of well-formed 
fOrL'1ulas ~ which ,muld be a proof of the well-formed formula 
(,;y)Nli(~,,;y). I.e. p«i)~B(~,;[), ~). Therefore, 
R(g I (,;y)"'E.(~,,;y~, g(E,)) by the equivalence of the arithmetic 
and metamathen~tical relations. Let g(]) = q. Then, since 
R is numerically expressed by li,rli(~,.9). From the predicate 
calculus incorporated in the object language it follows that 
language to be consistent, :Lt follows that it is not the case 
Having esta.blished that it is not the case that 
I- ll)III!l(~':i) if the obuect lan0"Uage is con:,istent, it follows 
that no sequence of well-formed fonnulu.s is a proof of 
(,;y)N!i(J2,,;y). 'rhus, it is not the case that R(p,l) nor 
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R(p,2), nor R(p,3) •••••.•• (Again from the eCJ.1.:tivalence of P 
and R). Since R is numerically expressed by :R it follows thclt 
If the assumption that the object ls...nguage is II)-consi stent is Hl:<:tde, 
it is immediate that it is not the case that )- ,., (X)'" B:C12,X) • 
On the assumption that the object langUc'1ge is tAl-consistent, it can 
:L'his is the incompleteness theorem in it syntactic sense. 
Generally, however, more is cl::dmed for the GULel 
incom~)leteness theorem than this. There is also the consequence 
tha t there is a. true ari thru8tic assertion tha.t cannot l)e proved 
in the object languaee. For the truth of (Y)NR(p,y) can l)e seen 
from the truth of ~R(p,1),"'R(p,2), etc. 1'he well-formed fonmla. 
which expresses this proposition in the object lanQ1!:1{;'e is 
(;Y)N}'i(J2,;Y) which has just been ahoi'm to be unprovable. 1'he 
existence of a true but 1.L.'1prova.ble sentence of the formalised lant~;uage 
1-
has been sho'lom. It is at thi.s point that a leap is made in 
transferring this semantic implic~ltion of GUdel's theorem to a 
formalised set-theoretic 1ana:uage. It is claimed that arithmetic 
can be incorporated into abstract set-theory by mes.ns of a series 
of definitions, defining numher in terms of sets. There a:J:'e of oourse' 
1. 1J.1his 'bas been disputed Goddard "True and Provable" !1in1, 1958 
pp.13-31 \Ii ttgenstein Ref'Jarks on tb:; Foundations of Mathem;s,tics I 
Oxford 1956 
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many vmys in ,:hich this Illay be done, and the method chosen 
will depend rartially on the set-theory chosen. 1. 
I shall suppose that a set-theory L1as been eho sen and 
that in this set-theol'Y a construction of arH})Detic is 
attempted. A construction of aTi thmetic VIi thin sot-t:18ory 
is reckoned as successful if the c.eflnition of '0' and 
'successor of' C2n 1)e given in terms of sets only, in such 
a nay as to preserve the laws of aritl1rnetic. 2 Whatever 
definitions are Given at leu.si; the +'" .I.~ve PeOllo [1..):iorr~s nu;;;t 
be provable. :5 Three of these dennud in adJition to '0 f a.Hd 
'successor oft trot the term 'nt.l.Ii1bGr' be defined, for each 
of the following is a Pea .. '1o axiom: 
(i) 0 is a nun:ber 
(ii) • the successor of a nU:ilb8r is a DU!i1'Der 
(Ui) if P(O) and for each n,P(n):lP(successor of n) then 
for each n, if n is a nUJub<;;r then P(n). 
It is necessary then to define 'munber' as ,,'ell as '0' al:'ld 
'succe;;;sor of'. (As the u):1i V21'se consi<,ts of sets, the 
extra clause in (iii) - the indti.Ction schema 'if' n is a nun:he:r' 
1. Clearly a set-theor,y wi th tYf,e-distinotions will not aHo,; a 
d8fin1 tion of nu.nber which has oixed types. J?or a comparioon of 
set-th8ories see ,~nine IISet fl'lv:'!or~r and its Isor;i ell. 
2. W.~uine, 1Set-theory and Its Lobic' f p.81 
3. This is a. II!inir,~a1 condi tion. It is also necessary to give a 
defini tion of f + I and f. I, to satisfy the usu:11 recursive definitions. 
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is necessary since otherv7ise the induction schema would 
imply the. t all sets had. the pro}Jerty I) \;hich is not desired 
since in the sot-theory there will be soots w~lich are not 
nU;7lbers, although all nwnbers will be sets.) 
If Vie 8up~)ose th'1 t the set-theory chosen i8 one vihich 
allows mixed types, the definitions Illay "be given as fol10Y1s: 
(Iv) 0 = df the nul set, i.e. ¢ 
(v) tho successor of x,S(x), = df the set consisting 
}x11 solely of x, i.e. t } 
(vi) the set of nur.ibers = df the intersection of all 
sets containing 0 !1!d closed vii til respect to the 
operation'sucCGGsor of' 
rot is clear that the first two Pec .. Ylo axioms are satisfied 
by these ·definitions. The axiom schema of induction follows, 
for if p(O) and (x){ll(X:):>P(S(x» then P determine's a sot 
thD,t contains 0 aIlei is closed with respect to 'successor'. 
l~'ovr if y(lJ, Y belongs to everJ such set and therefore p(y). 
It seems then as if the constru.ction of arithmetic within set .. 
theory is successful. Permo' saxioms a.ppear as pro \Table theorems 
1. essentia.lly Zermelo's 'ethed ''Untel'suchenden Hbel' die 
. Grundlagen der 1,Zengenlehre' :~;'l. theu:'1 tische Ann:11en 65 
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wi thin the tLeory \."11en defini ti on (i v), (v) and (vi) are 
given. 
Since G(1del t s theorem was proved originally for a system 
of arithmetic which, apart fr)IU the propositional calculus and 
the predicate calculus of order 113, includes only the Pf?ano 
axioms, it seems that the results of this theorem 11lUSt carry 
over to the set-theory in which arithmetic has bsen constructed. l 
However, Glliel' s original the orem eli d no t need a choi ce 
of terms to fune tion as the natural l1'Lmbers. The uni ve:cse of 
discourse - the value of the variables -,ras lind te(l to the 
nwnbers, the only constant terms being '0', and its Sllccossors. 
The Peano axioms included in the system are the trJ.I'ee tba,t do 
not mention number at all, i.e. (x) (S(x) 1= 0), (x)(y) (S(x)=S(:r})x=y) 
and the induction schema (iii). 2 Since there are only mUIllJers 
wJ:rich can be values of the variable, there is 110 se t 1'1 conSisting 
only of the na tura.l 11wabers to define. The same may be said 
of the treatment Kleene e;ives. 3. His object langu:lg-e is 
the proi,osi tional calculus, the first-order predicate 
calculus, the same three Peano axioms as for.G(1del's language, 
1. K. Gadel, op.cit. pp. 177-170, 190-191 
2. ibid. p.177 
3. S. Kleene, op.cit. p.82. 
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recursive definitions of addi tiO;1 and mul til)lication and 
various axioms of identity. Clearly, there will be no 
necessi ty for a defini tion of nUJliber since here ag'C;,in ther(~ are 
only numbers admitted as possible values of the variable-. 
The problem now is to prove Gl:)del' s theorem for a sye tam 
in which there are other objects besides l1UlTibers. 'rhe 
set-theoretic construction of the numbers that has just be(;ll1 
outlined is one such lane;1..k1.ge. As before, a corres i-ondence 
may be set up between the expressions of the lrul,:;u::1..c;e (and 1111 
sequen(~es of such expressions) and the natural numbers. 
In thi s way the metamC1 the:.la ti cal pr ed.ica te P and the 
arithmetic relation R co:r:respond Le. 11'0'1' any two expressIons 
of the lani?,;uace, A and B, P(A,E) if and only if 
R(g(A) ,g(E). The idea of numerical expressibi Ii ty is slichtly 
changed, for whereas in the formalised ari thmotic case there 
was no choice as to vlhich terms should be re,~!1rded as 
corresponding to the nwnbers 0,1,2, •••• , a decision 
must be to.~\:en as to which sets in the lanb'Uage are to rer;resel1t 
them. Following Zermelo I hmre , ... but 
it should be remembered that another choice 'IfaS equa.lly 
possible; von l~eUl1l!3.nn took p,til,t,s,{p\\ , ... 1. After 
1. J. von. lTet1111al'l1l, lI;~ur Eil1filhr'J.ll,g der tx':msfiniten Zr.,hlen" 
Acta I..Ji tterfl;rmTl ac Scientia:r:ulil Rer>;iCle Unt vers! tatis Irlmr~!lricae 
]'rancLsco-Jo.§.92Qinae (sect. scient. ma.th.) 1,1923 pp.199 .. 208 
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this decision has been taken, the J.efinitiol1 of numerical 
expressibility can be given. The arithmetic relation Ie is 
expressed by a well-formed forr:mlas of the system with two 
free variables li(~,~) so that, 
(i) if R(al ,a2) holds for a pair of number a l ,a2 then 
\- R(~l &2) 
and (ii) if 11(al ,a2) does not hold for a pair of numbers 
al ,a2 then h, B(Sll ,51) 
Consider the vrell-formed formula (J:)fII n(n,;y) where p is the 
GHdel number of the vlell-formed formula (.Y~ EC!£,;~) v;l1ers Z; 
is a free variable. \Je are now in a position to prove that 
The proof is identical to the 
proof given preV'iously for aritbmetic. 
is consistent, (.Y~E(J2,.:i) is unprovable. If now we attempt 
to show that "'(;r)IIIE,(lhZ) is unprovable proyided that the langlk1.g(;: 
is lIo\-consistent, the original proof fails. ,I.nthough we can 
show thaI:; it is no·c the case that n(p,l), nor n(p,2) t nor 
R(p,3) etc. o.nci thence that h'EClhJJ, hIlE(R,'£), r 1\1 11(.12,3) etc. 
we may not say that therefore ... (Z) N li(,I?,;y) is unprovable 
for there are expressions in the. Lmd.uage besides 
f;, tf; 1 , \ \ f; 1 \ , • • · · · (1. e. 0, 1, 2, ••• ). The only conclusion 
we tl8.y rea.ch is tba t 1\1 Cd t ;rE.~~ ;:) N R(Jl,z)} is unprovable which 
Theundetidability of 
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Choosin~~ a,;other formula 
will give us the incompleteness theoren. Suppose we 
choose the well-fo:rr;led forL1ula (y) [ y<rr ,) AI gC~hl)j with 
free 1£, then this formula will have a Gtktel number, q, say, 
and Vfe may shovr th.1.t both this formula wi th .9. substituted 
for the free variable 1£ and its negation ar'e unprovable 
provided that the lan[,'1lace is l<.l-consistent. Suppose that 
(y) \ iLE.li":l '" Ei(.9.,iL)) is provable, then there would be amllnber 
k such that R(q,k). Since R is lTwnerically expressel by 
li it follows that li(.9.,k) is provable. 11.1s0, if x is a 
number \- ~~.N (where '1S' is not a variable but the term 
representing the number x). Hence ls(fi is provable. By 
the predicate c~lculus tll1.t is incorporated in the 1ansuage 
Assuming consistency (iL) \ iLE.l{'N E,(.9.,1')1 is unprovable. ~'ve 
may now prove tlnt the negation of this formula. is unprovable, 
provided that the set-theory i3 t..3-consistent. As before, 
since (I) l!6~i:> IIIE(.9.,l:)! is unprovable, it is not the 
case tr~l,t R(q,l), R(Cl,2) ••• lienee r III £1(90,1) , \- ... g(,9,,£,), ...... 
and if the set-theory is I.)-consistent ~ (y) t :lEli) IV R~.9.'.In 
is unprovable. 
An undecidable well-formed. fOrITiula has been constructE;Q 
on the aSS1.lInption that the set-keory is I.) -consistent. l3u'c 
l.,3 ... consistency for set-theory is not a predicate of set .. t:leQry· 
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of the sartle category as consL.:tency. It demands for its 
defini tion th:l t certain sets have been chosen to rer:resent 
o and its descendents (via the successor function) as liell 
as a set trnt cont3.ins just Q,-1, .f" etc. (the set denot;ed by-
In') Al though (",)-consistency is desiri:::l:ble, if not essential 
for any formal system of arithmetic, t~1ere is no such can(ii tiol1 
for set-theory'. :B'or if that set-theory v.'i tl.l a IA'uticular 
choice of sets for the natural numbers turned out to be 
w-inconsistent then this Vlould sU,.SO'C)st, Lot a rejection of th:! 
set-theory, but a rejection of the particuln.r choice that Wf3 
had marie for the natural ntullb.,;rs. I t may be the C:..1,:::;0 thl t 
for every ohoioe of sets for tb.e natuxa1 numbers, the resulting 
theory Vlould be to) -inoonsistent, in v{hich case tb::I'e has 
been no undecidable formula constructdd for the set .. theoT'J, 
al though vre 11laY say tha, t the set-tLeory is not Sllitable for 
the construction of arithmetic within it. I sIlal1 return to 
this subject luter in this Ch3.:l:itcr. 
iUthough ~ -oonsis toney is nut of overriding importance 
for set-theory, consistency certainly is. Rosser has shown 
th;;-lt GBdel's mOI'€Lstringellt requirement th.:tif a theory is 
~-conSif:1tt1nt then an undecid.3.ble formula exists, may be 
droPJ)ed for the we3.1~er condi tl on of c011si stoncy .1. Following Kleeme, 2 " 
1. J .13. Rosser, fE:-:te:nsion:3 of some theQrelhS of Cedel and Church't 
Journ"l.l of S.l%oolic ,Lo(';1£" 1936 vol.l, pp.87-9l . 
2. H. Kleone, Introducti.on ,to :; et:~.mathmn8tics, pp.20S-209. 
.. 273 .. 
the metru;lathematic;J.l relation U that the 88:1u81we of ',';e11-
fonIled. foruu1as 13 is a proof of the well-forIl,€d formula 
..,.!(.n) where p is the G(jd.el nUlJber of the ,lell-formed 
for1;)u1a :!he];) with free va.riable .f. is e:111i valent to an 
ari thrnt:tic relation '1: bet\veen the GlJdel m .. unbers of A and 
Lb. U(A,13) if and only if T(g(A), geE) ) • POI' 
a formal system of arithmetic the rela tion ~ is l1mJcI'ically 
expressed by a well-formed formula~. Consider the well .. 
This is a ficll-formed fOI'IllUla 'ui th one frGe variable. S~lT)POS(j 
its Gt3J.el nU.mber is p. '11hen it can be shown thl.t for the 
forUlalised arithmetic wi thin which we are vlO}kin{!, the forn11l1a 
the theory is consistent. For suppose that the above 1"v'ell-
formed formula is provable, then for some k, R(p,k) emd, on the 
is Ul1provable. Therefore it is not the case that 
\- I,n(n?) \- ",rr(n 1.) AI-±, ~,.= , • ., •• t _ ~,~ • From the axioms.and definitions 
From the predicate calculus incorporated in 
the lB.'t1{;uc:gf~ it follows that 
\- (E~) [B:.(~'Jf) • (~) (z. ~ E ;> ~ (lh~» J and hence 
\-- ",tr)tr.H.n,;t).) ('Cz.)(J1. ~ ,;y:.!(.g,1!»1 which is thenego,tion 
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of the lyell-formed. formula tba.t was assumed provable. 
Ifherefore if the fOrII:alised ari tilt-netic is consistent 
Assume that the negation of the last well-formed formula 
is provable, then for some nuniber k, rr(p,k) hold.s. 
\- !(lhls) and by the definitions anJ. axioms of the formalised 
aritl1metic we have (ii) (;1)tX~ k::>(E~)(1! ~ X ·1.Clh1!»]. 
Prom the resul tat th e end of the las t paragra rh, we know tha t 
it is not the case that nC:~'to), R(p,l), H(p,3), ••• , H(p,kli) 
lIenee, \- ... g(12,g), \-"'ECrr,l), ••.• , \-"li(l?,.1£). From the 
ari thmetio acain, (iii) \- (X) 2f $ k ::>,., !l(12,2S) 
Combining (ii) and (iii) and since \- (X)tx ~ }; y X ~ k 1 
it follows tba.t \-- (X) [E(J2,:Y) :l (£.E.H .. ~ ~ Y.. • X(J1,~»1. 
Eu t we had supposed tra t the negation of this formula '1£1.8 
provable. Therefore, assUlning eonsi steney, it follows that 
For the ari thmetic lan~~,la5es of GtHel and Kleene, the 
aSb'Ulllption of consi8tency ento.ils the .eY.istenoe of Ul1deoidll.ble 
. well-fonned formula.s. As with the previous Gedel result, it 
does not follow automatioally tha.t this undecida.bili ty ca.rries 
over to a set .. theory in whioh arithmetic can be constructed. 
It must be rememb(,red that the uni"lterse no\v consists of sets, 
some of which represent ll'ctClhers and others that do not • 
.An extra difficulty arises at this point for the Hosser 
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proof since the well-formed formula contains the symbol I~'. 
In order for the proof to be forthcoming a definition of ,~, 
is required for sets. [rhe properties this must have for the 
proof to go thrOUGh may be found by examining the proof a,bove. 
rrhey are as follows: 
(a) if \- !(Q) , \- 11(1), •••••• , \- .4(k) where k is a number, 
then t (~)(2f ~ k :> .4 (~) ) 
(b) whenevel' Ie is a number \- (ll)(.Y~lf Y .:nk).1. 
~uinels definition of ,~' for sets is when inverted 
(Quine's definition of IN' is the inverted version of the 
defini t ion of 'l~ I given on page ) 
~ 4.Y = df (~)n.!~.h «.Yh~,~ 'l 2C'l)'~));:) 'yf~ 1·2 
r.rhis definition fails to meet condition (b) for whenever 
~ kG,!! and \- m{li it is not the case that \- ~ ~ !!l v ~~1]}, thus 
blocking the derivation from (ii) and (iii). 'rhe dotini tion 
may be modified, hOY18Ver, in such a 'i!f),y as to satisfy (a) and 
(b). Irlle following definition does satisfy both conditions. 
;;f~'y '" df (;;f'li·:rtli) v (J!) ('!~J!.~~~) (1l1:~ ::> SC'l)(.~)l:» :LEe) 
This definition of ',' does not connect all sets (unless all 
sets belong to li!) but it does connect a set which belonf,"Sto 
ll. to every set. Wi tll this defini tion of f , I the Rosser . 
1. Assuming trk1. t 'y ~ x' is defined as ':t' y I • 
2. W. ~uine, Set-Theory and, its Lc\'r,ict p.'n 
- 276 -
proof goes through as it stands and there is therefore an 
undeoidable well-formed formula for set-theor;y~. '}.'his time, 
unlike transferring the original GBclel proof to set-theory, 
there is no problem about the neoessity of there being a. 
class rr whioh includes all and only the rk'1. tural nUElbers. 
If,tuine 1 s definition of 1 ~ Iz tlere to be used in set-
theory rather than the rwdified version, then Q, proof of 
Rosser's theorem can be constructed. by modifying the vvell-
fonned forraula thrl, t is to lie shorm tmdecida.ble. If we 
replace in the following vlell-forme1i fomula the free variable 
by the set representing the G15del number of the well-formed 
formula we have a fOTnula which er.:m be shovrn undecidable. 
·The fOTr:ru.la is 
Suppose tbJ}.t the D8del number of -I;he above formula is m, 
then consider the forruula when 'x' is replaoed by 'mI. 
, --
Suppose the resulting fa mula is provable. 11hen R(m, k) 
for some number k. Also, if the 
1anE;uage is con8i8 tent it is not the case that the follcw:i,ng 
hold: -1 T (rn,O) "ir (m, 1) t ••• " • ,T(m, k) ) • From the definition 
OOilibining by 
the prodicate calculus, we may deduce thtl. t the necation of 
the formula we supposed was provable is also prova.ble. ASSuming 
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is unprovable. 
Hov? Vie E>.ay sho'1 that the nec:tion of the las", fell-formE;d 
formula is unprovable. SUFPose that it is provable, then 
T(l:1,k) for some number k. From nUJItcric;al f.lJq)re.ssibilit~r 
and the predicate calculus it follows that 
if'the languiJ;,:;e is consistent it follows that none of 
R(m,O), R(m,l), •.•..•• , R(m,k) hold. 'llherefore, 
Since 
\- (lsc;li.x£~) ::, (X ~.k 1: 'J ) k) and ~ k (E we lllay combine (iv) 
a.nd (v) to eive \- (Y)lx<~i ':) (E(m,y)::> (EZ.)(Z. ~ y.~ (l!1'~)))) 
Thus, if the lanL;"'UaG8 is consistent then 
NCY)(YC.ll ::> (g(m,;y);:, (~.~) (~ ~ ;y'!(E1,~)))1 is unprovable 
AZ:lin, in this proof there Y1aS no necessi tjr, that ~ should 
be a set that consisted of those and only those sets which 
repre.:;el"lted tbe natural nULibers. 
Analogously, we may show tlu t the following tI'Jovlell-formed. 
formulas are l..U1deciclable: 
number of the S8xne well-formed fonnula wi th the free variable 
12£1 replacing ',1:' a.nd the definition of '~t is trle mOllified 
version above. 
G8del number of the same w'ell-formed formula wi th th~ free 
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variable '2£' rep1s.cing 'n', ;:;.11d '~' is defined:)":.: the 
inverse of \~uine' s definition. 
Thel~ is for set-theory no lack of viell-forDed 
formulas that can be shown to be undecidable • (Clearly, 
• there are an infinite munber, since, to the above un:iecidablc"i 
formulas we ffi:l.Y prefix 8l1Y theorem of the 11ll1{j11age as an 
antecedent of a conditional the consequence of which is one 
of the undeciwlble formulas.) .Ie cannot doubt tha. t GBdel 
and Rosser's undecidability results do carryover to set-theory. 
But this bas only syntactic import. Tarski has alleged 
that the incompleteness results also have sem.a.ntic implicatioi;s 
t t - 1-for se - t1eory It is just this that I wish to deny. 
There are convincing reasons for saying that any intended 
formalisation of a.ri t1'illletic must oontain formulas that are 
unprovable even though they express true propositions when 
interpreted as aritl1ffietic propositions, i.e. when the formal 
variables are taken as ranging over the natural nmnbers 
and the formal operations interpreted as arithmetic operations. 
The first G~del formula t~~t we have shown to be unprovable is 
'\'{hen this is interpreted as expressing an 
aritr~etical propOSition we can see that the interpretation 
is true. For, as we have shown NR(p,n) holds for each ~ltural 
1. See beginning of this section, 
- 279 -
number n. Therefore (y )IVR(p,y) is true and this is expressed 
in the formal system by (y)"'!i(.:Q,y). Iro show this more rigourously 
a definition of a formula being true is needed, but this can be 
given easily in terms of the satisfa.ction of formulas in the domain 
of natural numbers in the same way as for any set of formulas of 
1 the first-order predicate calculus. 
The Rosser formula fares Similarly, for we have shown that 
of consistency). That is, there is no sequence of formulas 
such that this sequence is a proof of the well-formed formula 
(y)(g,C;l£,Y) ::l (c~)(~' y. !C~,~») when the free variable is 
replaced by the G8del number of the formula, namely p. From 
the equivalence of the metamathematical predicate P and the 
arithmetic predicate R we see tr~t for each natural number n 
it is not the case that R(p,n) and hence that it is the case that 
for each natural number n if R(p,n) then there exists a number 
z such tba t z:!:: y and rrep, z). The formula th"1 t expresses this in 
the formalised arithmetic is the unprovable formula at the 
beginning of this paragraph. Here again '\Ve have an unprovable 
but true formula of formalised ari thmetic or an unprovable 
formula that expresses in the formalised arithmetic a true 
arithmetic proposition. 
1. see A. Church, Introduction to Mathematic:,.! IJop;ic, pp.174-175 
ahd 227 .. 228. 
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The problem now is to see if there are any corresponding 
results for set theory. Ue know that the set theory 
incorporates arithmetic in as much as Peano's postulates are 
deducible in it for a certain sUb-system of sets. Vie also. know 
that any formalised language in which Peano's postulates can be 
derived contains a formula th~t is unprovable but which expresses 
a true arithmetic proposition. But it does not follow that there 
is in formalised set theory a formula t~lt is unprovable but which 
expresses a true set-theoretic proposition. 
IJ:lhe position is made clearer if we consider those e;camples 
of undecidable formulas which we discussed earlier. The set 
theoretic version of GI3d.el's formula is CX)(;y:(£!: :) IV E,(g"X» and tle 
two set theoretic versions of Rosser's formula are 
(xHy~!! ~ (li(m,;y:) 'j (I: ~)(~ ~ ;Y:.T.(mf~»)1 and 
(y)[]lClhX) ':) (E~)(z.~:v;,!Cl1'~»)} • 
When discussing the GBdel formula, we found that li(!l,Q), 
li(~,l), ••.. all numerically expressed true propositions of 
ari thmetic. Can vIe say that they also express true set-theoretic 
propositions? Trivially that is so, for they are also all 
provable. Hence they must be true in any model of the axioms, 
i.e. whenever an interpretation of the axioms is given for the 
axioms in which they are all true, then with this interpretation 
all theorems are true. Clearly the G8del formula is not true 
in this sense, Since its undecidability ensures that there are 
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models for the axioms in which it is true and others in which it 
is false. 1 ~nat must be presupposed in saying that the G~del 
formula expresses a true set-theoretic proposition is that 
there is some one interpretation of tl~ axioms in which the 
formula is true, that there is some intended model of the formalised 
set theory just as in tr~ case of formalised arit}~etic there 
is an intended model. 
Let us suppose that there is such an intended model. Then 
in this model 'IJ E(g.,91, "E(.9"l.J, ••• will express true set-
theoretic propositions, for the aforesaid reason. If it is 
asserted that in this model (Z}(ZE! ":) I\J R(Sl,Z») also expresses 
a true set-theoretic proposition then this could only be the 
case if the set in the model corresponding to ! consisted of 
those and only those sets which correspond in the model to the 
sets that represent the natural numbers in the formalised set 
theory. That is, the set in the interpretation that corresponds 
to {~; <'~J LQE~.(!!)(!!E~;) §.(!!)£~)1;:> ~f~1 consists only of 
the s~ts corresponding to i, fi~ , H i ~~ , {{\~m , ..... 
For if in the model there was a set a such that a~N and 
af¢, aftp\, a~~¢!\,2 etc. then we should be unjustified in saying 
1. Derived strs.ightforwardly from Gadel's completeness theorem 
of the predicate calculus. 
2. The set of the model oorresponding to a particular set of the 
forn~l theory is here written identically except for the absence of 
underlining. 
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that since AlR(..a.,Q), "'!l(Q.,lJ, ••• each express true propositions 
, 
of the model so must (X)(X~1L ';) IV R(..a.,x»). In other words, to say 
a model in which N consists of those and only those sets 
~, Vl, {{p~~ "etc. and that this model is, in some sense, the 
intended or proper model for the formalised set theor,r. 
Exactly the same remarks can be made about the Rosser 
formula (X) b:~li ';.) (R(m,x)' (E~) (~ ~ x.~(m,~»») because the 
antecedent of the hypothetical is the formula ~(li. 
'rhe third formula is more difficult to deal with since it 
does not contain the antecedent clause X~ explicitly. (It may, 
of oourse, occur implicitly in that if the function R(~,~) 
were spelled out in full ~~! might occur as an antecedent clause 
in this expansion, The above rerrarks would then apply directly 
to this formula.) To say that the formula expresses a true 
proposition would then be to say that in the intended model 
whenever R(p,x) is true for the set x then (£z)(z ~x.T(p,z» 
is true. Whether or not this is so can only be decided when the 
intended model is known. 
To talk of the truth of an undecidable formula of a formalised 
set theory is to presuppose a model which we think of as the 
intended model of the theory. What one may question is whether 
one can talk of proper models of set theory in any clear manner. ' 
If one could talk of a unique intended model then it would be 
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, proper to talk of the truth (or falsity) of the above 
formulas. 
Recently there has come into vogue the term 'standard model' 
to describe such a model. Myhill, for example, claims that 
I there is only one standard model of set-theory. Further, he 
claims that in the denumerable models of set-theory, the 
existenoe of which is assured by the L8wenhdim-Skolem theorem, 
when the predicate letter It' is assigned it no longer represents 
the relation 'is a member of' since the standard model contains 
an indenumerable field of sets. 'Class-membership oertainly 
has a vast non-denumerable fi eld' •2 As a corrective to this 
one should bear in mind that there are set-theories in which the 
membership relation has a denumerable field. Would it then be 
proper for Myhill to say that such theories do not contain the 
relation of class membership? 
The LBwenheim-Skolem theorem assures us that there are models 
of a formalised set theory in the domain of natural numbers. .' I 
think a case could be made out for saying th at such a model is 
'non-standard' in the sense that an arithmetic predicate would 
then be the interpretation of '!I. e. g.lf the axiom of 
infinity is ommitted from the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms the 
1. J. Myhill Irrhe Ontolob"ical Significance of the LBwenheim-
Skolem Theorem' ACademi.c Ji'reedom, Lo?-c a.nd Religion, Philad~hia' 
1953, p.68. 
2. ibid. 
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membership relation XEY can be interpreted as the relation 
that the quotient of dividing y by the xth: power of 2 is an 
odd nUlnber. l There is a sense here in which the arithmetic 
relation cannot be said to be the relation of class membership. 
But this sense is just that the relation holds between arithmetic 
entities, natural numbers, rather than, say, between numbers and 
sets of them. Certain formulations of the propositional 
calculus can in a like manner be construed as formulations of 
a partial arithmetic. Myhill's worry that set theory Will turn 
out to be some complicated arithmetic relation2 if the standard 
model is forgotten is misplaced. It would be as sensible to 
worry about the propositional calculus turning out to be a simple 
aritl1ffietic theory. 
But Myhill goes too far in saying that any denumerable model 
of a fonnalised set theory does not contain the relation of class 
1. • 
membership. Various 'inner' models of certain set-theories 
are known. 3 One wonders if Myhill would say that these too do 
not contain the notion of class-membership, since the model 
contains only ~ of the sets of the whole theory. 
There is another difficulty which Myhill overlooks and this 
is the difficulty of a preassigned interpretation of the predicate 
. "1. due to Ackermann, mentioned 6n H. Wang, A SurvG;Z of l;~thematical 
LogiC p.392 • 
2. J.Myhill, op.cit. p.69 
3. G~del's proof of the consistency of the axiom of choice relies 
on such a mo(iel. 
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letters occurring in the formulas a: the formal system. Myhill's 
definition of a standard model of a system is relative to 
interpretations being given to some of predicate letters of the 
system. Certain of the predicate letters of the formal system 
are given an interpretation and then a standard model is 
defined as a model in which those predicate letters receive 
the preassigned interpretation. Now such a definition is 
legitimate only if we can specify the preassigned interpretation. 
In order to talk of the standard model of set-theory l1yhill 
says that we must first assign to the predicate letter 'E,' of the 
formalised set theory the relation of class membership. But 
in order to specify this relation, we succeed only in giving 
a set of conditions which the relation fulfills. This set of 
conditions in turn can receive odd interpretations; it is 
no more safe from the consequences of G8del's completeness 
theorem than the formal system itself. On the subject of such 
preassie;ned interpretations Wang has likewise said that the 
explicit specification of the preassignment meets insuperable 
difficul ties. 1 
If there is no model wr~ch could be regarded as th~ standard 
model of a formalised set-theory or, in the phraseology of three 
1. H. Wang, 'On Denumerable Bases of Formal Systems', in 1~thematical 
Interpretations of Formal S:rstems, edt A. IIeyting t AQjsterdam, 1955 p.72 
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pages back, the intended model, then it is difficult to see how 
we could talk sensibly of the truth of some formula of the formal 
system which is unprovable. 
In spite of these difficulties, it might be thought that 
even if we could not specify completely the intended or standard 
model we might be able to specify .§2..~ of the conditions which a 
model must fulfill in order to be called standard. Thus, as 
we noted above, the standard model must include (y)(ycn';) 'VR(q,y» 
as one of its true propositions if we are to say that 
(~)(X'~ ~ 'VR(1,~» expresses a true proposition. It follows 
that N must contain only rj, tt>l, \l¢ \\, •••• This means that 
~ receives as a translation in the model 'the set consisting solely 
of p, {¢~', ••• Now, suppose that we use Tarski's method for 
translating the fonIal sentences of the language into an 
informal language (belonb~ng to the metalanu~ge). If we are 
conSidering Zennelo's set theory, for example, we may do so sinoe 
the variables belong to one type. There are no difficulties 
for such a theory caused by the variables of the formal system 
belonging to infinitely many types. The concept of satisfaction 
can be successfully defined and closed formulas of the system will 
receive translations in terms of 'for all sets' and 'there is a set 
such that'. It is clearly that the import of the tr$Jlslation 
of li will be 'the intersection of all sets z that contain the 
nul set are such that if they contain a set y, they also contain 
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the unit set whose only number is y. The trru1slation will 
not be 'the set consisting solely of the nul set, the unit set 
of the nul set, I • •• • Furthermore, the translation could 
not be 'the set consisting solely of ¢, \f6I, •••• ', since -
no formula of a formalised set theory contains the means for 
expressing dots, or the phrase 'and so on' or 'etc'. The 
description is not expressible in the formal system and so any 
proposition which contains this description will not be directly 
expressible in the formal system. The most that we can hope for 
is that we can express it indirectly by some other description. 
This is what we attempt to do when we define li by means of an 
intersection. 
Nothing, however, has been achi eved by this translation. 
If the metalanguage is formalised then the translation of the 
formal system is once more Zermelo's set tlwory. The 
problem is the same as that which occurred in section 3. 
We have effected a translation of a formal language into what 
might be described as 'realistic' terms. 'fhe exis ten tia 1 
operator is not, in the translation, just a mere s~~bol but is 
used to assert the existence of some p!l.rticular set. In 
order to segregate the set theoretic propositions in the translation 
which are true from those which are false we should have to have 
some standard set theory which we could use as a ~lide for deciding 
which of the proposi tionsof the translation held and which did 
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not. Until this standard set theory is specified, at least 
in part, there is no way of so classifying the propositions 
of the translation. 
The propositions that are of most interest in this 
context are the undecidable sentences of the fOX'L'1al system. 
The translation of (Y)(Y~li ~ N E(g,y» will be 'for all 
sets y, if y belongs to the intersection of all sets that 
contain y and are such that if they contain a set w, they also 
contain its unit set, then .. R(q,y) I (where ",R(q,y) is the 
translation of NR(g,y». Whether this translation is a true 
propOSition depends on whether the intersection does contain 
just 1, t¢! , etc. A proof that this set does contain just 
these sets presupposes the existence of a set which contains 
just these • For suppose that every set which contained p, ~ , 
••• also contained some additional member. Then there is no 
assurance that ¢, t¢!, etc. are the only sets common to all 
I 
sets that contain them. That there is a set consisting only 
of ¢, l¢~, etc. we could take as a true proposition of the standard 
< model. Then it would follow that the intersection set contained 
only~, t~l, etc. and, hence, that, for all sets y, if ybelongs 
to the intersection set then ovR(q,y). 
expresses a true proposition of the model. 
1. L. Henkin mentions this argument in hid discussion of the non-
isomorphic chara.cter of the Peano axioms, 'Completeness in the rrheory 
of Types', Journal of S:rtnbolic tarde, 1950, p.89. 
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We shall find that this has unwelcome consequences. 
Q,uinel, discussing t.a-inconsistency and its impliclttions for the 
system NF, says that if his system turned out to be w-inconsistent 
it would only mean that a set of the system was wrongly chosen as 
the set containing Q, 1, ~ etc. NF contains the set Nn defined 
rrhe only 
difference between this set and the intersection set I have been 
using is the different definition that the successor of a set 
has in }JF. Quine supposes that there could be some formula 
of the formal system such that~(Q), tel), ~(g), ••• are all 
provable and also (I: Z)(J.£dIn • "':/!-(1£) ). This si tua tion, should 
it occur, would mean that Nn must contain other sets than Q, 1, 1, 
etc. The notion of w-inconsistency loses its importance (in 
set theory) because: we may be able to choose another set which 
will contain Q, 1, g, •.• but no .; such that"t(z), e.g. {1£;.;tli!1. ~(1£)~ • 
This process of continual refinement maynot end, in which case, 
Q,uine says, we may say too t the system is pumericall;y ins8,\',Ta ti va, 
i.e. the system fails to contain a proper translation of 'x is: a 
natural number', 2 
Reinterpreting ~inels argument for the translations put 
fOTV/ard here, if there is a formula £~) such that 
*C~), ¥({#), etc. are all provable and (E];)(.!(!I • .,~(.!» is 
1. W. ~uine, I Onlol-Inconsi stency and the so -called ax:i om of 
Infinity Journal of Symbolio Logic, 1953. 
2. ibid. 
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provable then 1.. should not be translated as the set consisting 
solely of l' t~l, etc. But if we accept the idea of 
an intended model in which there is a set consisting solely 
of (", t~\, etc. and Tarski's method for translating the formal 
language into 'realistic' terms, the set corresponding to E 
in the model will consist of just p, 061, etc. 
Let us suppose that there is a formula of the formal 
system *(~) which has the above property. Now if we are 
prepared to say of the formula (X) (;,y:(l! ~ '" E(n.,;,y:» that it 
expresses a true proposition in the intended model we roost 
be equally prepared to say that (;,y:)(;,y:t~~ t(;,y:» expresses a true 
proposition of the intended model. In this case we must say 
that at least one of the axioms is f,'11se in the intended 
model, since, if they were all true in the intended model 
then so too would be all the formulas derived from them, one 
This would be a surprising result because When we build 
up the axiom system we choose axioms which correspond as 
closely as possible to our 'intuition' of sets. VIe may not 
succeed in capturing all the 'correct' axioms but at least, 
we feel,we have not chosen any of the 'incorrect' ones. 
But there seem to be worse consequences tr~n this. If 
the axioms contain at least one wh.ich is false in the intended 
model, then it may be the case thE'.t t(~J where A is one of the 
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sets t, {$J, ({ ill is false in the intended model. It may 
be remembered that the reason for considering such formula.s to 
be true in the intended model VIetS that they must be true in 
all interpretations in which the axioms were true. Since 
it turns out that the axioms are not true for the ihtended model, 
we have no good grounds for saying tba t each of f(~)' <p ( t~ p, 
••• etc. are true. It might be thought, however, that there could 
be independent grounds for saying that they are each true, 
e.g. by inspecting the translations and seeing if they are true 
of the intended model. But there is good reason to suppose that 
t(X) would be more complex than any of the axioms. That is, 
it would be harder to tell whether it was true of some particular 
set in the model than to tell whether the axioms are true in the 
intend.ed model. It may, for example, conta.in more quantifiers 
than any of the aXioms and be notationally longer than them. 
Consider the case of ~(2'~)' The expanded version of this will 
not even be surveYable in v{1 ttg'enstein t s sense. Now, if 
*(~) does not express a true proposition of the intended model 
where a is one of the sets ~, {¢l, H ¢ \!, etc. we no longer 
have ground.s for saying that (X)(XE:.1! ~ 'f!.(:r.» expresses a true 
proposi tion of the intended model, for our bTounds for saying 
this was that ~(~) e~pressed a true proposition of the intended 
model. In fact, if *(g) were to express a false proposition 
of the intended model, . (:l)(:l:~!~ ~0L) would express a false 
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proposi tion. For ",.i(§:) would express a true prollosi tiol} and 
therefore (t::.I)(.I(B: ... ~H,J) would be true, i.e. (.I)Cy'l!:> ~(.I)) 
would express a false proposition of the intended IHodeI. 
This is in direct contradiction to the initial position when 
we said thEl.t it expressed a true propos! tion. 
Sl~ch a consequence is intolerable. Viha t were the 
suppositions on which it rested? One was that such a formula 
existed. Now we could reject this, but to do so would be 
foolhardy. Formal systems have a habit of producing the most 
unlikely consequences. It is not beyond the bou.nds of 
possibili ty for such a formula to turn up. ''chere is 110 
guarantee that one will not, for if Yle coull prove that a fonnal 
set theory is ~-consistent we would have a proof of its 
consistency. \/e know that vIe can have no proof of consistency 
which employs only those Dlethods available in the formal theory. 
Any methods that we employ which are stronger than those in the 
system may themselves be inconsistent. 
The other supposition was that we should accept that 
(X)(£-! ~ tC.I» as expressing a true proposition in the intended 
model. We expressed doubts about the legitimacy' of intended 
or standard models since they can never be completely specified. 
The notion of an intended Olo.iel is unclear. Since the above 
argument.produces a contradict'ion on the assumption of the 
formal language being~-inconsistent Crela ti ve to N) if we allow 
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the notion of an intended model to settle the truth and falsity 
of the sentences of the formal lanf,Uage, it would be a wiser 
course to abandon speaking of a. fOI'Ulula expressing a true 
(or false) proposition of the intended model. 
Once we do so, we can no longer talk of an unprovable 
formula expressing a true proposition of set-theory. 
rrhus the claim too t there are true but unprovable formulas of 
any formalised set theo!"J can no longer be made. 
There is no mystery about this. If we bear in mind that 
a set theory is only committed to What it says exists, there 
remain proposi tions that are not expressible by means of any' 
formalised set theory. One such proposition is that there eXists 
a set which contains only the n~l set and sets generated from 
it by llleans of the operation of forming the unit set. As we 
know from Henkin's work1 it will always be I)Ossible to add to the 
axioms of any set in which Peano's axioms are derivable 
(relative to some set l! of the theory) the' set of axioms ~t1i, 
~Q, ~l, ill, .... without inconsistency. Indeed Skolem has 
given a model of Peano's axioms which, though denumerable, is 
not isomorphic Wi th the natural numbers. 2 'l'he consequence of 
m3del's and Henkin I s completeness theorems is that there are 
1. L. Henkin, 'Completeness in the rrheory of '.rypes 1 
2. T. Skolem, 'Peano's Axioms and 11ode18 of AritpJnetic', 
Iila,therIlfJ,tica.l IJ:1terpretations of Formal S,'{st~!!:u!t pp.1-14. 
(:rhis paper utilises reaul ts published by Skolem in 1934). 
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propositions which are not even expressible in a formalised set-
1 theory. 
1. R. Goodstein makes the r8a~rk that what G8del's theorem shows 
for a formalised aritbmetic is not that there is a true. but unprovable 
formula but that the universal quantifier does not express 'for alIt. 
R. Goodstein, 'The Significance of Incompleteness Theorems', 
Dri tish Journal for the Philosophy of.Science, vol. xiv, 1963. 
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II 
Recently certain axioms of set theory have been shoi'm to 
1 be independent. Cohen has produced proofs that shoVl the axiom 
of choice is not derivable from the other axioms of Zermelo's 
axioms. Together with GBdel t s resul t 2 that the axiom of cholce 
is consistent with the other axioms, its independence is 
established. Cohen has proved that a s:imiliar result holds 
for Cantor's continuum hypothesis. 
The independence of both the axiom and the hypothesis 
shows clearly that we are free to choose either (or their 
negations) as axioms for set theory. Opposed to such a view, 
the realist argues that there are sets (in some none too clearly 
defined sense) and that the nuthematician's job is to describe 
them and t hei r be ha vi our • Consequently either the a~dom of 
choice is true of this reality or it is not; if it is true we should 
adopt it as an axiom, if it is false we should adopt the negation 
of the axiom. Yet even if we accept the existence of this 
reali ty which set theory is supposed to be describing what 
kind of evidence can point either to its truth or its falsity? 
Both Cohen' and Gode14 are realis ts and bo til suggest toot the 
1. P. Cohen, Set Theory and '1'ha Continuum Hy:pothesis, New York, 1966 
2. K. GBdel, 'The Consistency of the Axiom of Choice and of the 
Generalised Continuum Hypothesis', Proceedinv,s cf the Nation!'!,;). 
Academy of Sciences U.S.A. 1938 3. It: !,.Cohen, op.ci t. p.151 . 
4. h ... Gddel, 'What is Ca.ntor t s Continuum Hypothesis?' t American 
Mathematical r:on,thly, 1947 
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continuum hypothesis or its negation may be derived from 
some other proposi tion which Yle can see describes the 
reality. But now we would want to know how this 'higher' 
~~iom can be seen to be a description of this reality. C6hen 
mentions another argument which he thinks might be used by 
future generations to show that the continuum hypothesis is 
'obviously false,l This is that Zermelo's axiom of power ':\e..\:s 
sets that cannot be reached by means of the other axioms of 
set theory. Again one wants to know how it co uld be seen 
that such sets cannot be reached by such means. Eventually 
realists would have to fall back on the self-evidence of such 
axioms or at least on some metaphor or analogy. But self-
evidence as a criterion of truth has obvious drawbacks2 and 
no metaphor can compel us to accept that it is the most appropriate 
metaphor. 
We are free to chose the continuum hypothesis or its 
negation as we like. Vfuichever way is cho5"en the result is that 
the rules for the use of 'is a member oft are specified further 
in the field of abstract sets. In section 1 I said that the 
construction of abstract set theory involved the setting up of 
rules for the use of 'is a member of' and tset t • Our choice 
1. P. Cohen, op.cit. 1'.151 
2. see, for examplet S. Korner, TJle Philo:':'oy;hy of Mathematics, 
1'.135 et seq. 
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of rules would be guided by the use of 'set' and 'is a member 
of' as they commonly occur outside of set theory. Clearly 
we want a set theory which will have application, particularly 
in the area of natural number or real number theory. 
we will be buided by the needs of these disciplines. 
Thus 
But, then, 
as we have seen, the creation of this set theory creates its 
own problems. frhe syntactic paradoxes arise at precisely the 
point where the notion of 'set· of' is replaced by the notion 
of an abstract set. The failure of the axiom of comprehension 
indicated only that care must be taken in setting up the rules 
for the use of 'is a member of' in tr~s field. flfhe different, 
non-equivalent axiomatic set-theories that have been set 
up each replace the axiom of comprehension by a set of existential 
axioms. Which one is the correct one? The question 
makes no sense without there being some set theory with which 
we are comparing all the iifferent axiomatic set theories. 
In the last chapter ;the tliffi"n ... lthg inherent in holtlil't~ 
th90riQiiI and. j,1:* thQ la.d ChlilPtw'- we saw the difficulties 
involved in such an approach. There is nothing to force us to 
use one set theory rather than another except for ease of 
applicability or aesthetic preference. 
Each axiom of abstract set theory chosen is not so 
chosen because of its 'truth'; rather, each. chosen axiom reflects 
a d.ecision to use tis a member of! and 'set' in a certain way. 
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We may use some metaphor to explain why one has made thi,s 
particular decision, but one is always free to reject the 
metaphor. \Ie can see this at a sta~e earlier than the 
continuum hypothesis, particularly in the case of the axioms 
1 
of fOW1da tion and replacement. In Zermelo1s set theory 
(excluding the axiom of fOW1cia.tion) it is not POB si ble to shovr 
that there is no set which belong to itself, nor is it 
possible to show that non-gro1.ll1.ded classes do not exist. 2 
We may argue that it is clear that the members of each set 
may contain members and that these members may contain members 
and so on. :But we may feel tba t there must be a layer which is 
fundamental and contain no members. Hence we a.dopt an axiom 
which will stop such sets arisine. That is, ~B make a 
decision that no such sets e)dst, we do not find out tl'1:1.t no 
such sets exist. For what would cOlU1t as a proof that no 
such sets exist? Again the axiom of replacement can be 
justified only by recourse to such arguments as, ["ivan that there 
is an infinite set Z and the axiom of power set producing the 
sets UZ, UUZ, UUUZ, etc. why should there not be a. set 
consisting of all of these. The analogy here i s wit h the 
a.xiom of infinity, since this gives us a set com~sting if all 
the sets ¢, {P\, \t~ll., ate. But there is nothing to force 
1. As formula.ted in :l!'raenkel and Bar-Hillel, l<'oundations of tie'ti'" 
Theory pp.85-91 
2. In the sense that it is not inconsistent to suppose that there 
are such sets. 
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. 
us to accept that such a set exists • \[11e11 we accept the axiom 
. ' 
we make a decisiml that such a set exists; we make a decision 
to use I is a member of' and 'set' in a way which was no t determined 
by the other decisions we had taken. 
The axiom of infinity which asserts the existence of a set 
with infinitely many members can also be rejected. Strict 
finitists would reject it. Of course such a rejection would 
mean that we could not construct mathema tics in such a set theory 
but there is no reason for supposing that mathematics must be 
constructible in set theory. There are some who prefer that 
set theory flhould be capable of. containing mathematics. 
~uine, for example, prefers a homogeneous universe to a 
heterogeneous one and wi 11 naturally prefer a set theory Which 
will explicate numbers in terms of sets. But there is no 
logical necessity for a set theory to contain mathematics. 
However, if we do reject the axiom of infinity "Ie are on 
the point of departing from the normal use of 'is a IT,ember of' 
for we do talk of the set of all natural nwnbers and the 
na tUi'al numbers are infinite. We are pa.rting company wi th the 
ordinary use of 'set' and 'is a member of' which We take as a g~ide 
for constructing our set theory, \lhereas the ordinary use 
of the phrases gCLve us no [,Uide with the other axioms it does 
so here. Even so, if we t\lke a set theory in which there are 
no individuals, e.g. the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms, the axiom 
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of infinity is stated in terms of the nul set and sets generated 
out of the nul set by some set operation. Now talk of the nul 
set itself reflects a decision to use 'set' in a certc..in way even 
though such talk is so familiar that we tend to forget this. 
'vIe have decided that we can talk of a set which has no members 
which is perhaps unjustified by any 'ordinary' use of 'set'. 
Whether there exists a set which contains this set and all unit 
sets obtained from it is not then determined by thenonnal use 
of 'set' or 'is a member of' since the existence of the nul set 
itself is not so ddtermined. Similar remarks apply to the other 
axioms of Zermelo-~'raenkel set theory. But once we have aocepted 
this extension of 'set' then we have no choice but to accept the 
axioms of sum-set, pairing etc., if we are using the pre-set-
theoretic use of 'is a member of' and 'set' as our guide. 
When we speak of Borne proposition of set theory being true, 
we are tacitly understanding a ~~rticular set theory in vfuich 
tha t proposition is a theorem. No sense can be made of the 
question: 'I know it is a the.orem but is it true?' The only 
sense such a question could have would be: 'I know it is a 
theorem of the set theory Sl but is it also a theorem of set 
theory S2'. It is our decision to use 'set' and 'is a member of' 
in a particular way which detenYlines which proposi tiona containing 
only such phrases are true. 
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Appendix 
Tarski'g axiom of infinity as given in CT]' (p.243) seems 
to contain an error. As stated there it could be translated 
\\.a\ 
as: There is a non-empty set z such.if X£~ there is a proper sub-
set of x which is also a member of z. This clearly is not what 
Tarski intended for he says thnt such an axiom 'guarantees the 
existence of infinitely many individuals'. As stated by 
Tarski, the set postulated by the axiom of infinity cru1not 
contain even one individual, since individuals do not possess 
proper sub-sets. 
We may correct ffarski' s axiom by altering the neg,:),tion bar 
in two places. Then the axiom will confonn to Q.uine' s 
interpretation of the axiom as given by him in Set Theory and itq 
Lordc, p.280. Q.uine explicitly states that this is 'l'arski' s axiom 
but Quine's axiom can be interpreted as: there is a non-empty 
set z such that if x,z then there is a set of which x is a 
proper subse t which also belongs to z. With the alterations 
given above Tarski's axiom can indeed be given this interpretation. 
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